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ABSTRACT
I am concerned in this thesis to assess the ways in which writers and
theologians have responded to the systematic murder of Europe's Jews by the
Nazis, an event now commonly referred to as the Holocaust. I take this event
to be of central importance in any understanding of Western culture.
Beginning with the writings of survivors themselves, I have sought to
address the question of what constitutes an appropriate response to the fact
of mass destruction. In considering imaginative versions of the Holocaust, I
have restricted myself to novels and short stories, offering a critique of selected
texts in the light of the historical event itself. I have singled out three novels
for special attention in a chapter on the pornographic tenor of some of this
literature.
If writers are confronted by the problem of making the event seem real
or credible, theologians are confronted by the problem of incorporating the
negative reality of the event into an affirmative tradition. I offer a summary
of Jewish theological responses in one chapter, and two chapters on relevant
aspects of contemporary Christian theology; namely, a re-examination of
suffering and the radical encounter with the Church's legacy of antisemitism.
I regard the respective enterprises of novelists and theologians as in
some measure complementary, believing that culture should where possible
be studied as a whole. The tenuous status of culture after Auschwitz makes
it imperative to recognize the extent to which the world has been irrevocably
changed by the epoch of genocide.
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All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage....
Whoever pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby
culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says no to culture
is directly furthering the barbarism which our culture showed itself to
be.
Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics
Some forty years after the systematic degradation and murder of Europe's
Jews, I find myself asking what it means to accept that such a crime took place.
The debate surrounding the uniqueness of the Holocaust 1 seems misplaced in
the face of its enormity. Are we any less obliged to respond to what might
be described as state-sponsored genocide simply because it is not without
precedent? What kind of cynicism is it that says, in effect, we need not bother
too much with this phenomenon, it has all happened before? We are indeed
coming to the end of a century that has unleashed two immensely destructive
world wars, countless regional ones, and the continuing success of despotism
as a form of government. That something has gone very wrong with the advance
of civilization is hardly a reason for complacency.
"The Final Solution of the Jewish Question", in the phrase the Nazis chose
to conceal their plans for mass murder, provides a seemingly insurmountable
obstacle to anyone who wishes to believe that humankind has something to hope
for from the progress of history. Like Moses Herzog, the hero of a novel by
Saul Bellow, we are perhaps troubled by what seems to represent the spirit
of the age:
"You think history is the history of loving hearts? You fool! Look at these
millions of dead. Can you pity them, feel for them? You can nothing! There
were too many. We burned them to ashes, we buried them with bulldozers.
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History is the history of cruelty, not love, as soft men think. We have
experimented with every human capacity to see which is strong and admirable
and have shown that none is. There is only practicality. If the old God exists
he must be a murderer. But the one true god is Death. This is how it is
- without cowardly illusions." Herzog heard this as if it were being spoken
slowly inside his head.2
Where is the voice to counter these thoughts?
This thesis is an attempt to find such a voice in the responses of writers
and theologians to the Holocaust. 3 The treatment of the Holocaust in literature
has become so extensive that I propose to limit myself to an examination of
its treatment in fiction, that is, essentially the novel, although I shall also be
considering the role of eyewitness testimony in defining the scope of what can
and cannot be said. Fiction produced by survivors would seem to occupy an
ambiguous position that merits being assessed in its own right.
My main justification for choosing the novel is a personal one: it is the
form of literature I most enjoy. But there is also a more general reason,
suggested to me in the course of reading The Sense of an Ending by Frank
Kermode. As he rather grandly puts it, "It happens that in our phase of civility,
the novel is the central form of literary art. It lends itself to explanations
borrowed from any intellectual system of the universe which seems at the time
satisfactory."4 Milan Kundera has argued something similar in an essay on "The
Novel and Europe". "The novel's essence is complexity," he claims. "Every
novel says to the reader: 'Things are not as simple as you think.' " Kundera
might have written "every good novel"; a distinguishing feature of bad novels
(and there are more than a few on the subject of the Holocaust) is a tendency
towards propaganda, simplification by distortion in much the same manner as
the mass media. Kundera himself is anxious to oppose the spirit of the mass
media with the novel's greater wisdom, what he calls "the wisdom of
uncertainty". 6 Kermode finds this wisdom in the nature of fiction as something
which is consciously false.7 Fiction provides a way of making sense of the world
without appealing to the timeless authority of God or destiny.
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Theologians, of course, are committed to some notion of divine authority,
but, whether Jewish or Christian, they now face the task of reconciling their
respective faiths with the fact of Auschwitz. For Jews the challenge is more
transparent: What does it mean to be a Jew after the destruction of so many
merely for existing? Christians are confronted by a number of questions: Can
the traditional belief that suffering makes holy still be affirmed in the light
of the apparently senseless suffering endured in the camps? To what extent
is the Church responsible for the antisemitism 8 that led to the Final Solution?
What are the implications of this for relations between Christians and Jews
today?
I do not wish to imply that novelists have an easier task than theologians
in coming to terms with the Holocaust. After all, the novel is a product of
Western humanism - "the epic of a world that has been abandoned by God",
Georg Lukcs calls it 9 - which proved no more effective in resisting the
ideological lure of Nazism than did religion. But the novelist does have the
advantage of not being committed a priori to a set of beliefs and is free, unlike
the theologian, to let the imagination roam. How the imagination is able to
cope with the world of the death camps remains to be seen. What is clear,
however, is that only by a supreme effort of responsiveness (that is, using our
capacity to respond) can we begin to acknowledge Auschwitz as our heritage.
Let me illustrate the nub of the problem by citing an example of the way
in which news of mass murder was first received by the Allies. In The Terrible
Secret, Walter Laqueur describes the reaction of a prominent American judge
to what Jan Karski, a courier from Warsaw who had himself seen the death
camp at Belzec, had to tell him soon after being smuggled out of Poland towards
the end of 1942:
Karski told Justice Frankfurter everything he knew about the Jews, and
when he finished the Justice said some complimentary things and then, "I
can't believe you." Ciechanowski ... told Frankfurter that Karski had come
under the authority of the Polish Government and that there was no possibility
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in the world that he was not telling the unadorned truth. Frankfurter: "I
did not say this young man is lying. I said I cannot believe him. There is
a difference."10
Even after the camps were liberated this incredulity persisted. Even today
the facts resist assimilation.
It is all the more urgent to find some way of responding to the death camps
in the wake of recent attempts to deny that they ever existed. The so-called
historical revisionists may be few in number, but the fact that neo-Nazi
apologetics have any support at all from the academic community is cause for
concern. Robert Faurisson, a French professor of history, provoked a scandal
with the publication of his claim that the gas chambers were a figment of the
imagination, yet he was nevertheless invited to air his views on American radio.
In an article on "Lies about the Holocaust", the historian Lucy Dawidowicz
relates how she was invited to debate with him:
While I was writing this article, a man associated with the Larry King radio
show, a national network talk program, called to ask if I would debate with
Faurisson. When I replied indignantly that Faurisson should not be provided
with a platform for his monomania, the man mildly inquired why I was against
discussing "controversial" matters on the radio. I in turn asked him if he
thought the murder of the European Jews was a "controversial" matter.
Had it not been established to his satisfaction as a historical fact? "I don't
know2" he answered. "I wasn't around at the time. I'm only thirty years
old."'
Has relativism thus triumphed over our capacity to respond to the nightmare
of history? Does the authority of the eyewitness count for nothing unless we
are eyewitnesses too? Is documentary evidence to be treated like fiction?
I would be over-reacting if I were to devote myself to the refutation of one
man's stupidity, but he and I belong to the same generation, and I perceive in
his response an unwillingness to accept the burden of the past. If we cut ourselves
off from our history, we are more likely than ever to repeat the mistakes of
earlier generations. Implicit in this man's statement is an indifference to the
fate of strangers. "Why should I care what happens to people I've never heard
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of?" he seems to be saying. Especially if they're Jews, one might add - as a
lack of concern with the Holocaust can often be traced to a lingering
antisemitism.
Not that Jews were the only victims. Martin Gilbert estimates that at
least as many non-Jews perished as a consequence of Nazi atrocities)Z Slays
and Gypsies were persecuted and killed because they were deemed to be racially
inferior. Homosexuals and Jehovah's Witnesses met a similar fate for what
was regarded as social deviance. Political opponents of the Nazis, needless
to say, were ruthlessly punished. But the argument for defining the Holocaust
as a Jewish catastrophe has always been based on the singularity with which
the Nazis sought to destroy every living Jew. 13 This is what a Jewish theologian
has called the unique intentionality of the Holocaust. 14 It was Hitler's belief,
first expressed publicly in Mein Kampf, that by eliminating the Jews from history
altogether he would be saving the human race:
If the Jew, with the help of his Marxist catechism, triumphs over the peoples
of this world, his crown will be the dance of death for mankind, and as once
before, millions of years ago, this planet will again sail empty of all human
life through the ether.... I believe that I am today acting according to the
purposes of the almighty Creator. In resisting the Jew, I am fighting the
Lord's battle.'5
If Hitler's project ultimately failed it was not because it lacked support
in the occupied countries. Though some people did risk their lives to help Jews,
most did not; and the Nazis were able to recruit willing accomplices to expedite
their elaborate programme of annihilation. The record of the Allies is itself
none too heartening when it comes to the rescue of Jewish lives. The failure
to bomb the railway tracks leading to Auschwitz has become a symbol of the
world's indifference to the fate of the Jews. The present-day equation of
Auschwitz with Hiroshima or the My Lai massacre in the Vietnam War is, as
Bruno Betteiheim suggests, an extension of this) 6 The Jews were victims of
an unprovoked aggression quite separate from the atrocities, terrible though
they are, of modern warfare.
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Bettelheim, a distinguished Austrian-born child psychologist who was
imprisoned for a year in the concentration camps at Dachau and Buchenwald,
before being allowed to emigrate to the USA in 1939, accuses American
intellectuals of siding, whether consciously or not, with the Nazis. "It is but
the other side of the coin," he adds, "when the same intellectuals applaud books
and films which use the death camps as background to titillate or excite, and
in this way make them appear as just an ordinary part of life".' 7
 Any assessment
of literary responses would be inadequate without some recognition of this trend
for glamourizing the Holocaust. One must also recognize the extent to which
the reality has been misrepresented by the very act of discussing it as an
academic problem. George Steiner first warned against this some twenty years
ago. "The best now, after so much has been set forth," he wrote in 1966, "is,
perhaps, to be silent; not to add to the trivia of literary, sociological debate,
to the unspeakable."18
Steiner has himself, in fact, continued to make occasional contributions
to the debate, reflecting his belief that the next best is to try and understand.'9
He has even produced a fictional response in the form of a novella, The Portage
to San Cristobal of A.H. (1979). But his warning still stands, for not everyone
is as passionate or as honest in their commitment to free inquiry. It is all too
easy to appropriate the Holocaust for your own ends. It is with a certain unease,
therefore, that I embark on what might be seen as yet one more instance of
morbid curiosity or impetuous axe-grinding. Robert Alter observed in 1981
that there were 93 courses on the Holocaust then on offer at American and
Canadian colleges and universities. 20 That number has doubtless increased
since. The emergence of Holocaust Studies as a discipline in its own right is
surely a mixed blessing. While it clearly bears witness to an increased awareness
of the need to investigate thoroughly the social and cultural factors that made
possible murder on so vast a scale, it also reduces the Holocaust to part of the
curriculum, something to gen up on for exams.
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To try and understand the Holocaust is a lifetime's work. It would be
absurd to imagine that academic seminars and conferences are anything but
a prelude to serious reflection. A discussion of genocide between breakfast
and dinner is unlikely to shed much light on the experience of dehumanization.
My analysis of the responses of others is thus guided by a sceptical respect
for the limits of human discourse. When W.H. Auden wrote "We must love one
another or die," he was not being over-literal (at any rate, he managed to survive
for a good many years to witness love's failure as a medium of exchange in
world affairs), but he was drawing attention to the gap between our needs and
our means.2 ' If a word like "love" is to have any meaning beyond its sentimental
definition in pop songs and romantic fiction, we must first address Adorno's
complaint that all post-Auschwitz culture is garbage. 22 As Steiner has put
it, "We come after." 23 Our world has been radically compromised by the
existence of the death camps. That the hardware of destruction is now sufficient
to end the world completely should not blind us to the fact that extreme human
destructiveness has already found its expression in the bureaucratic and
technological implementation of the Final Solution.
A Note on "Holocaust Literature"
There have been a number of general surveys of literary responses to
the Holocaust, in addition to those works which deal with individual authors
or literature in a specific culture. Irving Halperin's Messengers from the Dead
(1970) appears to have been the first, drawing on selected texts to illuminate
the moral questions raised by the catastrophe. 24 Lawrence Langer's
The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (1975) reflects a similar confidence
in the authority of literature as a form of instruction, but adopts a more critical
approach:
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The mind resists what it feels to be imaginatively valid but wants to
disbelieve; and the task of the artist is to find a style and a form to present
the atmosphere or landscape of atrocity, to make it compelling, to coax
the reader into credulity - and ultimately, complicity. The fundamental
task of the critic is not to ask whether it should or can be done, since it
already has been, but to evaluate how it has been done, judge its effectiveness,
and analyze its implications for literature and for society."
If one balks at Langer's desire to classify these literary responses as a
movement - to construct "an aesthetics of atrocity"2 6 - it comes as something
of a relief to find that his next work, Versions of Survival (1982), is restricted
to an assessment of the writings of survivors. It was confusing to read his earlier
contention that "anyone seriously concerned with the literature of atrocity
must devote his primary attention to those writers who were more closely allied
with the events of the Holocaust even when they were not literally survivors,
since they were the ones, notwithstanding intermittent moments of despair,
who were destined to recreate in their art a unique portion of contemporary
reality". 27
 But by exploring the question of how far survivors are reliable
witnesses of their own ordeals, Langer is able to give a clearer sense of the
uniqueness of their testimony.28
The term "Holocaust literature" is adopted by Edward Alexander in his
collection of essays, The Resonance of Dust (1979), and it seems to have become
the accepted shorthand for a new genre. 29
 Alexander himself is less concerned
with literature as such than with the status of Jews in the modern world.30
Alvin Rosenfeld, however, who also employs the term in A Double Dying (1980),
has aesthetic considerations very much to the fore, even if, like Alexander,
he recognizes the inextricable moral dimension of using the imagination to
reproduce the experiences of the victims. He writes of the need to place
Holocaust literature in the context of the history that has given rise to it, "a
history that reduces the expressive powers of language almost to silence, yet
at the same time obligates writers to speech". He continues:
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If one can talk about such a thing as a phenomenology of Holocaust literature,
it would have to be in terms of this contradiction between the impossibility
but also the necessity of writing about the death of the idea of man in order
to sustain that
A Double Dying is probably the most comprehensive survey yet produced,
covering diaries, journals, memoirs, novels, plays, and poetry. It has an excellent
bibliography to match the broad sweep of its text. Sidra Ezrahi's By Words Alone
(1980) also covers a lot of ground, but concentrates on imaginative responses,
providing a more or less straightforward taxonomy of these4 32
 As a taxonomy
it does not engage with the larger questions raised by artistic representation
of extremity. Rosenfeld, on the other hand, does much to address such questions
in A Double Dying, pointing to a crisis of language after the Holocaust. But
he is a little too hasty in his dismissal of the various literary theories, since
they also acknowledge a crisis of language and, however inadequately, seek
to resolve it.33
The whole humanist enterprise is foundering for want of a shared belief
in meaning. Rosenfeld's own belief that there is such a thing as Holocaust
literature, that it is a composite literature - "a literature of fragments, of partial
and provisional forms, no one of which by itself can suffice to express the
Holocaust, but the totality of which begins to accumulate and register a coherent
and powerful effect" 34 - is appealing without being altogether persuasive.
A good deal of second-rate material can be made to seem more important than
it really is.
Thus, I find the term "Holocaust literature" unhelpful. It dignifies a body
of texts that is united by a common theme but not by any consistent worth;
it fails to distinguish between eyewitness testimony and fiction (though Rosenfeld
makes the distinction in the course of developing his argument); and it is often
used ambiguously, applying variously to the writings of survivors alone, to work
by Jewish writers, or to the gamut of literary responses. Just as the growth
of Holocaust Studies brings with it the danger of making the response to mass
9 -
murder an academic exercise, so the concept of Holocaust literature predisposes
the student to bypass reflection in favour of passive consumption. Such
detachment as I can muster in the following pages is entirely self-conscious.
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Notes
(1) "Holocaust 11 is less than perfect to convey the senselessness of what
historian Lucy Dawidowicz has usefully called the war against the Jews.
Its connotation of religious sacrifice seems inappropriate. Nevertheless,
it is, as Dawidowicz points out, the term that Jews themselves have chosen
to commemorate being singled out for death. (See Lucy S. Dawidowicz,
The War Against the Jews 1933-1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977),
p.19.) Some Jews now prefer to use the Hebrew word Shoah (which means
more straightforwardly "destruction"), especially in the wake of Itholocausthi
becoming a generic term for any large-scale catastrophe (and in popular
usage for small-scale ones too). For the sake of clarity I have continued
to address the destruction of the Jews as the Holocaust, but with these
qualifications in mind.
(2) Saul Bellow, Herzog (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p.297.
(3) All the material I have dealt with is either written in English or in English
translation.
(4) Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1967), p.l28.
(5) Milan Kundera, "The Novel and Europe", New York Review of Books, 19
July 1984, p.18.
(6) Ibid., p.15.
(7) Kermode, Sense of an Ending, p.64.
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The word means hostility to Jews rather than to mythical Semites.
(9) Georg Lukcs, The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (London:
Merlin Press, 1978), p.88. Lukács also writes, "The novel tells the adventure
of interiority; the content of the novel is the story of the soul that goes
to find itself, that seeks adventures in order to be proved and tested by
them, and by proving itself, to find its own essence." (p.89) The story
of the Holocaust is the story of the soul's mortality.
(10) Walter Laqueur, The Terrible Secret (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982),
p.237.
(11) Lucy S. Dawidowicz, "Lies about the Holocaust", Commentary 70 (December
1980), p.36.
(12) Martin Gilbert, Atlas of the Holocaust (London: Michael Joseph, 1982),
p.11.
(13) Dawidowicz puts it thus:
"The Final Solution transcended the bounds of modern historical
experience. Never before in modern history had one people made
the killing of another the fulfilment of an ideology, in whose pursuit
means were identical with ends. History has, to be sure, recorded
terrible massacres and destruction that one people perpetrated against
another, but all - however cruel and unjustifiable - were intended
to achieve instrumental ends, being means to ends, not ends in
themselves." (War against the Jews, pp.18-19.)
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(14) Steven T. Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues (New York: New York University
Press, 1983), pp.287-310.
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THE SURVIVOR AS WITNESS
There are no parallels to life in the concentration camps. Its horror can
never be fully embraced by the imagination for the very reason that it
stands outside of life and death. It can never be fully reported for the
very reason that the survivor returns to the world of the living, which
makes it impossible for him to believe fully in his own past experiences.
It is as though he had a story to tell of another planet, for the status of
the inmates in the world of the living, where nobody is supposed to know
if they are alive or dead, is such that it is as though they had never been
born.
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
To read the testimony of survivors is to be challenged by a world beyond
our understanding. These narratives form a record of what was endured by
the inmates of the camps without, on the whole, making it seem more real.
However desperately the witness cries "I was there! I saw it with my own eyes,"
we shake our heads and say "But we weren't. We can't imagine what it was
like." We want to understand, yet knowing the details of this or that atrocity
brings us no closer to comprehension. As much as we feel a duty to heed what
survivors have to tell us, their accounts do not necessarily illuminate the terrible
suffering that they chronicle: the work of Primo Levi is a notable exception,
and the core of this chapter will be dedicated to an appreciation of that work.
It is understandable, then, if survivors have sought to express the nightmare
of their past through the medium of fiction. I also propose to examine some
examples of such fiction, measuring them against the sense of unreality that
afflicts the survivor of an event so extreme as the Holocaust.
First, let us be quite clear about who survived. Some two hundred thousand
Jews were among the survivors of the camps and the death marches. 1
 If we
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compare that figure to the six million who were murdered, we begin to realize
how near to completion the Final Solution was, in Europe at any rate. Even
after the camps had been liberated former prisoners continued to die from the
effects of hardship and disease. What could be more grimly ironic than the
fatalities consequent on the generosity of American troops, whose donations
of chocolate, jam and other rich food proved impossible to digest for many
of the survivors? Moreover, there were few survivors of the six camps set up
exclusively for the purpose of mass extermination - Auschwitz-Birkenau, Beizec,
Cheimno, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka. Of the two survivors of Beizec,
one was murdered in Poland nearly a year after the war had ended - because
he was a Jew.2
There have been various attempts to portray the survivors as an elect
of some kind, none more thoroughly researched than The Survivor: An Anatomy
of Life in the Death Camps (1976) by Terrence Des Pres. Apart from the
misleading inaccuracy of the subtitle - Des Pres not only fails to make a
distinction between death camps and concentration camps, he also mixes
testimony from the survivors of Stalin's purges with that from survivors of the
Holocaust - the very exercise seems like an insult to the dead, as if survival
were evidence of superior character. One of Primo Levi's chief preoccupations,
as we shall see, was to make understood that survival, for Jews at least, depended
rather more on chance than on strategy: all Jews were destined for annihilation.
The conclusion that Des Pres reaches - "A biological wisdom exists, prompting
us to know that in life's own needs the spirit can find a home" 3 - is based on
a naive reading of the material to hand.
The author's celebration of the will to live skates over his initial recognition
of how utterly degraded prisoners were. They were subjected to what Des Pres
calls "excremental assault", made to feel defiled by their own bodily needs,
stripped of any vestige of their dignity. This humiliation, as Des Pres points out,
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ray well have been a greater trial even than hunger or the fear of death. He
has no understanding, however, of its traumatic repercussions. Those who
survived were unable to recover fully their self-respect. "Survivors return from
the grave," Des Pres alleges, "they come through Hell, and some, after descent
into darkness and the defiling filth of underground sewers, rise again into the
common world of sun and simple life."4 Resurrections are rarely so
straightforward. Des Pres has allowed himself to neutralize the suffering of
others by making it seem romantic.
The concentration camps were reservoirs of slave labour. Those too weak
to work were beaten to death or sent to the gas chambers. Des Pres is so
impressed by the degree of consistency among eyewitness reports that he loses
sight of the fact that only a tiny minority survived to write them:
Books by survivors are invariably group portraits, in which the writer's personal
experience is representative and used to provide a perspective on the common
plight. Survival is a collective act, and so is bearing witness. Both are rooted
in compassion and care, and both expose the illusion of separateness. It
is not an exaggeration, nor merely a metaphor, to say that the survivor's
identity includes the dead.5
Does this mean that the dead are not really dead? In the face of mass murder
one might equally say that dying is a collective act. Theodor Adorno expressed
it thus:
The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had never
yet to fear in just this fashion. There is no chance any more for death to
come into the individual's empirical life as somehow comfortable with the
course of that life. The least, the poorest possession left to the individual
is expropriated.6
Des Pres depersonalizes the struggle to survive and thereby avoids the
difficult question of why some became accomplices to their Nazi overseers,
while others opted for some form of solidarity, however minimal, with their
fellow victims. "The purpose of action in extremity is to keep life going," Des
Pres argues. Whose life? Any life, it would seem. He criticizes psychoanalysts
for their moralizing approach to behaviour in the camps, singling out Bruno
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Bettelheim for his old-fashioned notions of heroism.7 But Bettelheim does
speak with the authority of a survivor, albeit one who was released before the
worst excesses began, and I am inclined to view his response to The Survivor
as the more penetrating critique. In his essay on "Surviving", concerned primarily
with Lina Wertmüller's film Seven Beauties, Bettelheim takes Des Pres to task
for believing that survival is all. 8 As he remarks elsewhere, "Survival in the
camps - this cannot be stressed enough - depended foremost on luck; to be able
to survive, one had to escape being killed by the SS."9
Bettelheim began writing about his experiences in Dachau and Buchenwald
following his release in 1939, and he has returned to the subject on a number
of occasions since. Acknowledging that he felt something akin to the compulsion
to bear witness, a desire to make people understand what was happening in
the camps, Bettelheim is nevertheless reluctant to see "survivorship" as a
vocation.' 0 It is rather a trauma to be coped with. One suffers from irrational
guilt about having been spared. "Being one of the very few who were saved
when millions like oneself perished," he writes in "Trauma and Reintegration",
"seems to entail a special obligation to justify one's luck and very existence,
since it was permitted to continue when that of so many others exactly like
oneself was not." The voice of reason is assailed by other, more insidious voices:
One voice, that of reason, tries to answer the question "Why was I saved?"
with "It was pure luck, simple chance; there is no other answer to the
question"; while the voice of conscience replies: "True, but the reason you
had the chance to survive was that some other prisoner died in your stead."
And behind this in a whisper might be heard an even more severe, critical
accusation: "Some of them died because you pushed them out of an easier
place of work; others because you did not give them some help, such as food,
that you might possibly have been able to do without." And there is always
the ultimate accusation to which there is no acceptable answer: "You rejoiced
that it was some other who had died rather than you."1
So much for the world of sun and simple life. It is hardly surprising that
Bettelheim should be concerned to relieve survivors of their sense of obligation.
"I do not think it is particularly laudable to spend one's life bearing witness
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to the inhumanity of man to man," he comments. 12 His most telling criticism
of works like The Survivor is contained in the observation that a partial truth
is often more damaging than an outright lie. "If presentation of what is involved
in survival is to have any meaning," he argues, "it cannot restrict itself to stating
simply that unless one remains alive one does not survive. It must tell what
else is needed: what one must be, do, feel; what attitudes, what conditions
are required for achieving survival under concentration camp conditions."3
Betteiheim is here referring to survival of the human personality rather than
physical survival as such. In The Informed Heart (1960) he maintains that he
survived his own year of imprisonment (a stronger word is needed, but "torture"
seems over—dramatic) largely by employing his psychoanalytical training to
reflect on what was happening to himself and to his fellow prisoners. The
conclusion he draws from this inevitably betrays a psychoanalytical bias:
Those prisoners who blocked out neither heart nor reason, neither feelings
nor perception, but kept informed of their inner attitudes even when they
could hardly ever afford to act on them, those prisoners survived and came
to understand the conditions they lived under. They also came to realize
what they had not perceived before; that they still retained the last, if not
the greatest, of the human freedoms: to choose their own attitude in any
given circumstance. Prisoners who understood this fully, came to know
that this, and only this, formed the crucial difference between retaining
one's humanity (and often life itself) and accepting death as a human being
(or perhaps physical death): whether one retained the freedom to choose
autonomously one's attitude to extreme conditions even when they seemed
totally beyond one's ability to influence them. 14
Here we approach the distressing nub of dehumanization. Conditions
in the ghettos and on the train journeys to the various killing centres, meant
that large numbers of people went to their deaths in a prolonged state of shock.
"Millions of people submitted to extermination," Bettelheim writes, "because
SS methods had forced them to see it not as a way out, but as the only way
to put an end to conditions in which they could no longer live as human beings."15
The concentration camps added to this toll of victims, but it is important to
remember that at least two out of three Jewish deportees were sent straight
to the gas chambers.'6
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To champion survival for it's own sake, then, as Des Pres appears to do,
is to miss the point. Bettelheim's insight into survival as a matter of preserving
one's humanity rather than staying alive at all costs, is complemented by his
belief that physical survival was not an adequate goal in itself. "To survive,"
he claims, "one had to want to survive for a purpose." 17 Whatever it was - the
desire for revenge, the urge to bear witness, the hope of being reunited with
one's family, the belief in a better world - there had to be a reason for staying
alive. We read in one memoir of Auschwitz, for example, how four sisters felt
compelled to survive for each other. 18 And the profusion of eyewitness testimony
itself bears witness, perhaps, to the fact that many were sustained by a
determination not to let what they had seen and suffered be consigned to oblivion.
Primo Levi has suggested that "the entire history of the brief 'millennial Reich'
can be reread as a war against memory, an Orwellian falsification of memory,
falsification of reality, negation of reality". 19
 No one was supposed to be left
alive to tell the story of the camps.
Primo Levi
Let us look more closely at the writings of this remarkable witness, whose
suicide in April 1987 must give us pause when we are tempted to place too much
faith in the healing power of reason. For there can be no doubt that Primo
Levi was the most reasonable of human beings. Like Bettelheim he assumed
the role of an observer, and in circumstances even more terrible. Born in Turin
in 1919, Levi was deported to Auschwitz in February 1944, having been arrested
as a partisan and identified as a Jew. His first account of his experiences, If This
Is a Man, was initially published in 1947 in a limited edition of 2,500 copies,
six hundred of which were to remain unsold, 2° but just over ten years later
- in 1958 - it was brought out in an enlarged edition by Einaudi, the prestigious
Italian publishing house, and has remained in print ever since. Levi explains
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in his preface to the book that it was written, first and foremost, as "an interior
liberation", to satisfy the need to tell his story. 2 ' But its enduring appeal shows
that it goes considerably further than that.
The title of the book is an important clue to its central theme: how much
humanity could be preserved in the face of a system dedicated to its eradiciation?
"It is man who kills, man who creates or suffers injustice," Levi asserts near
the end of his story; "it is no longer man who, having lost all restraint, shares
his bed with a corpse. Whoever waits for his neighbour to die in order to take
his piece of bread is, albeit guiltless, further from the model of thinking man
than the most primitive pigmy or the most vicious sadist." For Jews who survived
the initial "selection" on arrival at the camp - from Levi's convoy of 650 Italian
Jews only ninety-six men and twenty-nine women were deemed fit enough to
work; the rest were gassed immediately - there awaited the ordeal of initiation,
so vividly described in If This Is a Man. Stripped naked, shorn of all hair, forced
to put on rags and an ill-fitting pair of clogs, tattoed with a number on the
wrist: one thus became a Hãftling, a prisoner:
Imagine now a man who is deprived of everyone he loves, and at the same
time of his house, his habits, his clothes, in short, of everything he possesses:
he will be a hollow man, reduced to suffering and needs, forgetful of dignity
and restraint, for he who loses all often easily loses himself. He will be
a man whose life or death can be lightly decided with no sense of human
affinity, in the most fortunate of cases, on the basis of a pure judgement
of utility.22
Many were unable to adapt in time to the harshness of their new
environment. They became what were known in camp jargon as Muselmänner
("Muslims"), recalled by Levi with haunting clarity:
To sink is the easiest of matters; it is enough to carry out all the orders
one receives, to eat only the ration, to observe the discipline of the work
and the camp. Experience showed that only exceptionally could one survive
more than three months in this way. All the musselmans who finished in
the gas chambers have the same story, or more exactly have no story; they
followed the slope down to the bottom, like streams that run down to the
sea. On their entry into the camp, through basic incapacity, or by misfortune,
or through some banal incident, they are overcome before they can adapt
themselves; they are beaten by time, they do not begin to learn German,
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to disentangle the infernal knot of laws and prohibitions until their body
is already in decay, and nothing can save them from selection or from death
by exhaustion. Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the
Muselmánner, the drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous
mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who march
and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them, already too empty
to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call
their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too
tired to understand.23
Levi's final collection of essays is in fact called The Drowned and the Saved
(1986), and from it we learn that prisoners who did not understand German nearly
all died during the first ten to fifteen days after their arrival. 24
 It was vital
- literally - to know the complex rules governing camp existence.
"At a distance of years one can today definitely affirm," Levi writes in
the Preface to The Drowned and the Saved, "that the history of the Lagers
has been written almost exclusively by those who, like myself, never fathomed
them to the bottom. Those who did so did not return, or their capacity for
observation was paralysed by suffering and incomprehension." He returns to
this argument when contemplating a friend's insistence that he, Levi, must
have been chosen to survive, perhaps in order to write about what he had seen.
Levi's response is characteristically to the point:
The 'saved' of the Lager were not the best, those predestined to do good;
the bearers of a message. What I had seen and lived through proved the
exact contrary. Preferably the worst survived, the selfish, the violent, the
insensitive, the collaborators of the "grey zones", the spies. It was not a
certain rule (there were none, nor are there certain rules in human matters),
but it was, nevertheless, a rule. I felt innocent, yes, but enrolled among
the saved and therefore in permanent search of justification in my own eyes
and those of others. The worst survived - that is, the fittest; the best all
died.
He goes on to say that he has borne witness as best he could, but "the thought
that this testifying of mine could by itself gain me the privilege of surviving
and living for many years without serious problems, troubles me, because I cannot
see any proportion between the privilege and its outcome".25
That the survivors are not the true witnesses 26 is a radical suggestion
and must be placed in the context of Levi's probing analysis of his own experience.
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If those who suffered most did not survive, their personalities destroyed in
advance of their bodies, we should also remember that many of those who did
survive have continued to suffer from nervous disorders, sometimes leading
to complete breakdown.27 At the end of The Truce (1963), the story of his
eight-month journey home after the Russians had liberated Auschwitz in January
1945, Levi describes a nightmare that recurred throughout his life:
It is a dream within a dream, varied in detail, one in substance. I am sitting
at a table with my family, or with friends, or at work, or in the green
countryside; in short, in a peaceful relaxed environment, apparently without
tension or affliction; yet I feel a deep and subtle anguish, the definite
sensation of an impending threat. And in fact, as the dream proceeds, slowly
or brutally, each time in a different way, everything collapses and
disintegrates around me, the scenery, the walls, the people, while the anguish
becomes more intense and more precise. Now everything has changed to
chaos; I am alone in the centre of a grey and turbid nothing, and now, I know
what this thing means, and I also know that I have always known it; I am
in the Lager once more, and nothing is true outside the Lager. All the rest
was a brief pause, a deception of the senses, a dream; my family, nature
in flower, my home. Now this inner dream, this dream of peace, is over,
and in the outer dream, which continues, gelid, a well-known voice resounds:
a single word, not imperious, but brief and subdued. It is the dawn command
of Auschwitz, a foreign word, feared and expected: get up, ttWstawchtI.Z8
Beyond the sense that one is forever a slave to the memory of the Lager
(the camp) is the shame inspired by having been a witness to so much cruelty.
We have already noted the irrational guilt a survivor may feel for having been
spared. In The Drowned and the Saved Levi stresses how overwhelming this
can be. Deprred of "the screen of willed ignorance" that enabled the majority
of Germans to tolerate the existence of the camps, the inmates were confronted
daily by the nightmare of reality:
The ocean of pain, past and present, surrounded us, and its level rose from
year to year until it almost submerged us. It was useless to close one's eyes
or turn one's back to it, because it was all around, in every direction, all
the way to the horizon. It was not possible for us, nor did we want, to become
islands; the just among us, neither more nor less numerous than in any other
human group, felt remorse, shame and pain for the misdeeds that others
and not they had committed, and in which they felt involved, because they
sensed that what had happened around them in their presence, and in them,
was irrevocable. It would never again be able to be cleansed; it would prove
that man, the human species - we, in short - were potentially able to construct
an infinite enormity of pain; and that pain is the only force that is created
from nothing, without cost and without effort. It is enough not to see, not
to listen, not to act.29
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The just survivors took upon themselves the burden of guilt that was shunned
by the perpetrators and their accomplices. The German industrialist Friedrich
Flick, who was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment at Nuremberg for
giving financial support to the SS and for using slave labour, had said in his
defence, "Nothing will convince us that we are war criminals." 30 When he died
in 1972 he was reputedly the richest man in Germany, but he had persistently
refused to pay any compensation to the former inmates of concentration camps.31
How can we face these things and not despair? Cruelty and indifference are
hardly modern inventions; at the same time, as Primo Levi points out in his
Conclusion to The Drowned and the Saved, the corrosive influence of the Nazi
era is a disquieting legacy:
After the Nazi Gott mit uns, everything changed. Goering's terrorist bombings
were answered by the "carpet" bombings of the Allies. The destruction
of a people and a civilisation was proved to be possible, and desirable both
in itself and as an instrument of rule. The massive exploitation of slave
labour was learned by Hitler in the school of Stalin, but in the Soviet Union
it was brought back again, multiplied at the end of the war. The exodus
of brains from Germany and Italy, together with the fear of being surpassed
by Nazi scientists, gave birth to the nuclear bombs. Desperate, the Jewish
survivors, in flight from Europe after the great shipwreck, have created
in the bosom of the Arab world an island of Western civilisation, a portentous
palingenesis of Judaism, and the pretext for renewed hatred. After the
defeat, the silent Nazi diaspora has taught the art of persecution and torture
to the military and the political men of a dozen countries, on the shores
of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and Pacific. Many new tyrants have
kept in their drawer Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf: with a few changes, perhaps,
and the substitution of a few names, it can still come in handy.32
To stave off despair, one asks "Why?" - without expectation of a reassuring
answer. Soon after his arrival at the Buna camp in Auschwitz (officially known
as Auschwitz Iii or Monowitz), Levi is driven by thirst to break off an icicle
outside the window of his hut. A guard snatches it away from him:
"Warum?" I asked him in my poor German. "Hier ist kein warum" (there
is no why here), he replied, pushing me inside with a shove.3'
In The Drowned and the Saved Levi remarks that it was futile to try and
understand in the Lager itself. 34 Trying to understand came later, in the act
of recollection, though Levi, along with other survivors, was afflicted by a sense of
- 24 -
unreality. "Today, at this very moment as I sit writing at a table," he confesses
at one point in If This Is a Man, "I myself am not convinced that these things
really happened."35 Elsewhere, however, he cherishes the accuracy of his
memory. "Of my two years outside the law I have not forgotten a single thing,"
he tells us in the Preface to Moments of Reprieve (1985), a book that concentrates
on the survival of human personality. "Without any deliberate effort, memory
continues to restore to me events, faces, words, sensations, as if at that time
my mind had gone through a period of exalted receptivity, during which not
a detail was lost."36
"Redemption lies in remembering" is the inscription at the entrance to
Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, and in Levi's case this was
peculiarly apposite. If he showed more caution about memory as a reliable
tool in his final work,37
 it would still seem fair to assert that If This Is a Man,
The Truce and Moments of Reprieve, as well as The Periodic Table (1975), which
contains episodes from his life based loosely around his vocation as a chemist
- all highlight a gift for remembering, even when the memory itself is a traumatic
one. Levi's wry humour, affectionate regard for other human beings and luminous
intelligence are qualities that inform the narration of events else too harrowing
to contemplate. He was fond of quoting the Yiddish proverb "Troubles overcome
are good to tell" (and used it as the epigraph to The Periodic Table), but we,
his readers, should be aware that telling the story of past troubles for someone
of Levi's integrity was also a protest against the erosion of memory by external
forces, like the passage of time or political expedience.
In The Periodic Table Levi compares the way he felt on his return to Italy
with the Ancient Mariner's compulsion to tell the story of his misfortune.38
The epigraph to The Drowned and the Saved, fittingly enough, is taken from
Coleridge's poem. Prisoners in the camps were oppressed by the thought that
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no one would want to know what they had been through, suffering from nightmares
to that effect. "Why is the pain of every day translated so constantly into our
dreams, in the ever-repeated scene of the unlistened-to story?" Levi asks in
If This Is a Man.39 And is it not true that we would prefer on the whole to
ignore the survivor's "ghastly tale"? ttFor us to speak with the young becomes
ever more difficult," Levi wrote shortly before his death. "We see it as a duty,
and at the same time as a risk: the risk of appearing anachronistic, of not being
listened to." There is nothing new in Levi's message, but it is none the less
urgent for that:
We must be listened to: above and beyond our personal experiences, we
have collectively been the witness of a fundamental, unexpected event,
fundamental precisely because unexpected, not foreseen by anyone. It took
place in the teeth of all forecasts; it happened in Europe. Incredibly, it
happened that an entire civilised people, just issued from the fervid cultural
flowering of Weimar, followed a buffoon whose figure today inspires laughter,
and yet Adolf Hitler was obeyed and his praises were sung right up to the
catastrophe. It happened, therefore it can happen again: this is the core
of what we have to say.4°
Hitler was no buffoon, of course. A complex bureaucracy had to be won
over to the goal of a Europe free of Jews. Although unforeseen, the Holocaust
was made possible by the complicity of countless administrators and functionaries.
"When in the early days of 1933 the first civil servant wrote the first definition
of a 'non-Aryan' into a civil service ordinance," the historian Raul Hilberg claims,
"the fate of European Jewry was sealed."41 Once the process of destruction
had begun, many ordinary Germans were in a position to know what was
happening. Primo Levi is able to illustrate this from personal experience. In
the final winter at Auschwitz his background as a chemist helped him to secure
a post in the laboratory of the Buna factory (which had been set up by the
industrial conglomerate I.G. Farben to produce synthetic rubber). This stroke
of good fortune not only increased Levi's chances of survival, it also brought
him into contact with German civilians. In If This Is a Man he relates how the
young women in the laboratory would discuss their home lives and their plans for
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Christmas in front of him and his two fellow prisoners, oblivious to the camp
regime.42
More significantly, Levi devotes a chapter of The Periodic Table - under
the heading of "Vanadium" - to a portrait of a manager at the rubber factory,
Dr. MUller, whom Levi was to encounter again some years later. This Dr. MUller
had spoken to him only three times: the first time was about the work, the
second to ask him why he had so long a beard, and the third to ask him why
he looked so perturbed (having given him a note to authorize an extra shave
each week and the supply of some leather shoes). "I, who at that time thought
in German," Levi recalls, "had said to myself, 'Der Mann hat keine Abnung'
(This fellow hasn't got an inkling)."43
On discovering in 1967 that he has been corresponding with the same Dr.
Muller over the matter of a defective shipment of resin (Levi is by now working
as the manager of a paint factory), Levi sends him a copy of If This Is a Man.
MUller reads the book and is moved to reply, albeit somewhat evasively. Levi
writes back with a few searching questions, the upshot of which is a long letter
of self-exculpation. "Just as at the time of our meeting in the lab," Levi decides,
"so now as he wrote, Muller apparently continued not to have an inkling - 'keine
Ahnung'." It is this almost deliberate obtuseness which seems to have caused
Levi the greatest anguish. MUller had spoken of "overcoming the past" -
"Bewltigung der Vergangenheit". But Levi saw things more clearly:
I later found out that this is a stereotyped phrase, a euphemism in today's
Germany, where it is universally understood as "redemption from Nazism";
but the root walt that it contains also appears in the words that express
"domination", "violence", and "rape", and I believe that translating the
expression with "distortion of the past" or "violence done to the past" would
not stray very far from its profound meaning.44
The use of euphemisms by the Nazis to deceive their victims and keep
as secret as possible the mass destruction, is well known. Perhaps a crime so vast
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was by its very nature beyond the realm of a common language - "unspeakable"
in both senses of the word. "No one can boast of understanding the Germans,"
Levi exclaims in If This Is a Man. 45 But in a letter to the translator of its German
edition he reveals a need to understand them as the pre-condition for judging
them. He makes it quite plain that he does not believe in the attribution of
collective guilt, if he also expresses once more his incomprehension:
But I cannot say I understand the Germans: now, something one cannot
understand constitutes a painful void, a permanent stimulus that insists
on being satisfied. I hope that this book will have some echo in Germany,
not only out of ambition, but also because the nature of this echo will perhaps
make it possible for me to better understand the Germans, placate this
stimulus.6
Of the forty-odd letters Levi was to receive from German readers of If This
Is a Man during the next few years (1961-64), only one in particular could be
said to do violence to the past in the way mentioned above; the others, however,
as Levi himself points out, hardly represent a cross-section of his German
readership, let alone of the German people as a whole.47
His first letter from Mrs. Hety S. of Wiesbaden, out of which grew an
extensive correspondence, suggests that Levi is engaged in a fruitless task as
far as understanding goes:
You will certainly never be able to understand "the Germans": even we
are unable to do so, because at that time there happened things that, under
no circumstances, should have happened.48
Hety's own father was imprisoned at Dachau for his political affiliation to the
Social Democrats. She herself had been expelled from school for refusing to
become a member of the Hitler Youth Organization. Not all Germans marched
to the beat of the Nazi drum.
But in the Lager only the sick could avoid the march that began each
day of debilitating labour, while a band of prisoner-musicians played a medley
of popular German tunes:
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The tunes are a few, a dozen, the same ones every day, morning and evening:
marches and popular songs dear to every German. They lie engraven on
our minds and will be the last thing in the Lager that we shall forget: they
are the voice of the Lager, the perceptible expression of its geometrical
madness, of the resolution of others to annihilate us first as men in order
to kill us more slowly afterwards.49
Slave labour under the Nazis was not, in essence, an economic phenomenon.
The lowest-ranking prisoners were worked to death, an endless stream of
replacements available in the form of captive populations. Jews bore the brunt
of this, but homosexuals, too, in particular camps would be singled out for the
most brutal treatment. 5° Bruno Bettelheim draws our attention to the sheer
wastefulness of this kind of cruelty:
The new slave labor and extermination policy did away with all considerations
for the value of a life, even in terms of a slave society. In earlier societies
of an analogous character, slaves were rarely less than investments. To
be sure their labor was exploited without much thought for their humanity.
But in the Hitler state slaves lost even their investment value. That was
the great difference between exploitation by private capitalists and
exploitation by a state answering only to itself.5
Primo Levi refers to the Lager as "a gigantic biological and social
experiment". 52 The day-to--day running of the camp was left to the prisoners
themselves. A hierarchy was established which ensured that those in the most
privileged positions - the "prominents" - would be ruthless towards those in
their charge, especially when most of the "prominents" were convicted criminals.
Levi discusses this anomaly in a chapter of The Drowned and the Saved called
"The Grey Zone 1t . "It is naive, absurd, and historically false," he claims, "to
believe that an infernal system such as National Socialism was, sanctifies its
victims: on the contrary, it degrades them, it makes them similar to itself,
and this all the more when they are available, blank, and lack a political or
moral armature." 53
 At the same time, he is anxious to maintain the distinction
between victim and executioner.54 By highlighting the complexity of social
behaviour within the camp itself, though, he reminds us again that we should




"Survival without renunciation of any part of one's own moral world,"
Levi writes in If This Is a Man, "apart from powerful and direct interventions
by fortune, was conceded only to very few superior individuals, made of the
stuff of martyrs and saints." 55 Levi eschewed the idea that he belonged to
such a category. His own survival, we may nevertheless affirm, was due in
part to a friendship with another prisoner, Alberto. Their decision to share
equally what each was able to "organize" represented a social contract of
enormous value in an environment designed to isolate and break all bonds. Alberto
became a victim of the death marches, however. Levi was left behind because
he was too ill to walk, stricken with scarlet fever.
Another factor in his survival was the charity of an Italian builder called
Lorenzo who worked outside the camp, and again it was the human encounter
that provided the most strength:
I believe that it was really due to Lorenzo that I am alive today; and not
so much for his material aid, as for his having constantly reminded me by
his presence, by his natural and plain manner of being good, that there still
existed a just world outside our own, something and someone still pure and
whole, not corrupt, not savage, extraneous to hatred and terror; something
difficult to define, a remote possibility of good, but for which it was worth
surviving.56
The story of Lorenzo's sad decline after the war was over, which forms one
of the tales in Moments of Reprieve, 57 simply reinforces the impression that
here was one human being, at least, who questioned the fitness of the new order.
Other stories in Moments of Reprieve testify to the resilience of some
of the prisoners. These well-defined individuals are a foil4o the Muselmnner
whose image Levi sought to preserve in If This Is a Man. But it is that image,
finally, which continues to disturb the reader of Levi's work, even as one takes
pleasure in his anecdotal wit. A Jewish prisoner was by definition an
Untermensch, subhuman. "Coming out of the darkness," Levi observes in The
Drowned and the Saved, "one suffered because of the reacquired consciousness
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of having been diminished." It was the logic of the regime to humiliate. "The
useless cruelty of violated modesty conditioned the existence of all Lagers,tt
we read:
The women of Birkenau tell how once, having acquired a precious receptacle
(a large bowl of enamelled metal), they had to employ it for three distinct
uses: draw their soup; evacuate into it at night when access to the latrines
was forbidden; and wash themselves when there was water at the troughs.58
Much of If This Is a Man, in fact, is concerned with the inadequacy of
language to convey this experience of violation. There will always be a gulf
between what was suffered and the words available to describe it:
Just as our hunger is not that feeling of missing a meal, so our way of being
cold has need of a new word. We say "hunger", we say "tiredness", "fear",
"pain", we say "winter" and they are different things. They are free words,
created and used by free men who lived in comfort and suffering in their
homes. If the Lager had lasted longer, a new, harsh language would have
been born....
The Lager had already produced its own vernacular. "Never", for example,
was expressed as "Morgen friih" - "tomorrow morning".59
The stories of those transported to Auschwitz, Levi suggests, are the
stories of a new Bible. 6 ° And yet in an article on his work by Fernanda Eberstadt,
published in Commentary in October 1985, he is taken to task for his apparent
failure to re-create something of the flavour (sic) of Jewish life under duress.
According to Eberstadt, "Levi is simply cursed with a tin ear for religion."61
Well, he made no bones about his unbelief. One of the few occasions when he
gives way to anger in If This Is a Man is the result of witnessing the obduracy
of a believer who regards being spared after a "selection" as a token of God's
mercy:
Kuhn is out of his senses. Does he not see Beppo the Greek in the bunk next
to him, Beppo who is twenty years old and is going to the gas chamber the
day after tomorrow and knows it and lies there looking fixedly at the light
without saying anything and without even thinking any more? Can Kuhn
fail to realize that next time it will be his turn? Does Kuhn not understand
that what has happened today is an abomination, which no propitiatory prayer,
no pardon, no expiation by the guilty, which nothing at all in the power of
man can ever clean again?
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"If I was God," Levi concludes in exasperation, "I would spit at Kuhn's prayer."61
Levi himself was tempted to pray only once, a temptation to which he
confesses with the kind of honesty that made him such an authoritative writer.
It was in October 1944, as he relates in The Drowned and the Saved, at the
time of another selection:
Naked and compressed among my naked companions with my personal index
card in hand, I was waiting to file past the "commission t' that with one glance
would decide whether I should immediately go into the gas chamber or was
instead strong enough to go on working. For one instant I felt the need to
ask for help and asylum; then, despite my anguish, equanimity prevailed:
you do not change the rules of the game at the end of the match, nor when
you are losing. A prayer under these conditions would have been not only
absurd (what rights could I claim? and from whom?) but blasphemous, obscene,
laden with the greatest impiety of which a non-believer is capable. I rejected
that temptation: I knew that otherwise were I to survive, I would have to
be ashamed of it.63
As much as he opposed the notion of Providence, he was sensitive to the integrity
of religious values. To shun blasphemy might itself be seen as a religious act.
The point is that Levi was an assimilated Italian Jew, part of a different
tradition altogether from that of the East European Jews who formed the bulk
of the camp's population. It was only later, when he began to research the
material for his novel If Not Now, When? (1981), that he learned the Yiddish
that would have made it easier for him to communicate with them. Indeed,
If Not Now, When? commemorates the Jewish civilization that Nazism destroyed.
Inspired by the history of Jews from Poland and Russia who escaped from the
mass slaughter by becoming partisans, the novel is more than just the correction
of a stereotype; it is an act of reclamation. Levi'ä Jewish partisans are first
and foremost Jews. His own experience of being a partisan was short-lived
and, as he describes it in The Periodic Table, almost farcical, 6 but these
imaginary partisans from the other side of Europe have better luck, being better
prepared.
If they are better prepared, they are hardly better equipped, relying on
the grace of the Red Army for most of their supplies. Jews who have all lost
their families in the wake of the German invasion, they are fighting the just
war that Levi was denied. Their goal is to reach Palestine by way of an Italian
port, their more immediate objective being to help defeat Hitler's armies with
acts of sabotage behind enemy lines. Levi provides us with glimpses of the
Holocaust itself but is wary of pandering to the curious. His discretion in this
respect is exemplary.
His portrait of the Gedalists, as his partisans are called (in honour of their
quixotic leader Gedaleh), is an idealized one: they are symbols of Jewish
humanity (human not in spite of their Jewishness but because of it) and as such
more representative than individual:
Each of them, man or woman, had a different story behind him, but searing
and heavy as molten lead; if the war and three terrible winters had left
them the time and breath, each should have mourned a hundred dead. They
were tired, poor, and dirty, but not defeated: children of merchants, tailors,
rabbis, and cantors; they had armed themselves with weapons taken from
Germans, they had earned the right to wear those tattered uniforms, without
chevrons, and they had tasted several times the bitter food of killing.65
Mendel the watchmender is perhaps the only fully realized character; much
of the story is seen through his eyes. A moralist, like Levi himself, Mendel
prompts us to reflect on the meaning behind the Gedalists' adventures.
Their liberation of a small concentration camp near Chmielnik is a reminder
that there were few survivors of such camps - most of the inmates of this one
have already been murdered - and that the hour of liberation, so movingly evoked
at the start of The Truce,66 was experienced with pain rather than joy. Here,
there are ten survivors, kept alive like the Sonderkommando at Auschwitz to
cremate the dead bodies of their fellow Jews. "We're not like you," one tells
the liberators; "we don't feel right with other people." Only one survivor feels
able to set off with the partisans, and he doesn't get very far:
But after half an hour, the boy collapsed and sat down on a stone. He said
he would rather go back with the other nine.67
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The Gedalists later encounter a survivor of Auschwitz, a Frenchwoman
called Francine. She speaks of the shame that has driven some survivors to
commit suicide after liberation. Her interlocutors are puzzled. What is there
to be ashamed of? "It's the impression that others died in your place,lt Francine
explains, "that you're alive gratis, thanks to a privilege you haven't earned,
a trick you've played on the dead. Being alive isn't a crime, but we feel it
like a crime." Gedaleh spoke truer than he knew when he told the mayor of
a Polish village, "The only ones of us who are saved are those who have chosen
our way."68
The Russian commanding officer who tells Mendel that he envies him
and the other Gedalists because their choice wasn't imposed on them, might
equally have been the author himself. The same officer (possibly a Jew in
disguise, his identity remains obscure) makes a present to the Gedalists of
weapons and money to help them reach their destination. It is as though Levi
were invoking the spirit of justice to see the story through to its necessary
conclusion. One thinks of Mendel's response to the band's first definitive act
of sabotage, the wrecking of a workshop for railway engines: he hears a voice
in his head repeat the words of the miracles blessing ("Blessed be Thou, 0 Lord
our God, king of the Universe, who hast made for us a miracle in this place")
- incongruous but apt. And Gedaleh is moved to recite this very same blessing
after Mendel has successfully carried out the theft of a truck. "The other blessing
would be better," Mendel tells him drily, "the one for escape from danger."69
Miraculously, most of the Gedalists do escape from danger, at least as
far as Milan where the novel ends. The novel ends with a birth, and with the
news that the first atomic bomb has been dropped on Hiroshima. Mendel sees
the headline but does not understand its significance, being unable to read Italian.
The story, then, has a hopeful outcome that is qualified by the facts of history.
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Levi returns us to the world as it is, but not before convincing us that the
Gedalists are a redeeming part of that world, if only in the imagination. Their
triumph is a minor one alongside the defeats signalled by Auschwitz and
Hiroshima, and it is only obliquely historical: it is still a victory to be cherished.
Fiction or Testimony?
"Extremity makes bad art," Terrence Des Pres claims in The Survivor,
"because events are too obviously 'symbolic'." At the same time, he confuses
the workings of his own imagination with something inherent in the camps
them selves:
The concentration camps have done what art always does: they have brought
us face to face with archetypes ... they have given visible embodiment to
man's spiritual universe, so that the primary states of good and evil are
resident in the look and sound and smell of things.7°
But decorating the camps with an aura of cosmic significance does a disservice
to the victims. The reason that survivors have tried to tell their story through
the medium of fiction as well as in the more straightforward fashion of a memoir,
is because the events they have witnessed are not so much symbolic as beyond
belief. By devoting himself exclusively to eyewitness testimony, Des Pres
assumes he is getting closer to the experience itself, as if such testimony were
free of all artifice when, on the contrary, it is often more powerful for borrowing
fictional techniques. One critic has referred to Elie Wiesel's Night, for example,
which is probably the best known eyewitness account of Auschwitz, as "a
nonfictional novel".7'
Elie Wiesel was only fifteen when he and his family were deported to
Auschwitz in April 1944. They were among over 400,000 Hungarian Jews to
be deported there during the spring and summer of that year. His two older
sisters also survived, but his parents and younger sister all perished. He has
reported that he took a ten-year vow of silence in 1945 in order to be sure of
writing the truth.72 His memoir was originally published in Yiddish and ran
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to some eight hundred pages, before being pared down considerably for a French
version - the language in which he has written ever since - two years later in
1958. Night is an anguished lament, full of reproach against both God and the
human race for keeping silent while the destruction of the Jews took place
(its Yiddish title meant "And the World Was Silent"):
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, which has turned
my life into one long night, seven times cursed and seven times sealed.
Never shall I forget that smoke. Never shall I forget the little faces of
the children, whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a
silent blue sky.
Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever.
Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all
eternity, of the desire to live. Never shall I forget those moments which
murdered my God and my soul and turned my dreams to dust. Never shall
I forget these things, even if I am condemned to live as long as God Himself.
Never.73
The sight of children being thrown alive into burning ditches is perhaps
impossible to convey without becoming rhetorical. Wiesel has since tried to
confront the experience less directly - in fiction; and fiction, moreover, that
addresses the problems of being a survivor rather than seeking to rehearse the
atrocities that took place. Wiesel's own explanation of this is characteristically
enigmatic:
In truth, I think I have never spoken about the Holocaust except in one book,
Night - the very first - where I tried to tell a tale directly, as though face
to face with the experience. All my subsequent books are built around it.
I tried to communicate a secret, a kind of an eclipse, and in the Kafka
tradition even the eclipse is eclipsed. The secret itself is a secret.74
These words are from a speech delivered to a conference in 1970. Wiesel's
presence has been a sine qua non of conferences on the Holocaust, at which
his constant theme has been the central mystery of the event. "The event seems
unreal," he has said, "as if it occurred on a different planet."75
Hidden inside the mystery, however, is a moral imperative:
Did it really happen? Maybe not. I often wonder. Yet, it can be still
experienced - even now. Any Jew born before, during or after the Holocaust
must enter it again in order to take it upon himself.6
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But how does one "re-enter" the Holocaust if one was spared the original ordeal?
At another conference, this time in 1974, Wiesel appears to contradict himself:
Auschwitz negates all systems, opposes all doctrines. They cannot but
diminish the experience which lies beyond our reach. Ask any survivor,
he will tell you; he who has not lived the event will never know it. And
he who went through it, will not reveal it - not really, not entirely. Between
his memory and its reflection there is a wall - and it cannot be pierced.
The past belongs to the dead, and the survivor does not recognize himself
in the words linking him to them. A novel about Treblinka is either not
a novel or not about Treblinka: a novel about Treblinka is about blasphemy
- is blasphemy. For Treblinka means death - absolute death - death of
language and of the imagination. Its mystery is doomed to remain intact.77
This doctrinaire position, if allowed to go unchallenged, would silence even
the greatest of writers. Treblinka means death only for those who died there:
for the rest of us it means the struggle to understand its reality. Whereas Primo
Levi can be said to narrow the gap between the survivor and those who only
know of the camps at one remove, Wiesel seems intent on separating the survivor
from the rest of humanity. According to him, "It is simple: one cannot write
about the Holocaust - not if you are a writer." 78 But you can, as I hope to make
clear, write about the human experience of it.
Wiesel returns to his own experience of the event in Legends of Our Time
(1968). The wretchedness of his father's death in a barracks-hut at Buchenwald
is again recalled, along with the fate of the whole Jewish community from Sighet,
his home town in Transylvania. "For me writing is a matzeva," he explains,
"an invisible tombstone, erected to the memory of the dead unburied. Each
word corresponds to a face, a prayer, the one needing the other so as not to
sink into oblivion." His preoccupation throughout these stories is the debt he
owes for having survived - less a debt, in fact, than a curse. "It is by a strange
irony of fate," he claims, "that the only ones who were, who still are, fully
conscious of their responsibility for the dead are those who were saved, the
ghosts who returned from the dead."79
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This sense of responsibility spills over into his fiction. I should say from
the start, however, that I find Wiesel's novels extremely frustrating to read.
That they are highly thought of in academic circles is apparent from the volume
of research they have generated. 8° Theologians, as we shall see in chapters
to come, seem especially drawn to the gnomic ambiguity of these books. It
would be disingenuous of me to be baffled by Wiesel's success, though it should
be pointed out that few of his novels are in print in the United Kingdom - Wiesel's
fame is largely an American phenomenon. For many he is the voice of the
survivors as a whole, their spiritual leader, and he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1986 in recognition of this. But he is often regarded with a reverence
which, to my mind, borders on idolatory. To be told, "His books are of the kind
that save souls," 81 for example, leads one to suspect that they are not being
read as fiction at all.
The idea of madness as a sign of spiritual health is what troubles me most
about Wiesel's work. In Sighet there was a character known as Moshe the
Madman, whom Wiesel depicts as a holy fool, exemplary in his nonconformity.
He is a recurring figure in the novels, but we are given no reason to believe
that his abnormality is really a sign of wisdom. Wiesel's portrait of him in
Legends of Our Time tells us more about the author's own penchant for
mystification than it does about Moshe's personality:
Rather than reject his madness, Moshe evoked it. It served him as refuge,
as homeland, and when on a rare occasion I visit an asylum, I experience
in the presence of each patient, the same respectful fear that Moshe inspired
in me long ago. The prophet winking at me: it is he. The persecuted one,
who spurns me: him again. The young woman serenely rocking an invisible
infant: it is Moshe she is trying to calm. All of them have his look.82
To be fair, Wiesel's style owes much to his Hasidic background, and doubtless
he intends us to read the novels as parables rather than as character studies.
His use of Hasidic legends to frame his own plots, however, has the unfortunate
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effect of exposing the weakness of the latter. As Sidra Ezrahi points out,
"Wiesel's narratives are constantly in danger of being subverted by either too
much or too little realism." 83 Even in a later novel like The Fifth Son (1985),
which focusses on the experience of being the child of survivors, there is an
absence of credible detail.84 Irving Halperin comes to Wiesel's defence by
arguing that he is an important writer "not by the rules of contemporary fiction
but because his books excite us to intense reflection", 85 and he may in the end
be right. But Wiesel is too ghost-ridden to be an effective communicator. "To
live is to betray the dead," claims Gregor, the protagonist of The Gates of the
Forest (1964). "We hasten to bury and forget them because we are ashamed;
we feel guilty towards them." This sense of guilt seeps through everything
Wiesel writes, coupled with a vision of damnation. The victims were abandoned
to their fate. Nothing can atone for the world's indifference. "He who is not
among the victims," Gregor says, "is with the executioners."86
This latter judgement is the underlying theme of The Town beyond the
Wall (1962), a novel which may serve to illustrate, perhaps, the awkwardness
- at least for a reader not steeped in the Jewish mystical tradition - of Wiesel's
style. The Town beyond the Wall tells the story of a survivor called Michael
who returns to the town in Eastern Europe where he used to live. At first he
is not sure why he has returned, but he comes to realize that he is searching
for the face behind the window, the silent onlooker who witnessed the deportation
of the Jews with indifference. When Michael finally tracks him down, the
stranger reports him to the police, and he is arrested on suspicion of being a
spy.
The emphasis on madness is ever present. His friend Pedro accuses him
of trying to drive God mad. He also tells him, "You want to eliminate suffering
by pushing it to its extreme: to madness." After his imprisonment, which unlike,
say, that of Yakov Bok in Bernard Malamud's The Fixer (1966) seems more meta-
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physical than actual, Michael befriends a catatonic boy, about whom nothing
is known until Michael gets him to reveal his name: Eliezer, which means, we
are told, "God has granted my prayer".87
Eliezer is, of course, Wiesel's own name, and it does not take a lot of
reflection to work out the autobiographical significance of this ending, or indeed
of the whole quest. 88 The question is how much we need to know about Wiesel
himself before we can make sense of his fiction. According to Robert McAfee
Brown, "Wiesel the man and Wiesel the author are one," 89 as if this somehow
solved the problem of how to read his work. Terrence Des Pres makes a similar
claim:
Some of my literary friends have remarked to me that Wiesel is not an
especially fine writer. By comparison, they argue, other writers handle
language better. They mean differently, of course; but comparison of this
sort is suspect in general, and in this special case that kind of judgement
can be made only if Wiesel's unique position - the "place" from which he
speaks - is ignored. To read a book by Elie Wiesel is one thing; to read it
with knowledge of the man as a survivor and a witness, and further to read
it with at least some knowledge of the ghettos, the cattle cars, and the
killing centers, is another, very different experience, even from the
perspective of a purely aesthetic response. This is at once the weakness
(from a critical point of view) and the strength (from a human and artistic
point of view) of Wiesel's art. Much of the time the full impact of his prose
depends on knowingwho is speaking and what he is speaking of, while neither
is actually clarified.90
This last sentence might well be how I would choose to express my complaint.
It is difficult to understand in what sense Wiesel's obscurity is a strength. And
if writers merely handle language differently from each other, how on earth
are we to make any qualitative distinctions when it comes to assessing a work
of literature? In the end one comes up against an impasse when trying to assess
a novel by Elie Wiesel: his audience stands in the way.
The stories of Tadeusz Borowski, to risk a comparison, possess in full
measure that ironic detachment which Wiesel's writing seems to lack. They
are, moreover, about the experience of being in a camp, in spite of Wiesel's
proscriptions against such fiction. First published in Poland in the immediate
post-war years and translated into English in 1967 as This Way for the Gas,
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Ladies and Gentlemen, these terrifyingly plausible sketches bring to life the
inhabitants of the "grey zone" discussed by Primo Levi in The Drowned and
the Saved91 - those victims who became, to a greater or lesser extent,
accomplices to the executioners. Borowski was himself sent to Auschwitz at
the end of April 1943, but as a Pole had a better chance to survive than a Jew.
His survival was short-lived, however; in 1951 he committed suicide.
Borowski saw it as the duty of the survivor to be as truthful as possible
about the compromises that were necessary in order to stay alive:
Tell, then, how you bought places in the hospital, easy posts, how you shoved
Moslems into the oven, how you bought women, men, what you did in the
barracks, unloading the transports, at the gypsy camp; tell about the daily
life of the camp, about the hierarchy of fear, about the loneliness of every
man. But write that you, you were the ones who did this. That a portion
of the sad fame of Auschwitz belongs to you as well.92
It would be a mistake, though, to read his stories as straight autobiography.
The identification of author with narrator is not as clear-cut as it seems. "The
truth about his behaviour in Auschwitz, according to his fellow-prisoners,"
Czeslaw Milosz reveals in The Captive Mind (1953), "is utterly different from
what his stories would lead one to suppose; he acted heroically, and was a model
of comradeship." Borowski was more concerned to encapsulate the degrading
nature of the camp regime than relate his own trials. "As narrator," to quote
Milosz again, "he endows himself with the qualities which pass as assets in a
concentration camp: cleverness and enterprise."93
"We are not evoking evil irresponsibly or in vain," the correspondent of
"Auschwitz, Our Home (A Letter)" asserts, "for we have now become a part
of it."94 The world described in these stories is one where prisoners play football,
for example, in the shadow of the gas chambers:
Between two throw-ins in a soccer game, right behind my back, three thousand
people had been put to death.95
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The matter-of-factness is chilling. In the title story Borowski details the routine
of the prisoners assigned to unload the human cargo on the station platform
at Birkenau. There is no room for compassion in this task:
Brutally we tear suitcases from their hands, impatiently pull off their coats.
Go on, go on, vanish! They go, they vanish. Men, women, children. Some
of them know.
The narrator is less hardened than his companions. He tells one of them, a
Frenchman called Henri, that he can take no more. "After only two transports?"
Henri replies. "Just look at me, I ... since Christmas, at least a million people
have passed through my hands. The worst of all are the transports from around
Paris - one is always bumping into friends."96
Any comment on my part would be superfluous. No wonder survivors
are often driven to question their own testimony. According to Aharon Appelfeld,
for example, who spent most of the war hiding in forests in the Ukraine after
escaping from a Nazi work camp at the age of eight, "The Holocaust belongs
to the type of enormous experience which reduces one to silence." 97 Now one
of Israel's foremost novelists, Appelfeld is as oblique as Wiesel in his approach
to the event; so oblique, in fact, that Philip Roth has discerned a more universal
theme pervading his work:
His literary subject is not the Holocaust ... or even Jewish persecution.
Nor, to my mind, is what he writes simply Jewish fiction or, for that matter,
Israeli fiction. Nor, since he is Jewish citizen of a Jewish state composed
largely of immigrants, is his an exile's fiction. And, despite the European
locale of many of his novels and the echoes of Kafka, these books written
in the Hebrew language certainly aren't European fiction. Indeed, all that
Appelfeld is not adds up to what he is, and that is a dislocated writer, a
dispossessed and uprooted writer. Appelfeld is a displaced writer of displaced
fiction, who has made of displacement and disorientation a subject uniquely
his own.98
This is impressively confusing, but what does it mean? That Appelfeld is an
existentialist at heart?
But not all existentialists have experienced the degree of alienation suffered
by Appelfeld as a consequence of the Holocaust, as he himself explains:
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My real world was far beyond the power of imagination, and my task as
an artist was not to develop my imagination but to restrain it, and even
then it seemed impossible to me, because everything was so unbelievable
that one seemed oneself to be fictional.99
In Badenheim 1939 (1980) and The Age of Wonders (1981) he returns to the world
in the days leading up to the war, drawing a grotesque picture of assimilated
middle-class Jews, offering an indictment, it would seem, of their failure to
anticipate the impending catastrophe. 10° Appelfeld is especially unforgiving
towards their own brand of antisemitism - contempt for the Ostjuden, Jewish
refugees from Eastern Europe (these novels are set in Austria). It need hardly
be said that were Appelfeld himself not Jewish, one might get the impression
that the author sought to blame the victims for the crimes that were committed
against them. Some Jews may well have deceived themselves as to the intentions
of the Nazis and their supporters, but it makes little sense to hold them
responsible for a policy not of their making. In The Age of Wonders a rabbi
is tortured by his fellow Jews on the eve of the first deportation. 101
 The real
criminals are nowhere in sight.
For a survivor the sense of unreality can be overwhelming. We learn as
much about the Holocaust from reading Kafka himself, perhaps, whose death
pre-dates the catastrophe by some fifteen years, as we do from reading fiction
by survivors that so clearly bears his mark. Yet the story they seek to tell
demands to be heard. They are the witnesses. A generation hence and who,
apart from their children, will remember them? If I am predisposed in favour
of Primo Levi's testimony because it is pellucid rather than esoteric, I am also
inclined to believe that his words will still be read long after the Holocaust
has ceased to be a talking point in the media. His suicide notwithstanding,
Levi has bequeathed to us the only wisdom we dare hope for from such an
annihilating event:
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What recommends itself ... is the idea that art may be the only remaining
medium of truth in an age of incomprehensible terror and suffering.
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory
Few novels have exercised greater influence over the imagination in its
relation to suffering than Dostoevsky's Brothers Karamazov, first published
more than a hundred years ago. One of the central chapters, in which Ivan
tells Alyosha that he rejects Providence on the ground of the suffering of the
innocent, has been cited so often in discussions of the problem of evil as to
seem almost hackneyed; and yet the examples Ivan gives of deliberate cruelty
continue to appal. "We cannot contemplate without terror," wrote Simone Weil,
"the extent of the evil which man can do and endure." 1 As Ivan himself observes,
"People talk sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that's a great injustice and insult
to the beasts; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel. "p'
After Auschwitz, Ivan's strictures on human depravity contain an additional
urgency. A five-year-old girl is abused by her parents. A general sets his dogs
on an eight-year--old boy, who is promptly torn to pieces (and the boy's mother
is forced to watch). Ivan longs to believe in a future paradise, but finds the
idea of it unacceptable:
It's not worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the
breast with its little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its
unexpiated tears to "dear, kind God"! It's not worth it, because those tears
are unatoned for. They must be atoned for, or there can be no harmony.
But how? How are you going to atone for them? Is it possible? By their
being avenged? But what do I care for avenging them? What do I care for a
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hell for oppressors? What good can hell do, since those children have
a]ready been tortured? And what becomes of harmony, if there is hell?
I want to forgive. I want to embrace. I don't want more suffering. And
if the sufferings of children go to swell the sum of sufferings which was
necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the truth is not worth such
a price.3
Faced with the Holocaust, a similar protest might seem the only appropriate
form of response.
Moreover, the scale of destruction makes it extremely difficult to register
its toll in human terms. As early as January 1944, Arthur Koestler was warning
of the failure to assimilate the information:
Distance in space and time degrades intensity of awareness. So does
magnitude. Seventeen is a figure which I know intimately like a friend;
fifty billions is just a sound. A dog run over by a car upsets our emotional
balance and digestion; three million Jews killed in Poland cause but a moderate
uneasiness. Statistics don't bleed; it is the detail which counts. We are
unable to embrace the total process with our awareness; we can only focus
on little lumps of reality.4
As the eponymous hero of Saul Bellow's Herzog (1964) puts it, "We are on a
more brutal standard now, a new terminal standard, indifferent to persons."
But Herzog is forced to confront the human dimension of suffering during a
visit to New York's courtrooms. He sits in on the trial of a young couple for
the murder of the woman's three-year--old son. The child had always been
mistreated. Herzog is overwhelmed by a sense of helplessness:
With all his might - mind and heart - he tried to obtain something for the
mudered child. But what? How? He pressed himself with intensity, but
"all his might" could get nothing for the buried boy. Herzog experienced
nothing but his own human feelings, in which he found nothing of use. What
if he felt moved to cry? Or pray? He pressed hand to hand. And what did
he feel? Why he felt himself - his own trembling hands, and eyes that stung.
And what was there in modern, post ... post-Christian America to pray for?
Justice - justice and mercy? And pray away the monstrousness of life, the
wicked dream it was? He opened his mouth to relieve the pressure he felt.
He was wrung, and wrung again, and wrung again, again.
The child screamed, clung, but with both arms the girl hurled it against
the wall. On her legs was ruddy hair. And her lover, too, with long jaws
and zooty sideburns, watching on the bed. Lying down to copulate, and
standing up to kill. Some kill, then cry. Others, not even that.5
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Saul Bellow's attempts to engage with the monstrousness of life represent
some of the finest examples of contemporary fiction. It is only with his seventh
novel, Mr Sammier's Planet (1970), however, that we find him addressing the
subject of the Holocaust explicitly. A much earlier novel, The Victim (1947),
explores the nature of antisemitism in an American context (namely, post-war
New York), and has been hailed by Sidra Ezrahi as "a probing allegory of the
Holocaust as a process whereby prejudice and delusion take possession of the
psyche". 6 But, as the title of the novel suggests, The Victim is more about
the identity of the persecuted than of the persecutor. It is, moreover, too specific
in its location to support a very symbolic interpretation. Asa Levanthal's painful
lesson in self-knowledge is only conceivable as the product of an encounter
between two free individuals. Levanthal is a victim of his own personality as
well as Alibee's manipulative behaviour, and Allbee is no Nazi, more an old-
fashioned conman. If the latter's name is supposed to imply that he is something
of an archetype, an antisemitic Everyman, it is Levanthal's own naivety that
gives him scope for action. "It's almost a sin to be so innocent," another character
says to Levanthal.7
The Exemplary Survivor
A number of American Jewish novelists have approached the Holocaust
by inventing a fictional survivor. 8 Edward Lewis Wallant might perhaps take
the credit for suggesting the route with The Pawnbroker (1961), the story of
a survivor from a camp (where it appears, from flashbacks, that he belonged
to a Sonderkommando, burning the dead bodies) who now lives in New York,
employed by a mafioso to run a pawnshop for laundering money earned illegally
from prostitution. The moral of this tale, however, is unrelated to past suffering,
except insofar as Sol Nazerman, the pawnbroker, is implicitly rebuked for living
in the past. His black assistant, Jesus Ortiz, is killed saving his life in a hold-
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up; it is only then that Sol recovers the capacity to feel for others and is able
to lay the ghosts of his wife and children (who all died in the camp). 9 fli
Pawnbroker is essentially a sermon to American Jews not to ignore the oppressed
in their midst. It is liberal propaganda rather than fiction in any deeper sense.
Propaganda is also a feature of Mr Sammier's Planet, but it must be said
that Saul Bellow carries it off with considerably more aplomb, even if he takes
the less fashionable line of attacking the progressive values that Edward Lewis
Wallant espouses. Also set in New York, Bellow's novel is an examination of
contemporary (that is, late sixties) America from the point of view of a survivor,
an Anglophile Polish Jew whose intellectual pedigree combined with his
experience is clearly meant to qualify him as some kind of authority. The age
of moonshot, student revolt, and sexual permissiveness (but no mention of the
civil rights movement), is refracted through the lens of Mr Sammler's remaining
good eye, as he contemplates the forms of decadence and recalls his earlier
ordeals.
Jennifer Bailey describes Mr Sammler's Planet as Bellow's "most
disappointing work"; Mas'ud Zavarzadeh comments on its "aesthetic and ideational
thinness"; and David Galloway, somewhat rashly, perhaps, in retrospect,
pronounces it to be a work which, despite its distinctive touches of genius,
ultimately shows the bankruptcy of Bellow's novelistic imagination")° But
if the novel is transparently flawed - and I shall try to suggest why I, too, think
that it is - it nevertheless repays careful reading. Mr Sammler was brought
to the United States with his daughter after the war by an American nephew
(who is only a few years younger than Sammler himself). He has had plenty
of time to accustom himself to this new environment, but it remains forever
strange to him. In fact, he is introduced to us as a bookish man of seventy-plus
(who suspects that the books he has read are the wrong books), intent on observing
a majestic black pickpocket ply his trade on the bus Sammier regularly catches
outside the Forty-second Street Library, his second home.
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Mr Sammler goes to phone the police and finds the phone booth has been
vandalized. This prompts the first of many meditations on New York as the
new Sodom:
New York was getting worse than Naples or Salonika. It was like an Asian,
an African town, from this standpoint. The opulent sections of the city
were not immune. You opened a jewelled door into degradation, from
hypercivilized Byzantine luxury straight into the state of nature, the barbarous
world of colour erupting from beneath. It might well be barbarous on either
side of the jewelled door. Sexually, for example. The thing evidently, as
Mr Sammier was beginning to grasp, consisted in obtaining the privileges,
and the free ways of barbarism, under the protection of civilized order,
property rights, refined technological organization, and so on. Yes, that
must be it.
Much of the novel is written in this vein. "It was distinguishing, not explanation,
that mattered," we are told; but Mr Sammier's distinctions are so pedantic that
the insight loses its value. He is not simply testy with White Protestant America
for failing to keep better order, 11 he is testy with the whole modern world.
The Enlightenment is berated as a licence for excess, and the whiff of disaster
in the air affects Mr Sammier (who has already seen the world destroyed once)
to an exceptional degree.
But is the character of Mr Sammier convincing? Bellow's own regard
for his fictional creation would seem to have made him oblivious to the unintended
irony of certain passages. "Sammler denied himself the privilege of the high-
principled intellectual," we read, for example, "who must always be applying
the purest standards and thumping the rest of the species on the head." 2
 Critics
have been quick to spot the anomaly. "It is obviously Bellow's intention that
Sammler's judgements should be taken as axiomatically right," Jennifer Bailey
complains. "But it is doubtful whether a standard of implicit value can be
asserted in this way without the suggestion of parody. It has certainly crept
in unawares in Mr Sammler's Planet." 3 And Alfred Kazin makes the connection
between the character's sense of superiority and over-refined sense of smell:
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There is a brilliantly immediate, unsparing knowledge of other people's
appearance and limitations which in its moral haughtiness becomes as audible
to the reader as sniffing, and is indeed that. There is so strong a sense of
physical disgust with all one's distended, mad-eyed, pushing neighbors on
the West Side that there seems nothing in the book to love but one's
opinions.14
Mr Sammier, it need hardly be said, is not short of opinions. Whether
it is the belief that Hannah Arendt's thesis on the banality of evil is reprehensible
or that females are "naturally more prone to grossness", 15 these opinions are
the motor of the narrative. The plot itself, however, which stretches over several
days, is driven more by the dynamics of farce: a lecture Sammler gives on
"The British Scene in the Thirties" (of which he was himself a part) is disrupted
by an offensive student; the pickpocket exposes himself to Sammler in a bizarre
gesture of intimidation; Sammler's eccentric daughter Shula steals a manuscript
on colonizing the moon; his nephew's son Wallace floods the family home
(interrupting a lengthy exposition of his views to Dr Lal, the Hindu scientist
and author of The Future of the Moon); and Eisen, Shula's estranged husband,
attacks the pickpocket with a bag of metal sculptures. The only sane character
in the novel, apart from Mr Sammler himself, is his nephew Elya Gruner, and
he lies in hospital with an aneurism in the brain. His death, which brings the
story to a close, is paradoxically a reprieve from all this madness.
Madness, in Mr Sarnmler's opinion, "is the attempted liberty of people
who feel themselves overwhelmed by giant forces of organized control. Seeking
the magic of extremes. Madness is a base form of the religious life." He himself
aspires to a higher form of the religious life. His reading these days is confined
to Meister Eckhart and the Bible. This leads to a preoccupation with
creatureliness. Sammler has seen the creature in its worst aspect, but continues
all the same to have what he calls "God adumbrations". The journey back from
the grave - the mass grave that he and his wife Antonina, along with other Polish
Jews, had been forced to dig (Sammler having been struck in the eye with a
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rifle butt), and from which he had clawed his way out, the only survivor - has
been an arduous and costly one. "Too many inside things were ruptured," he
reflects. And he expresses to Dr Lal the conviction that his recovery has been
incomplete:
Sometimes I wonder whether I have any place here, among other people.
I assume I am one of you. But also I am not. I suspect my own judgements
because my lot has been extreme. I was a studious young person, not meant
for action. Suddenly, it was all action - blood, guns, graves, famine. Very
harsh surgery. One cannot come out intact.'6
One cannot come out intact, perhaps, but Mr Sammier's attachment to
life shows through in his restored sensibility, which is matched by the lyricism
of Bellow's prose:
Through Fifteenth Street ran a warm spring current. Lilacs and sewage.
There were as yet no lilacs, but an element of the sewage gas was velvety
and sweet, reminiscent of blooming lilac. All about was a softness of perhaps
dissolved soot, or of air passed through many human breasts, or metabolized
in multitudinous brains, or released from as many intestines, and it got to
one - oh, deeply, too! Now and then there came an appreciative or fanciful
pleasure, apparently inconsequent, suggested by the ruddy dun of sandstone,
by cool corners of the warmth. Bliss from his surroundings! For a certain
period Mr Sammier had resisted such physical impressions - being wooed
almost comically by momentary and fortuitous sweetness. For quite a long
time he had felt that he was not necessarily human. Had no great use, during
that time, for most creatures. Very little interest in himself. Cold even
to the thought of recovery. What was there to recover? Little regard for
earlier forms of himself. Disaffected. His judgement almost blank. But
then, ten or twelve years after the war, he became aware that this too was
changing. In the human setting, along with everyone else, among particulars
of ordinary life he was human - and, in short, creatureliness crept in again.
Its low tricks, its doggish hind-sniffing charm. So that now, really, Sammier
didn't know how to take himself. He wanted, with God, to be free from
the bondage of the ordinary and the finite. A soul released from Nature,
from impressions and from everyday life. For this to happen God Himself
must be waiting, surely. And a man who has been killed and buried should
have no other interest. He should be perfectly disinterested. Eckhart said
in so many words that God loved disinterested purity and unity. God Himself
was drawn towards the disinterested soul. What besides the spirit should
a man care for who has come back from the grave? However, and
mysteriously enough, it happened, as Sammler observed, that one was always,
and so powerfully, so persuasively drawn back to human conditions. So that
these flecks within one's substance would always stipple with their reflections
all that a man turns towards, all that flows about him. The shadow of his
nerves would always cast stripes, like trees on grass, like water over sand,
the light-made network. It was a second encounter of the disinterested
spirit with fated biological necessities, a return match with the persistent
creature. 17
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A tension between disinterestedness and the business of being human is
sustained throughout the novel. "The best, I have found," Mr Sammier tells
Govinda Lal, "is to be disinterested. Not as misanthropes dissociate themselves,
by judging, but by not judging. By willing as God wills." But we know Mr Sammier
too well by this stage not to find a touch of hypocrisy in that. Besides casting
his quizzical eye over the contemporary scene, he is tempted by the thought
that his survival has a purpose. "Mr Sammier had a symbolic character," we
read. "He, personally, was a symbol." And it is disingenuous of him to be puzzled
by the fact that his family and friends have made him a judge and a priest.
He has assumed these roles for himself. He hasn't simply lasted, as he likes
to put it, he has a definite sense of waiting for something, the significance
of which comes to occupy him more and more:
Assigned to figure out certain things, to condense, in short views, some
essence of experience, and because of this having a certain wizadry ascribed
to him. There was, in fact, unfinished business. But how did business finish?
We entered in the middle of the thing and somehow became convinced that
we must conclude it. How? And since he had lasted - survived - with a
sick headache - he would not quibble over words - was there an assignment
implicit? Was he meant to do something?18
Mr Sammier's lot has been extreme, but he has recovered from it
sufficiently to want to understand it. He knows from personal experience what
it is like to be less than human. As a partisan in Zamosht Forest he discovered
that the taking of life could be a form of luxury, that under brutal conditions
human beings tend to behave brutally:
Mr Sammler himself was able to add, to basic wisdom, that to kill the man
he ambushed in the snow had given him pleasure. Was it only pleasure?
It was more. It was joy. You would call it a dark action? On the contrary,
it was also a bright one. It was mainly bright. When he fired his gun,
Sammler, himself nearly a corpse, burst into life. Freezing in Zamosht Forest,
he had often dreamed of being near a fire. Well, this was more sumptuous
than fire. His heart felt lined with brilliant, rapturous satin. To kill the
man and to kill him without pity, for he was dispensed from pity. There
was a flash, a blot of fiery white. When he shot again, it was less to make
sure of the man than to try again for that bliss. To drink more flames.
He would have thanked God for this opportunity. If he had had any God.
At that time, he did not. For many years, in his own mind, there was no
judge but himself.19
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Towards the end of the end of the war, the Polish partisans turned on their
Jewish comrades. Sammler escaped and found refuge in a cemetery. The Polish
caretaker hid him in a mausoleum during that final summer.
It is difficult to reconcile the image of a man beyond appeal with the
fastidious intellectual whose consciousness we inhabit. Mr Sammier is now
pre-eminently an observer, an island of sanity in a world gone mad, "a meditative
island on the island of Manhattan". Apart, that is, from a brief derangement
brought on by the crisis in the Middle East. On the eve of the Six-Day War,
in spite of his age, Mr Sammler felt impelled to get himself credentials as a
reporter and head for Israel. No Zionist, we are told, but he was alarmed by
the prospect of another attempt to destroy the Jews. "Perhaps it was the madness
of things that affected Sammier most deeply," we read. 2° Perhaps. Perhaps,
too, the author is thinking of his own response to the crisis. Bellow himself
became a correspondent for the Six-Day War. What we read as Sammier's
experience is essentially his own.21 This makes it authentic in one sense but
problematic in another. Would a survivor of the Holocaust have felt the same
obligation to share in his people's fate a second time, unless, that is, he had
retained a strong sense of his own Jewishness? In an article on "Imagining the
Holocaust" Edward Alexander offers an explanation of this:
This reaction by Sammier, who is no Zionist and has not been much of a
Jew either, will remind readers of the novel of the reaction of many Jews
at the time of the June war who felt that here, at last, was their opportunity
to atone for having sipped tea in Manhattan while a third of their bretheren
were being murdered at Auschwitz, Belsen, and Buchenwald.22
Are we any the wiser, however, as to what Bellow is up to in his novel?
Mr Sammler has nothing to atone for. According to Alexander, the author is
"trying to appropriate his Jewish hero's credentials, and doing so in a severe
and conscientious way".23 But this further evidence of Bellow's
over-identification with Mr Sammier must lead us to question the integrity
of the fictional character. Returning to the theme of his article in The Resonance
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of Dust, Alexander reveals a change of heart. We now read, "This reaction
by Sammier, who is no Zionist and has not been much of a Jew either, can be
explained only by what he has learned from the Holocaust." 24 But this begs
another question. What has Mr Sammler learned from the Holocaust? That
death is the one subject the soul is sure to take seriously? 25 If Sammler was
returning to a war zone to remind himself of certain basic realities, why did
he have to wait for this particular conflict? Bellow is making a polemical
connection, and it behaves us to ask whether it is appropriate to do so through
the mouthpiece of a survivor.
If Mr Sammler has learned anything at all from his experiences, it is that
such catastrophes are irreversible. "And I know now that humankind marks
certain people for death," he says to Dr Lal. "Against them there shuts a door.
Shula and I have been in this written-off category. If you chance nevertheless
to live, having been out leaves you with idiosyncracies." 26 These idiosyncracies
are more apparent in his relatives: Walter Bruch, f or instance, who enjoys mock
funerals and Nazi rallies, and reminisces about his time in Buchenwald with
a perverse kind of nostalgia. Sammier's daughter and son-in-law are both crazy.
Only Sammler himself still has his wits, and he hankers to be released from
human bondage, or at least to be left alone with his Meister Eckhart.
Eckhart exhorts us to renounce the things of this world: to be poor in
spirit and stripped of all creatures. But life, it seems, teaches differently.
To be poor in spirit is less a condition of blessedness than a nightmare, as Sammler
discovers in his dependence on Eisen, his maniacal son-in-law, to break up the
fight between the pickpocket and Feiffer:
It was a feeling of horror and grew in strength, grew and grew. What was
it? How was it to be put? He was a man who had come back. He had rejoined
life. He was near to others. But in some essential way he was also
companionless. He was old. He lacked physical force. He knew what to
do, but had no power to execute it. He had to turn to someone else - to
an Eisen! A man himself very far out on another track, orbiting a very
different foreign centre. Sammler was powerless. To be powerless was death.
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And suddenly he saw himself not so much standing as strangely leaning,
as reclining, and peculiarly in profile, as a 2 person. That was not himself.
It was someone - and this struck him - poor in spirit. Someone between
the human and not-human states, between content and emptiness, between
full and void, meaning and not-meaning, between this world and no world.
Flying, freed from gravitation, light with release arid dread, doubting his
destination, fearing there was nothing to receive him.
No beatific vision for Mr Sammier, then. His worst fears are confirmed when
Eisen's idea of intervention is to smash the pickpocket's face with his bag of
home-made medallions. Eisen mocks his father-in-law's delicacy. "You can't
hit a man like this just once," he exclaims. "When you hit him you must really
hit him. Otherwise he'll kill you. You know. We both fought in the war. You
were a Partisan. You had a gun. So don't you know?" Even though the parallel
is inexact, it has the ring of truth. "If in - in. No?" Eisen continues. "If out
- out. Yes? No? So answer." But Sammier is defeated by this. It has awakened
too many memories. "It was the reasoning that sank Sammler's heart completely,"
we read.27
Questions of justice are pushed to one side by the more pressing event
of Elya Gruner's death. The episode with Eisen and the others has cost Sammier
his chance to reach Elya while the latter was still conscious. Waiting in the
hospital, he gets into an argument with Angela, Elya's daughter, about her lack
of filial respect. Any occasion, for Mr Sammier, is an occasion for moralizing.
"I don't like the opinion I think you have of me," Angela tells him. His reply
is circumlocutory, to say the least. He launches into a discussion of apocalyptic
beliefs, concluding with an emphatic defence of humanism. "We are an animal
of genius," he proclaims, 28 as if this were somehow relevant to the point he
is trying to make: namely, that Angela has been insufficiently affectionate
towards her father, as well as lax in her sexual etiquette.
Elya himself, a retired gynaecologist and property speculator, appears
to have performed clandestine abortions for the Mafia, but this does not
compromise his essential virtue as far as Mr Sammler is concerned. It never
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occurs to Sammler that the young might take their cue from the older generation's
lapses. To see Elya as the model of a good man and yet condemn his children
for their waywardness, is to be blind to the connection between the two. Elya's
"goodness" is that of an American partriarch: authoritarian, sentimental and
humourless. He expresses his love for his children by spoiling them and then
continually finding fault with them. A man who can refer to his own daughter
as "Sloppy cunt!" 29 lacks something as a role-model.
I do not doubt the sincerity of Mr Sammler's grief. It is, to be sure, a
sad time:
Well, this famous truth for which he was so keen, he had it now, or it had
him. He felt that he was being destroyed, what was left of him. He wept
to himself.... He felt that he was breaking up, that irregular big fragments
inside were melting, sparkling with pain, floating off. Well, Elya was gone.
He was deprived of one more thing, stripped of one more creature. One
more reason to live trickled out.3°
But Bellow fudges the ending of the novel by withdrawing into pietism. The
prayer which Sammler recites over his benefactor's corpse is neither illuminating
nor true. To say that we know in our inmost hearts the terms of our contract,31
lays claim to a theological certainty which fiction contradict3. All a novel
can hope to achieve by way of instruction is to make real in some way the
complexity of moral judgements. Mr Sammier's didacticism counteracts this.
Mr Sammler's Planet is a peculiarly distorted portrait of a survivor, too
cerebral, perhaps, to convince us that it has anything new to say about the
experience of suffering, and yet, for all that, a moving portrait too. It was
reading this novel that led me to embark on the present thesis. If little I have
read since matches it for imaginative energy, I cannot help being disappointed,
reading it again, by a certain meanness of spirit. Its querulous tone threatens
to stifle its more human voice. "Perhaps the best is to have some order within
oneself," Mr Samrnler advises Govinda Lal. "Better than what many call love.
Perhaps it is love."32 But as Bellow himself pointed out in an essay published
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a few years earlier, a writer may affirm principles we all approve of and write
bad novels. Mr Sammler's Planet is not a bad novel, but it certainly fails to
satisfy Bellow's own condition for a novel of ideas to become art:
It becomes art when the views most opposite to the author's own are allowed
to exist in full strength. Without this a novel of ideas is mere self-indulgence,
and didacticism is simply axe-grinding. The opposites must be free to range
themselves against each other, and they must be passionately expressed
on both sides.3
"Death is the Messiah"
Another American Jewish writer who has sought to confront the Holocaust
in fiction, often by means of imaginary survivors, is Isaac Bashevis Singer.
Singer was born in Poland in 1904 but emigrated to the United States in l935.
He has continued to write in Yiddish as part of an attempt to preserve something
of the culture that the Nazis destroyed. One of his characters expresses a belief
that the aim of literature is to prevent time from vanishing, 35
 and this assumes
a particular significance after the Holocaust. The twelve-year span of the
millenial Third Reich shattered all sense of continuity. The pressure on the
writer, especially the Jewish writer, to restore one is as enormous as it is
inhibiting.
Singer's first, and perhaps most durable, response to the annihilation of
his world can be found in The Family Moskat (1950), which chronicles the fortunes
of a Jewish family in Warsaw from the beginning of the century until the German
invasion of Poland in 1939. This novel represents both a piece of fictional social
history and a memorial to the victims of the approaching terror. Hope for the
Messiah becomes an ironic refrain. As Warsaw crumbles, the narrative grinds
to a halt. "The Messiah will come soon," Hertz Yanovar claims. His companion,
Asa Heshel Bannet, is astonished, and asks him what he means. "Death is the
Messiah," he replies. "That's the real truth."36
- 61 -
Real truth or not, it is the epitaph for an entire civilization. Don Cupitt
imagines its theological import is universal. In The World to Come (1982) he
contends that Singer's novel (all six hundred odd pages of it) was written "for
the sake of four words in the last line". But this suggests a curious attitude
to fiction, as if novels were merely vehicles for ideas rather than a testing-
ground for them. Cupitt invokes Singer to endorse his own belief that "everyone
must eventually come to terms with his own transience and the Void that encircles
him".37
 The Jews of Warsaw were encircled not by the Void but by the German
army. The reason for all that prefatory narrative in The Family Moskat is to
help us realize that those doomed human beings were indeed human. There
is more protest in the novel's closing line than there is resignation, whatever
the character who speaks it may intend.
Such protest is already apparent from the way the situation of Jews between
the wars is described.38 Widespread antisemitism in Poland would make it
easier for the Nazis to isolate the Jews from the rest of the population. Asa
Heshel Bannet, who embodies much of the novel's moral force, has no illusions
about what is in store. "They'll destroy all of us," he predicts. And when Abram
objects that the end of the world hasn't come yet, Asa Heshel retorts, "The
end of our world has come." In spite of this clear-sightedness, however, he
remains in Warsaw. Members of the family return from Palestine and the United
States for a reunion. Only Adele tries to get out - on a ship bound illegally
to Palestine that is eventually turned back. People are reluctant to leave,
anyway, because they feel bound by a common fate. As Hertz Yanovar tells
the chief of police, "If the peoples of the world want us to live, then they have
to discover the way."39
The Jewish community is seen to be in turmoil. Singer does not offer
a sentimental image of the Warsaw Jews; neither does he seek to blame those
whose response to the crisis was to wait for it to pass. Even the extreme fatalism
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of the Dead Hasidim, the followers of Rabbi Nachman Bratsiaver, is shown
to have its basis in an awareness of the gravity of the situation. It is the lack
of awareness elsewhere that is implicitly condemned. Witness Asa Heshel's
reflections on the outbreak of war:
There were countries where there was still peace. In America people were
going to the theatre, eating in restaurants, dancing, listening to music. He
heard the wailing of cats outside; the animal world did not know there was
a Hitler; in this way human beings, too, fail to perceive other realities.40
If I would argue that it is only human to carry on with normal life when barbarism
has put an end to normality for others, I do not mean to condone it. But is it
necessary to evolve a concept of different orders of time, as George Steiner
thinks it is,41 in order to account for the fact that one person will be enjoying
life while another is being beaten to death? As long as there is suffering in
the world, all our pleasures are inevitably tainted. Auden's poem "Mus& des
Beaux Arts" expresses it well. Suffering always takes place while someone
else "is eating or opening a window or just walking dully along".42
Surely it is more important to address the causes of suffering than to
worry about whether one is personally suffering enough. For a survivor, of
course, the everyday world may well seem strange. Herman Broder, the
protagonist of Enemies, A Love Story (1966), is confounded by the ability of
American Jews to shut the Holocaust out of their thoughts. "Half of his people
had been tortured and murdered," we read, "and the other half were giving
parties."43 Enemies, in fact, reflects Singer's growing concern with the trauma
of survival, and especially with the problems associated with being a refugee.
A number of his later short stories portray survivors who have settled in
America,44 but Enemies is more ambitious in its attempt to convey the
psychological impact of the ordeal that they have been through.
Set in New York a few years after the war, this novel is a disconcerting
account of the fragmented world inhabited by a group of survivors. It is Herman,
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however, who spent the war hidden in a hayloft, rather than his wife Tamara,
who witnessed their children being shot and endured the hardship of a Soviet
labour camp, or his mistress Masha, who experienced the full weight of the
Holocaust - it is Herman who is most loath to start life again. He is the type
of Singer's deracinated philosopher, for whom suffering is a vocation. His women
(he also has a second wife, Yadwiga, the Polish woman who risked her life to
hide him) indulge him in this, but they, ultimately, must bear the cost. Masha
ends up committing suicide, in spite of the fact that she "had retained the normal
instincts" and wanted "a husband, children, a household". And although Yadwiga
becomes a convert after Herman has told her "If we don't want to become like
the Nazis, we must be Jews,"45 this does not prevent Herman from abandoning
her and the child she is about to bear. It is left to Tamara, perpetually in
mourning for her own children (whom Herman seems never to have missed),
to give them a home.
The difference between Herman and the others is that the Holocaust simply
confirmed him in his pessimism. "He was not a victim of Hitler," we are told.
"He had been a victim long before Hitler's day." This allows him - and the author,
too, perhaps - to regard the universe as unchanged, even if he now has a different
metaphor for the hellishness of earthly existence:
His pondering always brought him to the same conclusion: God (or whatever
He may be) was certainly wise, but there was no sign of His mercy. If a
God of mercy did exist in the heavenly hierarchy, then he was only a helpless
godlet, a kind of heavenly Jew among the heavenly Nazis. As long as one
does not have the courage to leave this world, one can only hide and try
to get by, with the help of alcohol, opium, a hayloft in Lipsk, or a small
room at Shifrah Puah's.
So, once more, Herman goes into hiding. No one knows where he has gone.
How we are meant to judge this is uncertain. The novel has an attenuated quality
that reflects the lives it describes, and its ending is akin to evaporation. The
question of Jewish identity after the Holocaust - "What is my Jewishness?"
Herman asks himself at one point46
 - hangs in the air.
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A return to the Old World with Shosha (1974), reinforces the impression
that Singer is more at home in pre-war Poland, even when contemplating the
destructive course of events. Characters take on life from their surroundings.
A community is summoned into being. Aaron Greidinger, the narrator, is one
of the few to survive: it is the memory of a lost community that we in fact
encounter. Aaron is another modern Jew, the child of a strictly Orthodox home
(his father, like Singer's, a Hasidic rabbi) who has ambitions as a writer. Unable
to accept the restrictions of traditional piety, he nevertheless feels out of place
in the wider world. Like Asa Heshel Bannet he foresees the catastrophe, but
twice refuses to leave Warsaw when he has the chance of a visa to the United
States.47
Perhaps the most remarkable achievement in the novel is the character
of Shosha herself. Her profound innocence, based on the fact that she has the
mind and appearance of a child, is never cloying, and her death, not from
starvation or gassing but from a loss of the will to live, is as haunting in its
way as any more violent fate. It is described in retrospect by Aaron to his friend
Haimi, during the course of a reunion between them in Israel (where Haimi
has settled) seven years after the war. The intervening years, from after the
fall of Warsaw, that is, have been left blank. The other characters are revealed
to have perished. Haiml is moved by the establishment of the new state to
believe that miracles are still possible, speculating that the Messiah may come
after all if the Jews have a country of their own again. Aaron is more sceptical.
He has given up waiting for an answer. "There can't be any answer for suffering
- not for the sufferer," he says.48
The Jewish longing for redemption is a central theme in Singer's work.
According to Aaron, "From the day they were exiled from their land, Jews had
lived in anticipation of death or the coming of the Messiah." Aaron's brother,
a rabbi, interprets the Nazi threat as the birth pangs of the Messiah. "There
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have been many Hamans, and they all came to a bad end," he assures his mother.
"Before they came to their bad end," she points out, "they killed off plenty
of Jews." To be chosen is an ambiguous privilege. It is impossible to be a Jew;
it is impossible not to be one. "We are running away and Mount Sinai runs after
us," Aaron tells his mistress. "This chase has made us sick and mad."49
American Jewish Fiction at Large
Other leading American Jewish writers have been more tentative in their
responses to the Holocaust, with the exception of two writers of popular fiction,
Leon Uris and Gerald Green, whose work I shall discuss at the end of this section.
Bernard Malamud might be said to share a similar pessimism to Isaac Bashevis
Singer, but his stories are located, on the whole, in the immigrant Jewish
communities of America. Two of his short stories broach the subject of the
Holocaust directly, but the emphasis in both is on the need to preserve a Jewish
identity rather than on the experience of suffering. 5° It is possible to read
The Fixer (1966) as an allegory of the Holocaust, and both Robert Alter and
Alvin Rosenfeld have done so. 5 ' The narrative as such, however, is based on
the trial of Mendel Beiliss, a Jewish artisan from Kiev, on a trumped-up charge
of ritual murder in 1911. Malamud's version reflects his despairing equation
of Jewishness with suffering which elsewhere - in The Assistant (1957), for
example - leads him to imply that suffering is a Jewish virtue. "Being born
a Jew meant being vulnerable to history," we read in The Fixer, "including its
worst errors."52
In his study of American Jewish fiction that relates to the Holocaust,
Crisis and Covenant (1985), Alan Berger has sought to evaluate it in terms of
its "covenantal awareness": in other words, how well does it accord with
traditional Jewish teaching on the relationship between God and the chosen
people? The Fixer, on this model, is the product of a culture which no longer
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recognizes the authority of the Covenant. Being Jewish has become a puzzle
rather than a religious calling. "Malamud's pre-Holocaust novel should be read,"
in Berger's view, "as an evocation of the central fact of Jewish modernism;
the disruption of the covenant-history dialectic. Yakov Bok refuses his Jewish
religious and ritual inheritance." 53
 And this is what leaves him at the mercy
of history. But Malamud himself, one feels, is hardly on the side of modernism.
His questioning of tradition does not amount to a rejection of it so much as
an anxiety that the powers of this world are stronger than God.
Philip Roth, on the other hand, is less ambiguously a secular writer, for
whom being Jewish is largely an accident of birth. It is the state of his own
continent rather than that of Europe which has challenged him as an artist,
as he explains in an essay on "Writing American Fiction":
The American writer in the middle of the twentieth century has his hands
full in trying to understand, describe, and then make credible much of
American reality. It stupefies, it sickens, it infuriates, and finally it is even
a kind of embarrassment to one's own meager imagination.54
The Holocaust does find its way into one novel, The Ghost Writer (1979), in
the form of a fantasy about Anne Frank as a survivor who feels compelled to
keep her identity hidden. "I was the incarnation of the millions of unlived years
robbed from the murdered Jews," she says. "It was too late to be alive now.
I was a saint." 53
 But any serious point being made here is swept aside by Nathan
Zuckerman's real motive for imagining this in the first place. He needs to appease
his family for making stories out of their foibles. What better way to prove
that he remains loyal to his Jewish background than by marrying Anne Frank?
Roth is an adept comic and doubtless intends this joke to be in poor taste. As
satire, however, The Ghost Writer never really identifies its target.
A more conventional narrative defines the scope of Susan Fromberg
Schaeffer's Anya (1974), which purports to be the autobiography of a Jewish
woman who escaped from a concentration camp and found her way to America
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with her daughter in tow. 56 The lengthy reconstruction of life in Poland before
and during the war is so fussy and laboured that the fate of its characters would
be of little interest, were it not for the appeal to historical reality. Sidra Ezrahi
is more charitable. "The novel is a good example of impressive erudition and
a sensitive exploration of brutal experience," she claims, "as well as of the
lapses which are probably inevitable in the vicarious reconstruction of cataclysmic
history." 57 But scholarship in fiction seems a poor substitute for style. Anya
avoids the charge of being sensational only at the expense of being tedious.
"The tension between internal accountability to the imagination," Ezrahi goes
on to argue, "and external accountability to the victims expresses the heart
of the dilemma of Holocaust literature in America." 58
 Why, though, should
this tension be seen as a dilemma? Anya is no less fictional for being thoroughly
researched, but a good deal less convincing for lacking imagination.
This failure of imagination, however understandable in the face of real
human suffering, is not to be justified by a spurious appeal to scruples. The
scrupulous course of action would be to write nothing at all. For a novelist
to be in thrall to the facts is an admission of defeat. It is a licence for pseudo-
factual novels like Leon Uris's QBVII (1970) and Gerald Green's Holocaust (1978)
which mistake blood-and-thunder reportage for historical realism. Leon Uris
has been extremely successful as an epic storyteller who models his plots on
large-scale historical events. The plot for Mila 18 (1961), however, his tale
of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, is similar in construction to a novel published
some years before - The Wall (1950) by John Hersey. 59 It is therefore all the
more remarkable that, in spite of its sensational treatment, QBVII should have
what appears to be an original plot: the story of a libel action brought by a
Polish doctor, now a London-based GP, against an American novelist for a
reference in his latest bestseller to the doctor's involvement in medical
experiments in a concentration camp.6°
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Too good to be true, in fact - or, to be more precise, too good not to be
true. There is no mention in the blurb for QBVII that Leon Uris and his British
publishers were themselves defendants in a libel action in 1964, brought against
them by a Polish doctor and former inmate of Auschwitz, Wiadislaw Dering,
for an offending line in Exodus (1958), Uris's blockbuster about the emergence
of the State of Israel. A record of the original trial was published the following
year, under the title of Auschwitz in England, and created enough interest to
merit a paperback edition soon after. 61 Its authors, Mavis Hill and Norman
Williams, were both trained lawyers. Uris had referred in Exodus to a Dr Dehring,
in the company of two notorious Nazi doctors, and accused him of performing
"seventeen thousand 'experiments' in surgery without anaesthetic 't62
Abraham Cady, Uris's fictional alter ego, has written more or less the
same thing about Dr Kelno. 6 Wladislaw Dering, O.B.E., is thus transformed
into Sir Adam Kelno (a little exaggeration goes a long way). The imaginary
trial takes place in 1967, by which time the real-life plaintiff has died of lung
cancer. 6 The second half of QBVII is the story of this trial and its dramatic
climax, while the first half traces the lives of the two court-room opponents.
Kelno, like Dering, is held in Brixton jail after the war on suspicion of war crimes,
then released for lack of evidence. And again like his prototype, he spends
a number of years in the Colonial Medical Service before settling in London
as a GP. The author allows us a few brief glimpses of the man's conscience
as a foretaste of the trial to come, 65 but most of the narrative is in the form
of a chronicle.
Abraham Cady, of course, is the archetypal American hero: a hardbitten
womanizer with a heart of gold. Some of his own relatives died in the camp
(which Uris calls Jadwiga) where Kelno was a prisoner-doctor, which gives him
an additional glow of righteousness, as if it were somehow to his credit that
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they should have suffered thus. His elder brother, whom he idolized, was killed
in Spain, having enlisted as a pilot to serve the republican cause. Cady himself
enlists as a fighter pilot in the Second World War. Brought down by enemy
planes, he loses an eye but gains a beautiful English wife. They have a son who
grows up to be a volunteer in the Israeli air force, and the news of his death
in the Six-Day War is the novel's parting shot.
One does not have to be a pacifist, however, to find Uris's glorification
of combat objectionable. The subtext of all this - that Jews are now a people
to be reckoned with - ignores the forms of resistance that were available to,
and used by, the Jews of occupied Europe, 66 preferring instead to lend credence
to the myth that they went "like lambs to the slaughter" if it saves the reader
the trouble of probing how the murder of six million human beings was possible.
Uris has a simple answer: they didn't have guns. The martyrdom of Cady junior
is both a reminder that the enemies of Israel are legion and an example of
swagger. Ben Cady may have died, but the Arab air forces have been destroyed
by the Israeli strike.6
Sir Adam Kelno is eventually exposed as a rabid antisemite, indistinguishable
in essence from his German masters. Once again, Uris prefers the cliche to
the complex truth. Wiadislaw Dering, a qualified surgeon, was certainly guilty
of carrying out operations which had no medical basis, as a result of which a
number of Jewish prisoners were rendered sterile and at least one seems to
have died soon after from internal bleeding. It is more than likely that he was
antisemitic to some degree; as a Polish nationalist (the reason why he was in
Auschwitz to begin with) he would have had little sympathy with Jews as such.
All the same, he had belonged to the underground resistance movement at
Auschwitz for several years, enjoyed a good reputation as the Senior Prisoner
in charge of the camp hospital, and, it needs to be stressed, was not, however
compromised, among the executioners: at any time his own life might have
been forfeit.68
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The jury awarded Dering damages of one halfpenny ("the smallest coin
of the realm"). He had been ill-advised to bring the action and, it might be
thought, was simply getting his just deserts. But I fail to see how those of us
who have never experienced the degrading and frightening conditions of the
Lager can sit in judgement on a man who opted to save his skin without due
regard for others from a civilized point of view. There was nothing civilized
about Auschwitz. Three fellow doctors, all women, testified against iJering
because they had had the courage to refuse to participate in these bogus
operations.69 The fact that none of them had been severely punished for this
would seem to be an indictment of Dering's cowardice, but not evidence of
his inhumanity.
Uris, however, reduces the story to a confrontation between good and
evil, generating the requisite suspense by employing the register of surgical
operations from the camp as a deus ex machina, the final proof of Sir Adam
Kelno's complicity. At the original trial, this register was central to the case
for the defence from the very beginning. It contained no unexpected revelations.
Dering had taken part in ninety "experimental" operations on his own admission.7°
Survivors did indeed accuse him of compounding his responsibility with
callousness, and this surely moved the jury to award him such a derisory sum,
but Uris gets his revenge on the man who took him to court (and who, being
dead, is in no position to do so again) by painting him in even darker colours,
a man who ends up physically attacking his own prote'ge' for siding with the
Jews.71
QBVII, then, is a scandal of distortion, a good yarn spun from the thread
of a tragic reality. Gerald Green's Holocaust takes similar liberties with the
truth to satisfy the market for popular fiction. We find ourselves on a sightseeing
tour of the worst atrocities, stopping off here and there to meet a leading Nazi,
and then invited to cheer as the narrator, a German Jew called Rudi Weiss,
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fights his way to safety. Fighting Jews get a special mention in Green's
ljedication,72 and militancy is clearly as vital to this plot as it was to Uris's.
When his father is ordered to return to Poland, Rudi vows to resist:
They would not humiliate me, force me to do their bidding, the way they
had forced so many others. Jews were supposed to agree, be polite, obey,
listen, accept. But I had never understood this. I did not look for fights
in the street, but I never ran away. And when I played soccer I played to
win. And if the other fellow played dirty, I could trip and shove, and if need
be, throw a punch.
"What willyou do?" Anne asked, still weeping.
"I'll fight." '3
Interspersed with Rudi's story are extracts from the diary of a fictional
SS major called Erik Dorf, who seems to have had contact with most high-ranking
Nazis and taken an active role himself in determining the fate of the Jews.
Don is the antithesis of our hero: he is cowardly, overintellectual, and dominated
by his wife. He becomes an accomplice to mass murder, initially, not because
he is antisemitic but because he has no will of his own. Under the tutelage
of his idol, Reinhard Heydrich, he learns to believe in the necessity of the Final
Solution, emerging as a fanatical servant of the Third Reich. It is Dorf,
apparently, who must take the credit for Kristallnacht, who was one of those
present at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 when it was officially decided
to implement the Final Solution, and who was inspired to coin euphemisms like
"resettlement"74 - all of which helps to improve his flagging sex drive.
In short, Holocaust would be hilarious if it were not the trivialization
of a real catastrophe. Just as I can no longer watch a western without thinking
of the thousands of North American Indians who were massacred that such
travesties might exist, so I cannot believe that this kind of novel does anything
more than provide the most questionable form of entertainment, whatever the
intentions of its author. Gerald Green is also responsible for the screenplay
of the televized version, which reached an audience of even greater proportions.
In an essay called "What Shall We Tell Our Children?" written in 1979, Günter
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Grass describes the impact of this in West Germany. According to him, the
very success of the television series is an indication of its inability to illuminate
the complexity of the subject:
The success of "popular" enlightenment has never been more than skin-deep.
Demonstrably as television series (as shown by public-opinion polls) shatter,
touch, or horrify the masses, much as they move them to pity or even shame
- and this was the effect of Holocaust - they are quite incapable of disclosing
the complex "modernity" of genocide and the many-layered responsibilities
at the root of it. Basically, Auschwitz was not a manifestation of common
human bestiality; it was a repeatable consequence of a network of human
responsibilities so organized and so subdivided that the individual was
conscious of no responsibility at all.75
In other words, a collective emotional catharsis is no substitute for the serious
reflection demanded by Auschwitz itself, without orchestration and without
caricature.
The View from Within
"It's time that makes terror habitual: time is what we must write against,t'
claims the narrator of From the Diary of a Snail (1972), Giinter Grass's novel
that attempts to tell his children in a roundabout way certain facts of German
history. "A writer, children," we read shortly afterwards, "is someone who
writes against the passage of time." 6 If Günter Grass and Isaac Bashevis Singer
have this much in common,77 they also share a profound commitment to the
imagination as an instrument of truth. Historical events are invoked, not in
order to obtain a spurious authenticity for one's fiction but, rather, because
the fiction is itself the product of a need to understand those events.
Grass tells the story of his efforts on behalf of Willy Brandt and the Social
Democrats during the 1969 election campaign in West Germany, as a way into
the story of a time of indifference, when the Jews of Danzig (where Grass was
born in 1927 and grew up) were deprived of their livelihoods, forced to emigrate
or imprisoned in the concentration camp at Stutthof. Progress, he says, in a
telling metaphor that dominates the book, is a snail. "I am the civilian snail,"
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Grass-the-narrator confesses, "the snail made man. With my forward, inward
drive, with my tendency to dwell, hesitate, and cling, with my restlessness and
emotional haste, I am snail-like."78
It is too late to save the Jews of Danzig, but it is not too late to challenge
official prevarication. Grass's conviction that responsibility begins at home
imbues this curious novel with urgency, its didacticism justified by the parental
role he is assuming. A fictional character, Hermann Ott, is called on to play
the part of Doubt - Grass's guiding principle - and for helping Jews is himself
forced to hide in a cellar during the war. In 1947 he is committed to an asylum,
where for twelve years he suffers from extreme depression. Grass defines a
tension between melancholy and utopia as the prerequisite for social order. Willy
Brandt's gesture of kneeling at the site of the Warsaw ghetto is offered as an
image of what this entails for Germany today:
Auschwitz has become a museum, "incapacity for mourning" a much-bandied
phrase. This ability to get used to genocide has its parallel in a premature
readiness to shrug off the crimes of the National Socialists as momentary
insanity, as an irrational aberration, as something incomprehensible and
therefore forgivable. Perhaps the wordless action of a statesman, who
shouldered the burden and knelt at the site of the Warsaw ghetto, has given
belated expression to a people's awareness of undiminished guilt. Repentance
as a social state of mind would then be the corresponding utopia; it
presupposes melancholy rooted in insight.79
Repentance as a social state of mind has been Grass's obsession through-
out his writings. If his masterpiece The Tin Drum (1959) is more about the
supporters of National Socialism than its victims, the extraordinary section
called "Faith, Hope, Love" 80
 is surely among the most unsettling responses
to the Holocaust that we have. The occasion for it in the narrative is the eve
of Kristallnacht in Danzig. Sigismund Markus, the Jewish owner of a toyshop,
has committed suicide before storm-troopers destroy his premises. The famous
triumvirate of virtues (the last one, of course, is rendered as "charity" in the
Authorized Version) from 1 Corinthians 13, is measured against the dissolution
of Christian culture into the secular Messianism of Nazi ideology - and found
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wanting. The fugue-like quality of Grass's prose cannot be reproduced in extract,
but its relentless weaving of grotesque fantasy with heightened observation,
as the destruction of Europe's Jews gets its dress rehearsal, is impossible to
forget.
Grass was only seventeen at the end of the war, called up with the last
draft - "too young to acquire guilt", as he puts it in "What Shall We Tell Our
Children?". But he does not wear his innocence lightly:
The belated anti-Nazism of my generation was never subjected to the danger
test. I could not swear that, if I had been six or seven years older, I would
not have participated in the great crime. My doubts were such that I was
plagued (more and more often as time passed) by nightmares in which I felt
myself to be guilty. The dividing line between real and potential action
was blurred.81
Fellow German novelist Heinrich Böll was less fortunate in his date of birth
(1917) and served in the German army throughout the war, if only as a private.
Wounded several times while fighting on the Eastern front, he managed to spend
the final year of the war evading combat duty (though this in itself might have
cost him his life). A devout Catholic, he explains in a memoir of his adolescence
- What's to Become of the Boy? (1981) - the personal nature of his opposition
to the regime:
My unconquerable (and still unconquered) aversion to the Nazis was not
revolt: they revolted me, repelled me on every level of my existence:
conscious and instinctive, aesthetic and political.8Z
This rather aristocratic stance may account for the absence of any
compulsion to investigate "the great crime" in his fiction. An early novel, And
Where Were You, Adam? (1951), includes a Jewish convert to Catholicism in
its roster of victims, and this woman's death in an obscure concentration camp
(along with all the other Jewish inmates) is certainly given dramatic expression,83
but B5ll seems more concerned ultimately with the conflict between Nazi
fanaticism and religious (that is, Catholic) integrity than with the fate of the
Jews. And this concern informs the structure of Billiards at Half Past Nine
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(1959), which tackles the subject of German guilt from the point of view of
German innocence. The novel tells the story of a family for whom, as for Boll's
own family, Nazism was anathema. The action takes place in Cologne during
one day in 1958, allowing B011 to offer retrospective impressions of the war
and, at the same time, comment on how little has changed. Many of those who
held office as Nazis are still in office now. The virtuous are destined to suffer,
and none more virtuous than Johanna Faehmel, put away for trying to leave
with the Jews as they were loaded into cattle-trucks. 84 Her madness represents
the most complete form of internal exile.
Virtue and Sacrifice
One is tempted to conclude that history has had the last word, but Saul
Bellow, Isaac Bashevis Singer and Günter Grass, at least, have all shown that
the imagination remains a vital force in resisting a defeat so absolute. And
Elsa Morante's aptly-titled History: A Novel (1974), while clearly owing much
of its inspiration to The Tin Drum, offers further evidence of fiction's capacity
to test the assumptions of a belligerent culture. In his "Theses on the Philosophy
of History", completed shortly before his suicide in 1940, Walter Benjamin
addressed the world that was collapsing around him with a prophetic voice.
"There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document
of barbarism," he asserted. 85 Elsa Morante's highly stylized novel recalls some
of the darkest years in Italian history, from the beginning of Mussolini's
dictatorship to the chaos at the war's end.
"The tradition of the oppressed," to quote Benjamin again, "teaches us
that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule.'t86
This nicely summarizes the drift of History, which centres on the experiences
of a half-Jewish Italian woman called Ida Mancuso and her constant terror that
she and her infant son Useppe, conceived after she had been raped by a German
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soldier in 1941, will be deported. Although Ida survives the war without being
punished for her identity, she does witness the Jews of Rome being taken away
by train, soon after the Nazis have occupied Northern Italy at the end of 1943.87
The returning survivors - fifteen out of 1,056 - are later described: broken,
shadowy figures whose stories nobody wants to hear. "People wanted to censor
them from their days," we read, "as normal families remove the mad or the
dead."88
The connection between such extreme suffering and other forms of
oppression is made by juxtaposing this homecoming with that of an Italian
conscript who had been left behind in the retreat from Russia, mutilated by
frostbite, imprisoned in Siberia. Other soldiers, like Giovannino whose last
hours are reconstructed here,89 simply perished in the snow, defeated by the
elements before they could give themselves up. And while we are still taking
all this in, Davide Segre, the rest of whose family were deported to Auschwitz
and killed, recollects the dehumanizing conditions of a factory he worked in
during the war. The thought that occurred to him then, before he succumbed
to sheer exhaustion - "As long as men, or even a single man on the earth, is
forced to live such an existence, all talk of freedom and beauty and revolution
is a fraud" 9 ° - parallels an observation by the narrator of one of Tadeusz
Borowski's Auschwitz stories. "There can be no beauty if it is paid for by human
injustice," we read in "Auschwitz, Our Home (A Letter)", "nor truth that passes
over injustice in silence, nor moral virtue that condones it."9'
The point is not to see the whole of industrial society as a concentration
camp, so much as to recognize that concentration camps were made possible
by the dehumanization that already existed and still exists today. Davide Segre,
who in addition to his other afflictions has been tortured by the SS for distributing
subversive literature, dies of a drug overdose in the summer of 1947, shortly
before the death of TJseppe himself. tJseppe is less than six years old when
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ill health, aggravated by malnutrition, puts an end to his life. He is the model
of innocent suffering, a child whose precocious sensitivity affords him no armour
against the world he has been born into. His half-brother Nino, by contrast,
is a light-hearted rogue, a young Fascist turned partisan, instinctively rebellious.
The preternatural bond between the two is severed by Nino's death in a road
accident (while fleeing from the police with a gang of black marketeers), and
although Useppe is never told that Nino has been killed, it is about this time
he has his first attack of grand mal.
The companionship between tJseppe and Nino's dog Bella, which is the
focus of the novel's final chapters, marks a shift towards more emphatic
symbolism, as the pair explore the ruins of the human domain. Bella becomes
Useppe's protector - and is shot in the end because she will not let anyone disturb
the boy's corpse. "And so she kept her word," we are told, "given Useppe the
day of her return home: 'They'll never be able to separate us, in this world."92
If this seems unnecessarily sentimental, the novel's overall impact is still quite
desolating. At the close Ida is rendered cataleptic by her losses, doomed to
live out the last nine years of her life in a mental hospital.
As if to drive the point home, Morante continues the narrative with a
sketch of major historical events since. History is unrelenting. Useppe is no
redeemer (if he is a Christ-figure, then like Dostoevsky's Prince Myshkin, a
fellow epileptic, he is an attenuated one), and his goodness is a form of
powerlessness (which, as we have seen with Mr Sammler, does not amount to
being blessed). Yet for all its sentimentalizing of animals and children, History
does persuade us that virtue is real. We may still feel that there is no answer
for suffering, that the world is beyond redemption, but Useppe is a fictional
consummation of our deepest needs. His death brings us back to ourselves.
It is in this sense that I would argue the best fiction leaves us inconsolable.
It reminds us of what we lack.
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The theme of innocent sacrifice is even more striking in The Last of the
Just (1959) by Andre Schwarz-Bart, one of the most eloquent contributions
by a French author to our grim pantheon, and one of the first, too. Although
written from a traditional Jewish perspective, it is essentially a secular response,
adapting the tradition to provide an ironic commentary on Europe's failure to
tolerate the continued existence of the Jews. The story begins with a massacre
of Jews in York in 1185 and ends in the gas chambers at Auschwitz in 1943.
In an essay on "The Tradition of the Thirty-six Hidden Just Men" Gershom Scholem
has pointed out how Schwarz-Bart transforms the legend, 93 the main alteration
being the notion that one might be one of the just men hereditarily. These
thirty-six just men on whom the preservation of the world is said to depend
are strictly anonymous in the original teaching. 94 Schwarz-Bart is chiefly
concerned, however, to impress upon his readers the centuries of persecution
that has been the lot of Jews since the advent of Christianity. By following
the line of a particular family, the Levys of Zemyock, he is able to illustrate
a general history.
At times the narrative threatens to break down under the weight of its
subject-matter - quite self-consciously towards the end: "I am so weary that
my pen can no longer write"9 5
 - and is not entirely free from excess: the episode
where Ernie indulges in an orgy of insect-squashing, for example, is crudely
done.96
 Overall, however, The Last of the Just performs what Alvin Rosenfeld
has described as a major function of literary responses to the Holocaust: "to
register and record the enormity of human loss". 97 The finality of Ernie Levy's
martyrdom - he volunteers to be deported to Auschwitz from Drancy, and
volunteers again to be sent to the gas chamber (in order to stay with his fiancee
and a group of orphans deported at the same time) - is reinforced by a fragmented
prayer for the dead, into which the names of various camps are inserted. The
narrator, who claims at the start to have been a friend of Ernie's, allows himself
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to speculate that his friend, "dead six million times", 98 might still exist as a
presence. One can only assume that Schwarz-Bart intends this to be read
ironically.
But Is It Art?
A different kind of virtue is explored in Schindler's Ark (1982) by Australian
writer Thomas Keneally, though it is open to question whether or not we should
call this book a novel (even if it did win the Booker Prize for fiction). Michael
Hulse is pleased to call it "imaginative historical journalism", 99
 and Ken Worpole
fits it into a genre called "documentary literature" where the author collaborates
with eye- witnesses to reconstruct a historical event)°° Schindler's Ark is by
no means the first example of this in relation to the Holocaust, and Keneally
argues from precedent for the validity of his approach:
To use the texture and devices of a novel to tell a true story is a course
which has frequently been followed in modern writing. It is the one I have
chosen to follow here; both because the craft of the novelist is the only
craft to which I can lay claim, and because the novel's techniques seem
suited for a character of such ambiguity and magnitude as Oskar. I have
attempted to avoid all fiction, though, since fiction would debase the record,
and to distinguish between reality and the myths which are likely to attach
themselves to a man of Oskar's stature)°1
There is a semantic confusion here which suggests that Keneally is either not
being straight or is simply unaware that the story as he tells it takes considerable
liberties with the record. Dialogues are invented, and scenes reconstructed
with scant regard for their literal accuracy.102
However, the story itself is utterly compelling. Schindler was clearly
a remarkable man. His place in the Avenue of the Righteous at Yad Vashem
for saving the lives of eleven hundred Jews attached to his factory in Cracow,
as well as helping to rescue other Jews caught up in the infernal system, was
earned at some risk. The force of Keneally's narrative, though, is to canonize
the man, in spite of an assertion to the contrary.' 03 The Talmudic moral of
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Schindler's Ark is that if you save a life, you save the whole world. But we
have to ask whether this is an appropriate response to a history in which individual
heroism played such a small part. The Holocaust was not a setting for great
escapes, as Keneally appears at times to acknowledge, 104
 and yet Schindler
is presented as the mastermind of one, a man who kept his word to provide
deliverance.
A further moral is detected by Michael Hulse. "Only because he was a
man of vice," claims Hulse, "could Schindler accomplish his pragmatic virtue....
The virtue of the virtueless, the pragmatic strength of the philosophic innocent,
may be the only salvation in dark times." 105 The only salvation in dark times,
ultimately, is a liberating army; even Schindler could not have saved his workforce
without the German defeat. And Schindler was less a philosophic innocent,
whatever that means,'° 6 than a gambler who perceived that the stakes were
human lives (his own included) and felt impelled to play the best hand he could.
The anecdote about his playing cards with the camp commandant to win the
right to include the latter's Jewish maid on his list, may well be apocryphal
(though Keneally treats it as fact), but it does illustrate Schindler's brand of
courage. There is no need to mystify this with elaborate psychologizing. We
might invert Hannah Arendt's famous phrase and refer to the banality of virtue.
Schindler's sensuality (which made him an irresponsible husband but hardly a
man of vice) was in itself at odds with the Teutonic discipline of the ruling
elite. He was, moreover, a Sudeten German, something of an outsider:
"You have to remember," said a boy whom Oskar would later save, "that
Oskar had a German side but a Czech side too. He was the good soldier
Schweik. He loved to foul up the system."107
Perhaps, in the face of so much antisemitism, it seems extraordinary
that a man should care about the murder of the whole Jewish population, but
Schindler was a witness to cruelty that only the fanatic or the sadist could have
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sanctioned. What is more extraordinary is that others witnessed similar cruelty
and were moved to do nothing to prevent it. Schindler's Ark is a powerful
reminder that more could have been done to obstruct the Final Solution, as
well as the record of one man's tenacious resistance. But we are certainly in
no position to conclude from the testimony of those he rescued that Schindler
was the saviour of the world. His achievement must be reckoned more soberly
than that.
By making Schindler larger than life, Keneally risks losing sight of the
millions for whom no saviour came. The story lacks a sense of proportion in
the end. Schindler's own hardship after the war deserves our sympathy, but
not if it means neglecting the real victims of National Socialism. His death
in 1974 was mourned "in every continent", the author observes by way of
conclusion - unable to see how this comforting thought obscures the deaths
that went unregarded, those anonymous deaths for which no amount of
retrospective mourning can atone. That Schindler's Ark is more fictional than
historical is borne out by a gratuitous reference to William Styron's Sophie's
Choice, 108 one of the prurient versions of the Holocaust to be considered in
the following chapter. Styron's portrait of Rudolf Höss, the commandant of
Auschwitz, reflects the assumption that a work of fiction can be authenticated
merely by appeal to historical sources. But a true story does not become truer
for being told as a romance.
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CHAPTER 3
GAZ[NG INTO THE ABYSS: THREE AMBWALENT TEXTS
He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not
become a monster. And when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also
gazes into you.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil
In his study of popular literature, Dockers and Detectives, Ken Worpole
includes a brief section on "The Literature of the Holocaust" and refers to the
way in which women's accounts of the concentration camps were marketed
as if contributions to the pornography of sadism. 1 I have my own example of
this: a copy of I Shall Fear No Evil, the story of a female doctor imprisoned
in Auschwitz, which has on its cover a voluptuous and scantily-clad woman
prostrate before a Gestapo officer who carries a whip. 2 Such crass
misrepresentation of extreme suffering is no longer so prevalent as a selling
point, thank goodness, but it has not vanished from our culture altogether.
The three novels I propose to examine here - The Painted Bird (1965) by Jerzy
Kosinski, Sophie's Choice (1979) by William Styron, and The White Hotel (1981)
by D.M. Thomas - are examples of a kind of voyeurism that attaches itself to
the (female) victims of atrocity while at the same time claiming to be a
sympathetic response. It is not simply a question of how these novels are written
(though it is largely that) but also of how they will be read. The naturalistic
description of cruelty that involves sexual degradation invites prurience whether
it is intended to or not.
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The Painted Bird, Sophie's Choice and The White Hotel have all enjoyed
a measure of critical acclaim and been bestsellers too. Even if Kosinski's novel
is currently out of print in this country, it is nevertheless useful to assess its
impact as a response to the same catastrophe that has inspired the two more
recent novels. Kosinski, himself a Polish Jew who survived the Nazi occupation
and emigrated to the United States after the war, was among the first writers
to challenge the taboos that surrounded the Holocaust, 3 though he chose not
to describe the camps themselves. The Painted Bird is instead full of detailed
descriptions of rape, brutal murder and bestiality. A boy has his eyes gouged
out by a jealous husband; a woman makes love with a goat; a young Jewish girl
dies after being raped by a peasant: these are only a few of the terrible scenes
we are forced to witness. According to Alvin Rosenfeld in A Double Dying,
"Kosinski may be the strongest example among the fabulists of the Holocaust"4
- but to dignify The Painted Bird as a fable is to ignore its cumulative effect.
It is certainly true that The Painted Bird is not a historical novel, even
though the author takes pains to leave us in no doubt as to the time and place
of its setting. We are told in a prologue that a six-year-old boy was sent by
his parents in the autumn of 1939 from a large city in Eastern Europe to the
shelter of a distant village, and that this same boy found himself wandering
from one village to another, suspected of being a Gypsy or a Jew because of
his olive complexion and dark features. Since we are also told that this is the
country of the death camps, we are clearly in Poland. The story itself is narrated
in the past tense by its own protagonist. Our first glimpse of the war as such,
however, is not until about a quarter of the way through, when the boy stumbles
on a German military outpost. Some time later, he also witnesses trains passing
that are carrying Jews crammed into cattle-trucks. Some peasants who have
been employed in the construction of a camp divulge all that they have seen.
The calendar is not mentioned at all until we learn that the boy is now ten and
- 90 -
it is the spring of 1943. History returns in the form of the liberating Soviet
army at the end of the summer of 1944.
The chief difficulty in accepting The Painted Bird as any kind of fable
is that the narrator lacks all authority. He may be an unnatural child because
he is caught up in unnatural circumstances, but leaving aside the question of
how plausible his own sexual experiences are, the pornographic lyricism that
characterizes his description of them only underlines his role throughout the
rest of the novel as voyeur:
I recalled the moments I had passed with Ewka.... My touch was gentle;
my hands, my mouth, my tongue, hovered consciously over her skin, soft
and delicate like gossamer floating in windless warm air. I continually sought
out new sensitive places unknown even to her, bringing them to life with
my touch, as rays of sunshine revive a butterfly chilled by the cool air of
the autumn night. I remembered my elaborate efforts and how they released
within the girl's body some yearnings and tremors that otherwise would have
been imprisoned there forever. I freed them, wanting her only to find pleasure
in herself.6
As an image of tenderness to contrast with the violence that attends other
sexual acts in the story, this is laughable. And I do not believe that a ten-year-
old boy, however precocious, would be so knowing, so proud of his sensitivity
as a lover.
The peasants that dominate the pages of The Painted Bird are anything
but sensitive; they are cruel, lewd and superstitious to the point of insanity.
Women no less than men are slaves to the libido and equally capable of savage
revenge. We are in the kingdom of the beasts, continually reminded that nature
is red in tooth and claw. The first violent image is that of a hawk swooping
on a pigeon. The story of the painted bird itself, doomed to be attacked by
its own kind on returning to the flock, is obviously a metaphor for the fate of
the individual in the oppressive communities that comprise the human sphere,
especially as far as the boy is concerned. We are in the nightmare world of
King Lear, a play that springs to mind as soon as we read the episode of the
miller blinding the ploughboy. Unlike the blinding of Gloucester, however, this
- 91 -
has no relation to anything else in the plot, except as yet another illustration
of barbarism. But Kosinski wants to claim more for it than that. In an interview
given in 1968, he describes it as a way of disclosing the reality of the camps:
The concentration camp as such is a symbol you can live with very well.
We do. It doesn't really perform any specific function. It's not as close
to us as the eyesight is. When you describe the atrocity of the concentration
camp you are immediately reminding the reader that this is not his reality.
It happened, you say, it happened in such and such a time.... But when you
describe the eyes being gouged out, you don't make it easier for the reader,
he cannot help feeling his own eyes disappearing somehow, becoming blind.7
And how is the reader supposed to feel when he is confronted by lurid
accounts of rape? Especially if it is implied that a woman is enjoying her ordeal,
as it is in the case of Stupid Ludmila, a woman raped by a gang of peasants
in her youth and now subjected to the same experience again. The trauma of
the first experience had addled her mind, to use the narrator's own words, and
left her with an insatiable sexual appetite. The suspicion that there is an element
of male fantasy at work here is surely confirmed by the final ingredient of female
submission:
A tall shepherd attacked the woman while she writhed below him, howling
at his every move. The man struck open-handed blows at her breasts, leaned
over and bit her nipples, and kneaded her rounded belly. When he finished
and rose, another man took his place. Stupid Ludmila moaned and shuddered
drawing the man to her with her arms and legs.8
Soon afterwards Stupid Ludmila is dead, but not at the hands of these men. She
is set on by women from the village who have long resented the anarchy of
her sexual behaviour. They beat her nearly to death, then ram a bottle full
of manure between her legs and kick it till it shatters inside her. Kosinski spares
us none of the horror; why should he? - this is what human beings do to one
another. Yes, but is it appropriate to describe it so literally in fiction? Any
moral impulse on the author's part is obscured by the apparent relish with which
he depicts the most abject cruelty.
Amid so much carnage it becomes arbitrary to single out specific examples:
almost every page contains a new one. However, the destruction wreaked by
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the Kalmuks (Cossacks?) before the arrival of the Soviet army (and with it the
notion of order) represents the apotheosis of lawlessness. Again Kosinski lays
it on with a trowel. We are numbed by a seemingly endless catalogue of rapes,
murders and torture, none of it perpetrated by the Nazis who, it must be noted,
barely feature in this particular vision of hell, in spite of Kosinski's own insistence
that the novel should be read as a response to the Holocaust. The drunken
Kalmuks, performing sadistic rites with abandon, are almost heroic in their
evil, so that one is tempted to regard the intervention of the disciplined Soviet
army as emanating from the author's superego. The description verges on the
rhapsodic at times. "The younger and more desirable girls were nearly torn
apart," we are told. Raping women on horseback merits being called a feat.
And sentences like "A woman moaned softly from time to time" 9
 have an
unfortunate erotic resonance.
The facts of rape are as appalling as anything Kosinski may care to invent.
They are related to the Holocaust not simply because countless Jewish women
were raped by Nazis, 1 ° but also because, as Kosinski unsuccessfully tries to
suggest, rape is an extreme form of assault, designed to humiliate the victim,
and thus has something in common with the dehumanization that took place
in the camps. Any comparison, however, any attempt to make one a symbol
for the other, is fraught with difficulty. Violent acts make poor metaphors
for the reason that they are in themselves too significant to signify something
else. If the Holocaust resists fictional treatment so, too, does rape. Styron
and Thomas also make the mistake, as we shall see, of assuming that the outrage
of the former can be expressed through close attention to the latter)1
Kosinski eschews the oblique approach, favouring instead a kind of
apocalyptic intensity. There is no use of irony, no change of perspective to
give the horror some relief. The passing of trainloads of Jews is almost incidental
to the local nightmare. The fate of the Jewish girl who escapes from one of
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these trains is just as terrible as if she had ended up in Auschwitz. Why does
Kosinski make peasants the ciphers of absolute evil? The Holocaust was
engineered by men of culture, which is a far more disturbing proposition to
consider. Witness George Steiner's discomfort in his Preface to Language and
Silence:
We know now that a man can read Goethe or Rilke in the evening, that he
can play Bach and Schubert, and go to his day's work at Auschwitz in the
morning. To say that he has read them without understanding or that his
ear is gross, is cant. In what way does this knowledge bear on literature
and society, on the hope, grown almost axiomatic from the time of Plato
to that of Matthew Arnold, that culture is a humanizing force, that the
energies of spirit are transferrable to those of conduct?13
To attempt to answer that question would produce a very different novel indeed
from The Painted Bird.
Kosinski's fictional jungle misses the point entirely. The glamorous SS
officer whom the boy encounters is no more convincing than the hordes of
illiterates who butcher their way through the countryside. To compare the
beauty of his face with one painted on a church wall, "bathed in organ music,
and touched only by light from the stained-glass windows" is just straining for
effect (the Antichrist in the image of Christ?). This is fantasy divorced from
any historical reality:
Nonchalantly the officer approached me, beating a swagger stick against
the seam of his freshly pressed breeches. The instant I saw him I could not
tear my gaze from him. His entire person seemed to have something utterly
superhuman about it. Against the background of bland colours he projected
an unfadable blackness. In the world of men with harrowed faces, with
smashed eyes, bloody, bruised and disfigured limbs, among the fetid, broken
human bodies, of which I had already seen so many, he seemed an example
of neat perfection that could not be sullied: the smooth, polished skin of
his face, the bright golden hair showing under his peaked cap, his pure metal
eyes. Every movement of his body seemed propelled by some tremendous
internal force. The granite sound of his language was ideally suited to order
death of inferior, forlorn creatures.
Here we have the stereotype of a blond-haired blue-eyed Nazi. The boy is
overwhelmed by a feeling of unworthiness. "In the presence of such a resplendent
being, armed in all the symbols of might and majesty, I was genuinely ashamed
of my appearance, t' he confesses. "I had nothing against his killing me."' 4 To
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the boy the officer is a symbol of power. To us he is merely a character in
a B-movie.
Having lost his voice as the result of one ordeal, the boy becomes a silent
witness. But before he is reunited with his parents, he will himself learn what
it is to be an executioner: while staying at the orphanage for displaced children
(whose own lawlessness rivals that of the adults in the book) he is an accomplice
in the derailment of a train carrying peasants on their way to market. The
parallel with the organization of the Final Solution is made explicit - the power
to decide the fate of other human beings) 5 The boy's initiation into the mystery
of evil is completed by the discovery that the peasant he and his companion
had sought to avenge themselves on was not among the dead. What we are
to infer from this is unclear. Equally unclear is the novel's conclusion, in which
the boy regains the use of his voice after a skiing accident during the spring
of the following year (a year after the war has ended):
The voice lost in a faraway village church had found me again and filled
the whole room. I spoke loudly and incessantly like the peasants and then
like the city folk, as fast as I could, enraptured by the sounds that were
heavy with meaning, as wet snow is heavy with water, confirming to myself
again and again that speech was now mine and that it did not intend to escape
through the door which opened onto the balcony)6
If this conclusion is intended to be optimistic, it is hardly warranted by
what has preceded it. Kosinski's morbid preoccupation with the body's
vulnerability prevents him from reflecting on the far greater vulnerability of
human identity. For all the shock value of describing physical abuse in detail,
there is little to be learnt from such information, which is anyway available
in a myriad news stories. People are driven out of their minds by the experience
of torture. Even those who survive are doomed to relive the agony in nightmares
(as we saw in Chapter 1). According to Kosinski, "The inability to see the trauma
of daily life as such breeds future victims."' 7 But trauma is precisely what
the author fails to convey. Even the fact that the boy loses his voice makes
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no material difference to the narrative, since what we read is in the form of
a report. At no point are we privileged to recognize the suffering that Kosinski
purports to uncover. The novel places us in the fatuous position of spectators
at a disaster, with the pretext that we are going to find out something about
the ambiguity of good and evil. The gesture of making a German soldier one
of the few humane characters in the story - the soldier who is given orders
to shoot the boy but who lets him escape instead 18 - seems finally gratuitous,
a way of reinforcing the dominant thesis of The Painted Bird; namely, that
most human beings are depraved, peasants more so than others.
The Erotic Sacrifice
The author of Sophie's Choice, William Styron, first wrote about Auschwitz
in an article for the New York Times, 25 June 1974, which was based on a visit
to the camp itself. 19 In this article Styron alludes to a survivor, "the once
devoutly Catholic Polish girl I knew many years ago, the memory of whom
impelled my visit to Auschwitz".2° Anyone who has read Sophie's Choice will
be aware that the prototype for the novel's heroine was this same survivor.
Unlike Sophie, however, the girl in question, or rather, woman, saw both her
children taken to the gas chamber and was therefore not forced to make the
choice on which Styron hinges his novel. 21 Be that as it may, Styron's chief
reason for discussing his visit to Auschwitz in the pages of the New York Times
is to state his belief that the Holocaust was not a specifically Jewish catastrophe,
to point out that "at Auschwitz perished not only the Jews but at least one
million souls who were not Jews":
Of many origins but mainly Slays - Poles, Slovaks, other - they came from
a despised people who almost certainly were fated to be butchered with
the same genocidal ruthlessness as were the Jews had Hitler won the war,
and they contained among them hundreds of thousands of Christians who
went to their despairing deaths in the belief that their God, the Prince of
Peace, was as dead as the God of Abraham and Moses.
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Styron claims not to be a Christian himself and invokes the fact that his
four children have a Jewish mother to endorse his credentials as a fair-minded
spokesman, but his obsession with the non-Jewish victims of the death camps
leads him to overstate his case. am speaking as a writer whose work has
often been harshly critical of Christian pretensions, hypocrisies and delusions,"
he assures us, only to undermine that assurance by seeking to exonerate the
Church of ultimate responsibility for antisemitism. Styron wants us to see
antisemitism in terms of "dark and mysterious discord", referring to it as "this
ancient animosity". All of which is grist to his mill where the meaning of the
Holocaust is at stake, for the Jews simply bore the brunt of a more universal
conflict. Styron chastises those who would argue that Hitler's war was primarily
a war against the Jews:
To take such a narrow view of the evil of Nazi totalitarianism is also to
ignore the ecumenical nature of that evil. For although the unparalleled
tragedy of the Jews may have been its most terrible single handiwork, its
threat to humanity transcended even this. If it was anti-Semitic, it was
also anti-Christian. And it attempted to be more final than that, for its
ultimate depravity lay in the fact that it was anti-human. Anti-life.23
Styron's position is not so much false as ill-advised. I am devoting space
to challenging it here because Sophie's Choice is the fruit of such a position
- a didactic novel that must be judged in the end by its own pretensions. What
Styron appears to ignore is that antisemitism was the cornerstone of Nazi
ideology; without it there would have been no Final Solution, no death camps.
Other so-called inferior races were used chiefly as slave labour and not designated
as such for extermination, though it is true that many were killed anyway.
I have no wish to deny that extreme suffering waas the lot of virtually all those
who found themselves prisoners in the camps, even if there were opportunities
for non-Jews to rise through the prison hierarchy and thus escape the worst
deprivation. But I do believe that a distinction still has to be made between
the fate of the Jews and the fate of everyone else in Europe. By blurring this
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distinction, Styron fails to acknowledge that Nazi totalitarianism was anti-human
because it was anti-Jewish, and not because it threatened other people too.
Styron's choice of a Polish Catholic to represent the victims of the
Holocaust, then, is polemical in origin. I find it almost impossible to write
about his novel dispassionately, for reasons which I hope will become clear.
Styron takes some seven hundred pages to relate the story of Sophie's experience
of Auschwitz and its sequel in her doomed love affair with a brilliant but
psychotic New York Jew, and barely a page goes by without the narrator, an
established writer called Stingo recalling the early days of his career, letting
us know how horny (if I may be permitted to use the appropriate argot) he was
at the time. Sophie's Choice - I will argue - is a paean to the (American) male
ego and its dream of total sexual gratification, with Auschwitz merely serving
as a glamorous backdrop.
The author's intention, as revealed in an interview published in 1985, was
to bring the story into the American grain:
Sophie's Choice is Stingo's tale. This is why Stingo is so utterly essential
to the whole story. If I had told it any other way the book would not have
made any ripples at all. It had to be told through the eyes of this young
man - this young American.... Perhaps it's a story not so much of Auschwitz
but of discovering evil. It's a time-honored technique to have the young
man revealed through a reminiscence by the older man of his youthful
experience. This was a measure of my distance from Auschwitz. Had I
gotten any closer, even if I had tried to tell it totally from Sophie's point
of view, it would have lacked resonance and would have had no conviction
whatsoever.
But the character of Stingo is a contributory factor in destroying what conviction
the story might have had. When asked why Auschwitz should figure at all in
Stingo's rite of passage, Styron can only reply "Because Stingo the elder, I, the
alter ego, felt an absolute fascination with Auschwitz."24
This identification of author and narrator might explain why Stingo's career
path bears an uncanny resemblance to Styron's own, but it does not begin to
justify the vanity of the twenty-two-year--old fledgling writer as he is presented
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to us by his older self. We could forgive Stingo for being naive, gauche and
obtuse, perhaps, since immaturity is not a capital offence, if only we could
forget that his story is being told in retrospect. The youthful Stingo is cherished
and indulged like a puppy. The narrator takes great pride in his earlier
concupiscence, more or less boasting, in fact, as if we should applaud the vigour
of his hormones.
Not surprisingly, Stingo's first impression of Sophie is entirely physical.
If we are seriously to believe that he falls in love with her almost at once, partly
on the grounds that she resembles an old flame who has recently killed herself
(no occasion for melodrama is passed over), we must also accept that this love
is emphatically carnal. With only a glimpse of the tattoo on her forearm to
go by, Stingo is able to visualize the emaciated camp detainee inside the beautiful
woman:
As she went slowly up the stairs I took a good look at her body in its clinging
silk summer dress. While it was a beautiful body, with all the right
prominences, curves, continuities and symmetries, there was something
a little strange about it - nothing visibly missing and not so much deficient
as reassembled. And that was precisely it, I could see. The odd quality
proclaimed itself through the skin. It possessed the sickish plasticity (at
the back of her arms it was especially noticeable) of one who has suffered
severe emaciation and whose flesh is even now in the last stages of being
restored. Also, I felt that underneath that healthy suntan there lingered
the sallowness of a body not wholly rescued from a terrible crisis. But none
of these at all diminished a kind of wonderfully negligent sexuality having
to do at that moment, at least, with the casual but forthright way her pelvis
moved and with her truly sumptuous rear end. Despite past famine, her
behind was as perfectly formed as some fantastic prize-winning pear; it
vibrated with magical eloquence, and from this angle it so stirred my depths
that I mentally pledged to the Presbyterian orphanages of Virginia a quarter
of my future earnings as a writer in exchange for that bare ass's brief lodging
- thirty seconds would do - within the compass of my cupped, supplicant
palms.'5
There may be room for debate (at this stage, anyway) about what constitutes
pornography, but Alvin Rosenfeld is surely right, in commenting on this passage,
to identify Sophie as a new type of sex object - "the Mutilated Woman". 26 Sophie
is an amalgam of suffering and eroticism, a siren who is herself cursed by the
stain of Auschwitz. Stingo finds the combination irresistible.
- 99 -
Lest we lose sight of the author's overall objective, let us return briefly
to his own appraisal:
I think it is a book in which the Holocaust is overwhelmingly present, but
which is more than that - a metaphor for something else. The metaphor
lay in the title of the book - choice, Sophie's choice. The metaphor lay in
the epigraph I use in the book from Mairaux: "I seek that essential region
in the soul where absolute evil confronts brotherhood." What is absolute
evil? Absolute evil, to my mind, as a metaphor, is, or can be, or must be,
an act in which a woman is forced to murder her own child, whether she
be Jewish, Gypsy, Pole, Russian, French, or whatever. This seized me as
being a metaphor for absolute evil as represented by Nazism. That is what
impelled me more than anything else to write about the Holocaust. Not,
God forbid, to write it from the vantage point of Elie Wiesel, the point of
view of the barracks, the tortures, the beatings, the terrible deprivation.27
Does Styron's claim for the significance of the choice that Sophie is forced
to make stand up to investigation, though? - leaving aside the question of its
relation to the rest of the novel for the time being. In what sense is it a metaphor
for absolute evil as represented by Nazism? There is no evidence to suggest
that the Nazis were in the habit of forcing mothers to choose between their
children on the ramp at Auschwitz. It would be more pertinent to show how
the Nazis were systematic in their cruelty rather than wantonly sadistic. Sophie's
choice is a dramatic device calculated to shock the reader rather than an
appropriate metaphor for totalitarianism. The crime to be addressed is the
wholesale destruction of human beings - Jews in particular - not the imposition
of outrageous dilemmas.
As a postscript to the revelation of Sophie's choice, Stingo confesses to
us that he has often brooded since upon "the enigma of Dr Jemand. von
Niemand"28 - his clumsily invented name for the Nazi doctor responsible. A
more tenuous explanation for the man's behaviour would be hard to imagine:
At the very least he was a maverick, a sport.... The doctor must have waited
a long time to come face to face with Sophie and her children, hoping to
perpetrate his ingenious deed. And what, in the private misery of his heart,
I think he most intensely lusted to do was to inflict upon Sophie, or someone
like her - some tender and perishable Christian - a totally unpardonable
sin. It is precisely because he had yearned with such passion to commit
this terrible sin that I believe that the doctor was exceptional, perhaps unique,
among his fellow SS automata: if he was not a good man or a bad man, he
still retained a potential capacity for goodness, as well as evil, and his
strivings were essentially religious. '9
,-loo-
Let me point out straightaway that to describe members of the SS as automata
is pernicious nonsense. They may not have accepted responsibility for what
they were doing; in some complex way they may even, as Hannah Arendt and
Gnter Grass both suggest, 3 ° have been ignorant that they were responsible
for what they were doing; what is beyond doubt, however, is that they were
human beings - with a capacity for reason and a highly-developed
self-consciousness. They, too, had a choice. If they chose to offer complete
obedience to the Fthrer's will, they were no more automata than monks are.
Alvin Rosenfeld has already condemned this passage in A Double Dying,31
but he omits to mention the most disturbing anomaly of all. Thousands of Jews,
many of them religious, would have had their fate decided by Dr Jemand von
Niemand, and we are asked to believe that all along he had been waiting for
"some tender and perishable Christian" like Sophie, who unwittingly revealed
herself to be a devout Catholic, so that he could commit an unpardonable sin.
Perhaps in his eyes the Jews didn't count, but in our eyes they must. "Some
tender and perishable Christian" is Stingo's expression, no one else's (except,
of course, the author's), just as the whole analysis is a product of his own
imagination, based solely on Sophie's revelation that the doctor, contrary to
SS regulations, was drunk and unkempt. "I have always assumed," Stingo goes
on to confide, "that when he encountered Sophie, Dr Jemand von Niemand was
undergoing the crisis of his life: cracking apart like bamboo, disintegrating
at the very moment that he was reaching out for salvation."32
As the author/narrator warms to his theme, the poor doctor becomes
an object of pity: a man unable to live without God and driven to extreme
measures by the need to experience a sense of sin. Kenneth Surin, an Anglican
theologian, has praised Styron for the astuteness of this insight. "Styron's novel,"
he tells us in an article called "Atonement and Moral Apocalypticism: William
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Styron's Sophie's Choice", " is a remarkable study in the psychology of morals."33
Surin is more than happy to endorse Stingo's view of the matter, is quite prepared
to improve on it even:
Hope is a modality of love, arid where there is no love there can be no hope.
And where there is no hope there can be no faith in the God of the future;
and where there is no faith in the God of the future there can be no
surrendering of our own future into the hands of God, no trust in the mystery
of God. This is perhaps why von Niemand snatched so desperately at the
chance to engineer his own salvation. His faith - for he is a religious man
- lacks an eschatalogical dimension, and hence resides in the "already" of
the God who is instead of the "not yet" of the God who is to come.34
It might seem churlish to remind Surin that all Sophie in fact tells the narrator
is that von Niemand was arrestingly handsome, possibly aristocratic, almost
certainly drunk, and had a sprinkling of boiled-rice grains on the lapel of his
tunic. From this it is quite ludicrous to infer so emphatically that he must
have been a religious man simply because he also proved capable of being a
sadist.
More importantly, this raises the question of how we are to read Sophie's
testimony. Stingo lets us know that her earlier confessions contain a number
of untruths but is himself guilty of embellishing much of what we are meant
to accept as authentic revelation, especially if it has anything to do with Sophie's
sexuality. Rosenfeld is critical of the introduction of Rudolf H6ss, the
commandant of Auschwitz, as a fictional character, largely on the grounds
that he is portrayed in an overly sympathetic light,35 and it is certainly true
that the author's characterization of him lacks any depth. The essential problem,
however, is that Auschwitz itself in this novel lacks depth. Stingo is too proud
of his gifts as a storyteller to let Sophie's experiences speak for themselves.
He has to smother everything she tells him with the thick sauce of what he
takes to be realism. Not only is it indigestible, it is also stretching our credulity.
Would Sophie conceivably have described being raped by Hess's lesbian
housekeeper so minutely, for example? Here is an extract from Stingo's version:
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Having made her decision moments before, Sophie was not about to resist
or protest - in a kind of headlong autohypnosis she had placed herself beyond
revulsion, realizing in any case that she was as helpless as a crippled moth
- and let her thighs, submissively, be spread apart as the brutish muzzle
and the bullethead of a tongue probed into what, with some dull distant
satisfaction, she realized was her obdurate dryness, as parched and without
juice as desert sand.6
"I long to have intercourse with you," Höss confesses to Sophie, though he
is unwilling to take the risk. Sophie's misfortune is that everyone longs to have
intercourse with her, no one more so than Stingo himself. Her experience of
sexual assault begins when a female Kapo tries to rape her. The implication
that Sophie is fated to be an erotic sacrifice is reinforced by our knowledge
that soon after her arrival in New York she was subjected to what the narrator
refers to as digital rape while travelling on the subway. Naturally this assault
has been described to us in lurid detail. The real climax of the novel is reached
when Stingo finally gets what he has been waiting for - not the truth about
what happened at Auschwitz but a night in bed with Sophie. His failure hitherto
to get laid has provided the story with its moments of comic relief, even if
I, for one, do not find them funny. This failure has taken the form of two
disastrous encounters: one with the stereotype of a Jewish princess called Leslie
Lapidus, whose analyst has taught her to talk dirty but not yet cured her fear
of the sexual act itself, and the other with a Southern belle called Mary Alice,
whom Stingo describes in his journal at the time as "a Whack-off artist".37
At no point does Stingo regard his own behaviour as in any way wrong-headed.
As he sees it, these women are frigid and he is their victim. Stingo the elder
does nothing to revise this view. The relation between affection and sex remains
invisible. Women exist, it would appear, in order to satisfy the rampant desires
of men.
Hot-blooded Stingo proves his manhood in the space of a single night with
Sophie. His first sexual experience with her had also been a flop - the day they
spent on the beach together - but - he now redeems himself with flying colours.
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Sophie initiates him into the mysteries of sex with the gusto of a prima donna,
and we are all invited to attend. "The varieties of sexual experience are, I
suppose, so multifarious that it is an exaggeration to say that Sophie and I did
that night everything it is possible to do," the narrator reminisces. "But I'll
swear we came close, and one thing forever imprinted on my brain was our
mutual inexhaustibility."38
The next day Sophie is dead, having returned to Brooklyn to fulfil her
destiny with Nathan. The note she leaves Stingo in their hotel room reads like
a parody of what someone with a poor command of English might write. Sophie
has made her choice: death rather than life, Nathan rather than Stingo. But
Stingo at least has the assurance that he is a great lover. His future is not
after all to be shared with Sophie on a peanut farm in the South, but the future
beckons nonetheless. "This was not judgement day - only morning," the novel
ends. "Morning: excellent and fair."39 It is the morning after the funeral. Stingo
has shed his tears, fallen into a drunken sleep, and awoken to a new day. Soon
his first novel will be published to considerable acclaim. Stingo, in fact, has
got it made - he is the true survivor, living proof that the American Dream
is there for anyone who stays the course. Against a background of sublime
music, each masterpiece named for the benefit of the reader ("the ravishing
sweet heartbeat of the slow movement of Beethoven's Fourth Symphony",4°
for example), Sophie and Nathan have acted out the tragedy of doomed lovers,
the theme of great art since time immemorial. Stingo's choric voice forbids
us to mourn beyond the proper span. Life must go on.
And so must I. Up until now I have merely complained about the
intrusiveness of the narrator's sordid and priapic lust. There is worse to come.
The character of Nathan represents the nadir of Sophie's Choice for several
reasons, chief of which is linked to the way in which Stingo chooses to describe
Nathan's relationship with Sophie, sensationalizing its alternation of violence
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and tenderness in order to arouse our curiosity, if not to titillate. The revelation
towards the end of the novel that Nathan is a paranoid schizophrenic who has
spent much of his adult life in institutional care is the stuff of melodrama.44
Up until then we are under the impression, along with Stingo and Sophie (though,
of course, Stingo the narrator knows the truth), that Nathan is a high-powered
research scientist on the verge of making some important new discovery. His
fits of inexplicable rage are to be explained in terms of his drug abuse
(amphetamines and cocaine), if they are to be explained at all.
Nathan is cast as Sophie's saviour-cum-destroyer, rescuing her from the
abyss of her camp experiences only to plunge her into a hell of his own. Even
those who have sought to defend the novel against its detractors are obliged
to concede that there is something seriously wrong here, unless, like Allen
Shepherd in an article on "The Psychopath as Moral Agent in William Styron's
Sophie's Choice", they try to convince us that Nathan's suffering is the equal
of Sophie's. "Styron's concern is neither evasion nor exoneration," Shepherd
claims; "it is rather to render a true account of American initiation, even of
the American attempt to democratize evil." 42
 I have no idea what Shepherd
means by this, but if Nathan is a psychopath he is also a Jew. It is puzzling
that the author should have given Sophie's nemesis a Jewish identity. That
Sophie sought to ingratiate herself with Rudolf H6ss by posing as an antisemite,
may have compounded her sense of guilt but hardly justifies Nathan's obsession
with how she survived. It is her suffering, her suffering as a non-Jew, moreover,
that is impressed upon us. "Although she was not Jewish," Stingo writes, "she
had suffered as much as any Jew who had survived the same afflictions, and
- as I think will be made plain - had in certain profound ways suffered more
than most."43
Jewish suffering, then, does not fail within the domain of this novel. We
are more alert to Nathan's cruelty than any mental torture he might have to
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endure. The only positive interpretation of Styron's decision to make Nathan
a Jew which seems plausible is that offered by the Anglo-Jewish writer Arnold
Wesker - in a review article on Sophie's Choice published in Encounter (January
1980). "The tragedy of a race locked in seemingly endless conflict with the
world," he suggests, "is played out here through two people locked in mortal
combat with one another." But, as Wesker himself acknowledges, this does
not square with the novel's dnouement:
But so preoccupied is Styron with sustaining narrative suspense that he invents
twists and turns of plot at the cost of a diminished metaphor: the clinically
mad Jew rather than the Jew driven mad. I know that whom the Gods destroy
they first make mad, but the Gods are fate in the form of worldly misfortune,
not chemistry gone wrong in the genes.44
Wesker is nevertheless a great admirer of the novel as a whole. His most
lavish praise is reserved for Styron's courage in seeking to counter the Holocaust
with an uninhibited celebration of the lust for life:
His courage lies in his attempt to reach some "bearable" perspective of
that grotesque time of carnage by recording the life force that clings on
after, and his achievement is to have coupled respect with juicy enthusiasms
for life, sex and art, each inextricably linked with the other. He seems
to be saying through his novel: "I pussyfoot with none of these - I fuck with
zest, live voraciously, and have been prepared to take twelve years writing
my book, nor will I pussyfoot with this outrageous episode that has taken
place in my life's time. I need to know and understand just as Sophie needed
me to know and understand and so she revealed all...."45
But this is not courage at all; it is braggadocio. Styron could have used the
twelve years he is alleged to have taken over Sophie's Choice more wisely. His
narrator is too preoccupied with the mechanics of sex to have any inkling of
what someone like Sophie must have endured, and expects us to share his
obsession. The novel has the corrosive effect of pornography, all the more
disturbing for its use of Auschwitz as a means to gain respectability.
If there remains any doubt concerning how pernicious Sophie's Choice
really is, let me draw attention to the subject of fellatio as it is treated in the
novel. It is first introduced in the form of a dream - a dream Stingo has after
moving in to the pink rooming house in Flatbush. 46
 It also features in one of
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Sophie's dreams in Auschwitz, which is a dream about the devil, relayed to us
by Stingo with vivid eloquence.47 By this time we are aware that Nathan has
taught Sophie not to feel guilty about her own penchant for fellatio. But we
are also aware that he has used it to humiliate her in the course of one of his
psychotic moods, and it is this episode, given the narrator's full coverage, which
confirms for me the real identity of the book. For here an event of sickening
depravity is made even more obscene in the telling. Sophie has been relating
to Stingo how she and Nathan had driven to New England in the autumn of 1946
(the previous year), at a time when Nathan's paranoia was in full flood. It was
his intention that they should commit suicide together then. Due to a juggling
of time-sequences to heighten the impact, we already know that Nathan is going
to kick Sophie repeatedly in the ribs and try to urinate in her mouth. He calls
her Irma Griese as a vicious taunt - a woman found guilty of murdering Jews
at Auschwitz and hanged for it only days before:
Even with his crazy whispered rhyme repeated again and again - "Don't
be a teaser, Irma Griese" - even with his hand remorselessly twisting her
hair as if from its roots, even with his other hand at her shoulder clamped
down with sickening pain and force, even with the pervasive sense he
transmits, lying there, shuddering, of a man far over the brink and prowling
his own demented underworld - even with the feverish fright engulfing her
she cannot help but feel the old delectable pleasure as she sucks him. And
sucks and sucks and sucks. And endlessly loving sucks. Her fingers claw
the loamy earth of the wooded hillside upon which he lies underneath her,
she feels the earth impacting itself beneath her fingernails. The ground
is damp and chill, she smells woodsmoke, and through her eyelids' translucency
is filtered the incredible radiance of the foliage afire. And she sucks and
sucks. Beneath her knees fragments of shale gouge and hurt, but she makes
no move to ease the pain. "Oh Jesus Christ, oh fuck, suck me Irma, suck
the Jew-boys." She cups his firm balls in her palm, strokes the delicate
spider-web hair. As always she envisions within the hollow of her mouth
the slippery surface of a marble palmtree, the soft spongy head, its fronds
swelling and blossoming in the darkness of her brain. "This relationship,
this unique thing we have, this ecstatic symbiosis," she remembers, "could
only result from the meeting of a large stiff lonely Semitic schlong, which
has been successfully circumvented by an army of terrified Jewish princesses,
and a set of beautiful Slavic mandibles starved for fellatio." And she thinks
even now in her discomfort, in her fear: Yes, yes, he even gave me that,
laughing, he took away that guilt anyway when he said how absurd it was
for me to feel shame about longing so madly to suck a cock, it wasn't my
fault that my husband was frigid and didn't want me to and my lover in Warsaw
wouldn't suggest it and I couldn't begin the thing - I was merely, he said,
the victim of two thousand years of anti-sucking Judeo-Christian conditioning.
That lousy myth, he said, that only faggots love sucking. Suck me, he always
said, enjoy, enjoy! So even now with the cloud of fear around her, while
he taunts her and abuses her - even now her pleasure is not mere mild
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enjoyment but the perennially re-created bliss, and chill waves shiver down
her back as she sucks and sucks and sucks.48
I could go on, but I think my point has been made. Stingo continues in much
the same vein. (Sophie told him all this?)
Earlier in the novel, Stingo catches Sophie in an unguarded moment without
her teeth in and is stunned to behold "an old hag whose entire lower face had
crumpled in upon itself, leaving a mouth like a crumpled gash and an expression
of doddering senescence". But the casualty of Auschwitz has been put back
together again by American technology. Her false teeth are the handiwork
of "one of New York's classiest practitioners of prosthodontia". "Those teeth
were hard to forget," Stingo tells us. "They had to be the dental equivalent
of Benvenuto Cellini."49 And put back together again - "reassembled" - is how
Stingo sees her. Nathan gets the credit for repairing her sexually, even as we
watch him tear her apart psychologically. Stingo's fantasy of marrying Sophie
and making her into a good American housewife reflects a similar disregard
for her state of mind. He expects her to forget Nathan at once, as if her feelings
were as synthetic as her teeth. Nathan was no more than a warm-up man for
Stingo - the tender, the true - who is simply dying to experience fellatio for
himself. "I would lie there and let her suck me until my hair grew thin and
gray," he boasts when his night of ecstasy begins. 50 Stingo helps to destroy
Sophie as surely as mad Nathan does, though the author would not have us think
so. Stingo's crass philosophy of wholesome living must have reinforced Sophie
(who could never be made whole) in her conviction that she had nothing to live
for.
Need it be added that the references to George Steiner and others, the
snippets of historical detail, are all irrelevant, except in so far as they lend
Sophie's Choice a superficial air of gravity? The narrator rejects Steiner's
proposal that silence may be the most appropriate response to the horror of
the camps. "I have thought it might be possible to make a stab at understanding
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Auschwitz," he contends, "by trying to understand Sophie, who to say the least
was a cluster of contradictions."51 Since no understanding of the fictional
Sophie is to be gleaned from the novel, it follows that Auschwitz itself remains
as distant as ever.
In his summing up, as it were, Stingo retrieves some lines from his old
journal. "Let your love flow out on all living things" is one of them. Stingo
meditates upon this sentence with utter seriousness, oblivious of its banality,
conceding only that it "may be a little too facile". For him it is "a reminder
of some fragile yet perdurable hope". 52 Sophie's Choice is an unutterably fatuous
book - sentimental, pornographic kitsch. "Having understood, absorbed, and
digested the Holocaust (in so far as the worst nightmare in our experience can
be grasped)," one eminent reviewer wrote, "Styron recycles and distills his
immense reading into scenes (always the crucial unit in his fiction) of awesome
power." 53 It is indicative of how far our culture lacks a coherent moral framework
within which to make sense of Auschwitz that anyone could mistake this trash
for the genuine article.
Poetic Licence
D.M. Thomas's The White Hotel is perhaps a more difficult novel to assess.
It has widely been regarded as a tour de force, partly, I suspect, because of
the boldness with which the author adopts his various disguises - hysterical
woman, Sigmund Freud, paternalistic narrator, eyewitness to atrocity, visionary
- but also because of the sheer density of symbolism which defies anyone to
say that it signifies nothing. Written in seven sections, the novel shifts from
one style to another, very much after the fashion of postmodernist fiction.
Nabokov's Pale Fire (1962), for example, which also begins with a long poem,
may well have been a source of inspiration. "For the first half of the novel,"
one critic has been moved to observe, "The White Hotel seems nothing so much
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as a piece of surfictionist formalist adventurism." 54 All is not what it seems,
how ever.
Crudely stated, The White Hotel tells the story of how an ex-patient of
Freud's came to be a victim of the massacre at Babi Yar (a ravine on the outskirts
of Kiev) in September 1941, when over 33,000 Jews were murdered by an
Einsatzkommando in the space of two days. 55
 As a novel it is an absorbing
exercise. What concerns me here, though, is the attempt to relate a pornographic
fantasy (allegedly imagined or dreamt by the novel's protagonist, Lisa Erdman)
to the Holocaust through the medium of a fictional character endowed with
second sight.
After the Prologue, in which Lisa is first introduced to us via some
correspondence between Freud and his colleagues, this fantasy is presented
to us in its original form as a poem. "I think of myself as a poet who writes
novels as well as poems," Thomas has said, 56 and what better way to get a wider
audience for your poetry than to incorporate it into a novel? The poem, I might
add, came first, then the idea for the novel (after Thomas had read Anatoli
Kuznetsov's Babi Yar), even though Lisa is its putative author. Thomas provides
a disclaimer for its subject matter by getting Freud in the Prologue to stress
that the author of the poem was suffering from "a severe sexual hysteria" at
the time.58
Lisa imagines an orgastic encounter with Freud's son in a white lakeside
hotel, and Thomas clearly enjoys the licence it gives him to be as sexually explicit
as possible. However, Frank Conroy, commenting on the novel in Partisan Review
(Winter 1982), points out that the eroticism has a distinctly masculine tone.59
"Beneath our rug your son's right hand was jammed! up to the wrist inside me,
laced in skin," for example, is less than convincing as a description of the woman's
sensations. Or again: "I leaned upon the rail, he came behind! and rammed
up into me, he got so far! up into me, my still half-wintry heart! burst into
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sudden flower, I couldn't tell! which hole it was." 60 She couldn't tell which
hole it was? Her lover's virility is the thing: with constant reference to his
erect penis. 61 Moreover, the structure of the poem is anachronistic, given
that it was apparently written in 1920, and surely too stylized to be the work
of someone versifying at whim.
Conveniently for the imaginary Freud, the fantasy combines Eros and
Thanatos, the libido and the death instinct, in equal measure. It is repeated
in a prose version of some fifty pages (for the benefit of those readers who
might have skipped the poem, perhaps), under the heading of "The Gastein
Journal", so that a third of the novel is over before the explanations - initially
in the form of a case study - begin. Thomas invites us to take on Freud at his
own game, as it were, and guess the meaning of the various symbols, but to
accept the invitation is to credit the fantasy with a plausibility it almost certainly
lacks. We have an unfair advantage over the great man, anyway, in knowing
something of what lies ahead. The severe pains in Lisa's left breast and pelvic
region that Freud treats as symptoms of hysteria are warning signs from the
future.
Indeed, what Thomas is trying to do at Freud's expense is to make a case
for precognition. Jumbled up with the erotomania is a prophetic vision of Babi
Yar. Lisa herself will survive the shooting only to suffer a more agonizing death.
An SS man will swing his boot into her left breast as she lies among the corpses,
and also into her pelvis. A Ukrainian accomplice will rape her with a bayonet.
Thomas's matter-of-fact description of this heightens its impact, reminding
us at the same time that the rest of the novel has no bearing on its reality.62
Lisa's second sight is unable to save her from history. The point is that the
massacre at Babi Yar happened, not that Lisa unwittingly foresaw it.
As for the authenticity of Thomas's report, he freely acknowledges his
debt to the eyewitness testimony of Dina Pronicheva, possibly the only survivor,
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whose account of the massacre is retold by Anatoli Kuznetsov in Babi Yar.6
"I agree with the people who say that you shouldn't fictionalize it," Thomas
claims, referring to the Holocaust as a whole and providing himself with an
alibi for having reproduced parts of Kuznetsov's text as his own:
It's too real and still too painful for people who lost parents and so on. Simply,
my imagination failed before it. So what I did was to bring my fictional
heroine closer and closer to Dma Pronicheva, the actual survivor, and to
make it clear in the text and also in acknowledgments that I was doing so.
My heroine was in the same group, the last group of Babi Yar, and what
Dma saw, my heroine saw. For a while, therefore, they move step by step
with each other, and fiction becomes dissolved for a few moments in history.
That was the only way I could deal with it. Lisa's thoughts are her own but
what she saw could only be the historical reaiity.6
If this provides an effective defence against the charge of plagiarism, it also
reveals certain anomalies in Thomas's approach. Lisa's death is an imagined
death. Doubtless many atrocities like raping a woman with a bayonet did take
place, but Dma's testimony does not include that specific one. It is anyway
disingenuous to side with those who argue against the fictional treatment of
the Holocaust, when you are the author of a novel that would be regarded by
them as an example of what they deplore. Thomas's version of Babi Yar is
rendered fictional by its context.
Immediately after Thomas has described Lisa's death he tries to tie up
the loose ends of the fiction. "The soul of man is a far country, which cannot
be approached or explored," he intones, recalling the saying by Heraclitus that
Freud quotes in one of his letters to Lisa. We are then given a homily on the
victims of the massacre:
Most of the dead were poor and illiterate. But every single one of them
had dreamed dreams, seen visions and had amazing experiences, even the
babes in arms (perhaps especially the babes in arms). Though most of them
had never lived outside the Podol slum, their lives were as rich and complex
as Lisa Erdman-Berenstein's. If a Sigmund Freud had been listening and
taking notes from the time of Adam, he would still not fully have explored
even a single group, even a single person.65
This is a spurious way of making the earlier pornography seem part of the story.
We are no closer to the real Lisa for having been taken inside her
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white hotel. If her life was rich and complex, we only have the author's word
f or it. We know that she was an opera singer, that she was afraid to have
children, that she became a step-mother to her second husband's son, Kolya,
and that she died with Kolya at Babi Yar. The patronizing suggestion by Thomas
that slum-dwellers are no less human than the educated middle class obscures
the fact that Lisa is barely revealed to us as a person at all.
A more serious flaw in the novel's construction is the importance Thomas
attaches to Lisa's premonitions (which include foreseeing the death of Freud's
grandson). If the physical pain that begins to afflict Lisa in 1915 is an intimation
of what she will endure in 1941, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the
Holocaust was preordained. This is reinforced by what would appear to be an
instance of ESP on Freud's part, when he faints because of Jung's continued
reference to corpses (albeit peat-bog ones) during a conversation in 1909.66
A central mystification at work in The White Hotel is that Jews knew at a
subconscious level what was coming. They were doomed, Thomas appears to
be saying, as if history possessed the inevitability of tragic fate. But historical
events are inevitable only in retrospect, and while it is true to suggest that
antisemitism was rife in Europe before Hitler's rise to power, Jews had no more
reason than anyone else to anticipate the unprecedented totality of the Nazi
campaign.
Lisa concealed from Freud the fact that her own father, a grain merchant,
was a Jew, and with it the story of how she had been sexually assaulted by a
group of sailors working on one of his ships in Odessa. These men had forced
her to commit acts of oral sex with them at the same time as they reviled her
for being Jewish. Lisa reveals all this in a letter to Freud in 1931 - in reply
to his request to publish his case study of her - and by so doing undermines our
faith in the psychoanalyst's skill as a detective. Her first marriage was a failure,
moreover, because her husband was a thoroughgoing antisemite who knew nothing
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of her background. "He said he loved me,' Lisa writes; "but if he had, known
I had Jewish blood he would have hated me. Whenever he said 'I love you' I
understood it as 'I hate
A few years after writing this letter, despite confessing to Freud that
she had been made to feel ashamed of her Jewishness, Lisa in fact marries a
Jew - Victor Berenstein. And by assuming responsibility when Victor dies (a
victim of Stalin's purges) for the welfare of his son Kolya, she ensures that
her fate will be to accompany the boy, along with all the other Jews of Kiev,
to the ravine at Babi Yar. Lisa's own diagnosis of her condition proves closer
to the truth than Freud's elaborate case study:
I cannot explain my pains either. (They have recurred from time to time.)
I still think they're organic, in some peculiar way; and I keep expecting,
every time I visit a doctor, for him to say I've been suffering from some
outlandish disease in my breast and ovary for the past fifteen years! The
"asthma" at fifteen may have been hysterical, I grant you that; but I don't
think the rest is. Let's try to look at it afresh. I lost my mother when I
was five. That was terrible; but as you say, there are orphans everywhere.
She died in dreadfully immoral circumstances - and very painfully. Yes,
but I could come to terms with it. Is there any family without a skeleton
in the cupboard? Frankly I didn't always wish to talk about the past; I was
more interested in what was happening to me then, and what might happen
in the future. In a way you made me become fascinated by my mother's
sin, and I am forever grateful to you for giving me the opportunity to delve
into it. But I don't believe for one moment that had anything to do with
my being crippled with pain.68
Poor old Freud! He was too preoccupied with the past to see into the
future. Lisa saw but could not understand, even saw into a future not her own:
it is Dma Pronicheva who hears Motya say "Don't be scared, lady! I'm alive
too," even though the boy in Lisa's fantasy says more or less the same thing.
Thomas takes the trouble to draw our attention to this:
Lisa had once dreamt those words, when she was taking the thermal springs
at Gastein with Aunt Magda. But it is not really surprising, for she had
clairvoyant gifts and naturally a part of her went on living with these
survivors: Dma, and the little boy who trembled and shivered all over.69
Naturally? The author is intent on hoodwinking us into believing that he is
some kind of authority on the paranormal. It's as if he wanted to put his own
searing description of the massacre behind him with a jolly little puzzle about
the nature of human perception.
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"Nor can the living speak for the dead," Thomas goes on to assert. What
exactly has he been doing then? And still doing now: "The thirty thousand
became a quarter of a million," we read. "A quarter of a million white hotels
in Babi Yar. (Each of them had a Vogel, a Madame Cottin, a priest, a prostitute,
a honeymoon couple, a soldier poet, a baker, a chef, a gypsy band.)" 70 By the
end of October 1941, some quarter of a million Jews had indeed been slaughtered
by the Einsatzgruppen (killing squads), if not all of them at Babi Yar. 71
 Surely
we are not to measure the value of human lives, though, in terms of a capacity
to fantasize about sex? Thomas concludes this section with references to the
grotesque industry that the pit of corpses was to generate, as well as the refusal
of the Russians after the war to honour the dead with any kind of memorial,
unable to see how self-indulgent his commentary must seem by comparison.
"But all this," he ends, "had nothing to do with the guest, the soul, the lovesick
bride, the daughter of Jerusalem." 72 He might as well have been referring
to the novel itself.
The final section, called "The Camp", represents Thomas's bid for a happy
ending. It is an optimistic vision of purgatory modelled on the emigration of
survivors to Palestine. The author has been careful when interviewed, however,
to deny that this has any political significance. "Perhaps it says that, faced
with an experience like the Holocaust," he explains, "there is no salvation within
history, that if there is healing, it is somewhere beyond history." 73 As an image
of redemption it has certain parallels with Lisa's fantasy about the white hotel,
not least of which is a woman's capacity to breastfeed at will. 74 Thomas wants
us to make the connection. "Despite their weariness the passengers exclaimed
with pleasure, seeing an oasis - green grass, palm trees, sparkling water," we
read, as Lisa and Kolya arrive in this new world. "And the building itself looked
more like a hotel than a transit camp." When Lisa tells her mother "I think
wherever there is love, of kind, there is hope of salvation" and then corrects
herself, remembering the bayonet, with the words "Wherever there is love in
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the heart" - we are being offered the same wisdom as before: "The spirit of
the white hotel was against selfishness." 75 The only evil, ultimately, is death
itself, and those who have obeyed the spirit of the white hotel are assured of
a gradual recovery from their mortal sickness.
However cloying Thomas's idyll may be, it does at least have a sort of
dream-logic. Which is not the case with the glimpse of the life to come revealed
to us by Christian theologians Roy and Alice Eckardt at the end of Long Night's
Journey into Day (a meditation on faith after the Holocaust). "There is the
assurance of the fully eschatological character of the Resurrection," they
proclaim:
Redemption comes, redemption is coming.... That young Jewish prophet
from the Gailee sleeps now. He sleeps with the other Jewish dead, with
all the disconsolate and scattered ones of the murder camps, and with the
unnumbered dead of the human and the nonhuman family. But Jesus of
Nazareth shall be raised. So too shall the small Hungarian children of
Auschwitz. Once upon a time, they shall again play and they shall laugh.
The little one of Terezin shall see another butterfly. We shall all sing and
we shall all dance. And we shall love one another....70
If there is a hint of desperation underlying such faith ("Once upon a time....),
it is nevertheless faith being affirmed here rather than the consolations of
storytelling. "There are things so far beyond belief that it ought to be possible
to awake from them," Thomas writes, as the nightmare of Babi Yar is brought
into focus.77 His fantasy ending is a tacit acknowledgment that it's not possible.
"Everything will come right," the Eckardts reassure us, 78 as if the small
Hungarian children of Auschwitz could be restored to health with some new
toys and an eternity of play-time. Even the idea of purgatory seems wanting
when we are confronted by the victims of atrocity. Lisa's physical pains are
beginning to abate, but what of her trauma? Memory plays an important part
in Thomas's narrative, and yet only amnesia could alleviate the mental anguish
- which may explain why The White Hotel ends with the suggestion that memory,
too, can be healed:
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She smelt the scent of a pine tree. She couldn't place it.... It troubled her
in some mysterious way, yet also made her happy.79
This is comforting. The horrible image of Babi Yar is now safely contained.
Thomas has seduced us with the illusion of a world in which nothing is irreparable.
For all his virtuosity, Thomas is unable to make this ending stick. The
sections of the novel are too disparate; the cracks show through. The White
Hotel is most convincing in its obsession with a female victim. Lisa is both
the author's muse and fetish. To witness the vulnerability of the woman becomes
a pleasurable experience for him. Thomas confesses to being turned on by the
act of writing itself,8 ° so that to write about any form of cruelty, let alone
the destruction of thousands of lives, would seem to be perverse. His
auto-eroticism is the key to the novel. Not only Lisa but other female characters,
too, function as symbols of sexual plenitude. We learn, for example, that Lisa
had once stumbled upon her mother, aunt and uncle all making love together.
This is the kind of detail which Thomas regards as authentic. "It's always hard
for us women to admit it's mainly sexual desire," Lisa's resurrected mother
says.8
The White Hotel, like Sophie's Choice and The Painted Bird before it,
is a fraud. The bigger the catastrophe, the better the story. No matter that
Kosinski lived through part of it, or that Styron once knew a survivor, or that
Thomas felt he had to bow to eyewitness testimony: the Holocaust is merely
a vehicle for some private apocalypse. The images are ready-made and
guaranteed to shock. Thomas narrowly missed winning the 1981 Booker Prize
for fiction with his contribution to the genre. The winner a year later, as we
have already noted, was Schindler's Ark. There is evidently a cultural demand
for narratives that broach the subject, if no corresponding sense of what can
or should be said - or left unsaid.
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Those who would enquire what it means to be a Jew today must ask not
only, or even primarily, vague and unformed questions about Jewish identity
and the relation of Judaism and modernity and Judaism and secularity,
but must rather articulate the much more precise and focused question
through which all the other dimensions of our post-Holocaust identity
are refracted and defined: "What does it mean to be a Jew after
Auschwitz?"
Steven T. Katz, Post-Holocaust Dialogues
What do we need a God for if not to deter the wholesale slaughter of the
innocent?
A Holocaust survivor (cited by Reeve Robert Brenner)
Israel's victory in the Six-Day War marked a watershed in Jewish self-
understanding. A lot of rash theological claims were made, as we shall see,
but it is difficult for a non-Jew to appreciate the significance of this event,
which surpasses the founding of the State itself, even, in restoring a sense of
religious purpose to a traumatized community. After June 1967 Jewish
theologians have, on the whole, been more prepared to consider the implications
of the Holocaust for their faith. This may simply reflect the passage of time,
but I believe it also reflects a renewed confidence in the meaning of history.
Without such confidence Auschwitz was too terrible a catastrophe for most
Jews to contemplate. At any rate, a symposium on "The State of Jewish Belief"
published in Commentary, August 1966, whilst reaffirming traditional religious
values, made little mention of the Holocaust, though several of the contributors
have produced book-length responses to it since.'
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One contributor was a notable exception, however. "I believe the greatest
single challenge to modern Judaism arises out of the question of God and the
death camps," he wrote:
I am amazed at the silence of contemporary Jewish theologians on this most
crucial and agonizing of all issues. How can Jews believe in an omnipotent,
beneficent God after Auschwitz? Traditional Jewish theology maintains
that God is the ultimate, omnipotent actor in the historical drama. It has
interpreted every major catastrophe in Jewish history as God's punishment
of a sinful Israel. I fail to see how this position can be maintained without
regarding Hitler and the SS as instruments of God's will. The agony of
European Jewry cannot be likened to the testing of Job. To see any purpose
in the death camps, the traditional believer is forced to regard the most
demonic, anti-human explosion in all history as a meaningful expression
of God's purposes. The idea is simply too obscene for me to accept.2
The author of these words, Richard Rubenstein, a Conservative rabbi in the
United States, published a more detailed exposition of his views during that
same year, under the title of After Auschwitz. Now regarded as something
of an authority on the Holocaust, Rubenstein has also written in sociological
vein about the potential for totalitarianism within all modern societies.3
Rubenstein's moral rejection of the traditional Jewish God has not attracted
much support from other observant Jews; and his belief in God the Holy
Nothingness, "known to mystics of all ages, out of which we have come and
to which we shall ultimately return", is surely too idiosyncratic to convince
those who have abandoned the Torah of the necessity of religion as an existential
commitment. His argument in After Auschwitz is that the only meaningful
option remaining to Jews is a revitalized paganism which makes use of the forms
of traditional Jewish religion - a return, as it were, to primal origins (which
encompasses a return to the land of Israel). Unwilling to assert that God is
dead - "How can we know that?" - Rubenstein says rather that we are living
in the time of the death of God. "When I say we live in the time of the death
of God," he explains, "I mean that the thread uniting God and man, heaven and
earth, has been broken."4
What Rubenstein offers, in effect, is his own personal defence of traditional
Jewish practice. Having expressed a sympathy with the Reconstructionist
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movement, which stresses the centrality of the peoplehood of Israel, Rubenstein
discovers a vocation in belonging to a community. That community owes its
identity to a set of shared rituals:
I did not choose to be Jewish. It has been one of the givens of my nature,
but no religious institution other than the synagogue is psychologically and
culturally appropriate for my need to celebrate and share the decisive
moments of existence. These moments include birth, puberty, marriage,
temporary or permanent infirmity, the marking of time irretrievably past,
the rearing of children, the need to express and find catharsis for feelings
of guilt, the need for personal renewal, and the feeling of awe and wonder
which overcomes me when I think about God's nothingness as the ultimate
source and final end.5
Missing from this list is the need for a communal response to the Holocaust,
though Rubenstein probably regards the founding of a Jewish state as fulfilling
it. The needs he describes are essentially individual. Rejecting the God of
the Covenant, he is left with the idea of religion as a kind of therapy. Religion
confers a sense of well-being on its adherents. It reminds them, too, of their
social obligations. But what it cannot do is hallow the victims of Auschwitz
by appealing to a God who cares about their fate.
The 6 14th Commandment
The year following the publication of After Auschwitz, a symposium was
organized by Judaism expressly to discuss "Jewish Values in the Post-Holocaust
Future", albeit outside a purely theological context 6 - though it gained added
significance by being held on Purim day (26 March 1967). With an invited audience
of notable scholars and rabbis, the chief participants were Emil Fackenheim,
Richard Popkin, George Steiner and Elie Wiesel. The starting-point for discussion,
according to Steven Schwarzschild, the editor of Judaism and chair, is that
with Auschwitz a new age has begun. As he puts it, "The unity of history is
different from what we may previously have thought it to be." Or more explicitly:
"The post-Holocaust world is fundamentally different from the previous world."
Schwarzschild applauds those sensitive writers who have borne witness to this,
and berates religious thinkers for failing to do so.7
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It is a religious thinker at the symposium, nevertheless, who addresses
the issue most directly. Emil Fackenheim asserts that the cornerstone of Jewish
values is a commitment to Jewish survival. As an addition to the 613
commandments in traditional Judaism, he formulates what he terms the 6 14th
commandment:
The authentic Jew of today is forbidden to hand Hitler yet another,
posthumous victory.8
And this commandment has been the predominate theme of his work ever since.
In Quest for Past and Future (1968), for example, it is expressed thus:
I believe that whereas no redeeming voice is heard at Auschwitz a commanding
voice is heard, and that it is being heard with increasing clarity. Jews are
not permitted to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are commanded
to survive as Jews, lest their people perish. They are commanded to remember
the victims of Auschwitz, lest their memory perish. They are forbidden
to despair of God, lest Judaism perish. They are forbidden to despair of
the world as the domain of God, lest the world be handed over to the forces
of Auschwitz. For a Jew to break this commandment would be to do the
unthinkable - to respond to Hitler by doing his work.9
Fackenheim, who trained for the rabbinate in Germany and was imprisoned
in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen for several months in 1938, has
described himself as neo-Orthodox)- 0 He is married to a Christian, however,
so it is not entirely clear how rigid the 6 14th commandment is supposed to be.
In God's Presence in History (1970) he appears to endorse any affirmation of
Jewishness as an authentic response. tTFor a Jew today merely to affirm his
Jewish existence," he claims, "is to accept his singled-out condition; it is to
oppose the demons of Auschwitz: and it is to oppose them in the only way in
which they can be opposed - with an absolute opposition." Religious and secular
Jews are united in their witness against the devil)-
But Fackenheim goes on to assert the need for a theological perspective:
Jewish opposition to Auschwitz cannot be grasped in terms of humanly created
ideals but only as an imposed commandment. And the Jewish secularist,
no less than the believer, is absolutely singled out by a Voice as truly other
than man-made ideals - an imperative as truly given - as was the Voice of
Sinai)2
It need hardly be said that Jewish secularists may not choose to see their position
in these terms. For them, the value of the tradition is entirely cultural. The
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notion of a Commanding Voice would probably strike them as absurd, an
unwarranted resort to metaphysics. Fackenheim is concerned to find a basis
for Jewish unity but at the same time unwilling to concede that Jews might
continue to regard themselves as Jewish in spite of, rather than because of,
Auschwitz. 13
At the beginning of God's Presence in History Fackenheim defines Judaism
in terms of "root experiences". These are events in Jewish history that have
a revelatory significance, events like the Exodus that continue to be re-enacted
as a present reality. He also makes use of the idea of "epoch-making events"
to account for those historical moments when the root experiences have been
put to the test, in the wake of catastrophes like the destruction of the First
and Second Temples, the expulsion from Spain, and now, of course, the
Holocaust. 14
 The Commanding Voice of Auschwitz represents Fackenheim's
attempt to salvage the root experiences after the most shattering epoch-making
event of all. Israel is to remain a witness unto the nations, but with the emphasis
on survival rather than martyrdom:
The Jew after Auschwitz is a witness to endurance. He is singled out by
contradictions which, in our post-holocaust world, are worldwide
contradictions. He bears witness that without endurance we shall all perish.
He bears witness that we can endure because we must endure; and that we
must endure because we are commanded to endure.1
Inextricably linked with Jewish survival in Fackenheim's eyes is the State
of Israel. At an international symposium on the Holocaust in 1974, he asserted:
"The heart of every authentic response to the Holocaust ... is a commitment
to the autonomy and security of the State of Israel." 6 In The Jewish Return
into History (1978) he elaborates on this point:
Israel is collectively what every survivor is individually: A No to the demons
of Auschwitz, a yes to Jewish survival and security - and thus a testimony
to life against death on behalf of all mankind.'7
But Fackenheim retains his conviction that to seek a religious response
is inescapable, which leads him to re-examine the Midrashic framework of Jewish
belief. The traditional Midrash helped to make sense of the apparent
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contradictions in God's universe. Can it still do so? Fackenheim is unsure:
The religious Word ... seems no longer possible within Jewish existence.
Yet, prior to Buchenwald, some Jews have always found it possible to hold
fast to God, hold fast to the world, and affirm a bond between them with
their lips and, indeed, with their very lives. The most authentic Word
expressing this bond is Midrash, and a life witnessing to it may be called
midrashic existence.
Midrashic existence embodies a recognition of the gulf between the world as
it is and the world as it ought to be. "Midrashic existence," we read, "acts as
though all depended on man and prays as though all depended on God."18
Fackenheim cites the work of Elie Wiesel as a new Midrash, a mad Midrash
in which the Holocaust and Jewish tradition are locked together. Wiesel's writing
offers plenty of scope for theological interpretation since it frequently addresses
the question of faith after the Holocaust and is self-consciously paradoxical.
"After what happend to us, how can you believe in God?" a survivor asks a Hasidic
rabbi in The Gates of the Forest. "How can you not believe in God after what
has happened?" he replies. 19 Fackenheim underlines the ambiguities of this
new Midrash:
Midrashic madness is the Word spoken in the anti-world which ought not
to be but is. The existence it points to acts to restore a world which ought
to be but is not, committed to the faith that what ought to be must and
will be, and this is its madness. After Planet Auschwitz, there can be no
health without this madness, no joy, no life. Without this madness a Jew
cannot do - with God or without him - what a Voice from Sinai bids him
do: choose life.20
Wiesel's own religious position incorporates reproaching the divine for allowing
the Holocaust to take place. "The Jew, in my view," he has said, "may rise
against God, provided he remains within God." What this entails is a kind of
holy defiance:
You, God, do not want me to be Jewish; well, Jewish we shall be nevertheless,
despite Your will.2'
Fackenheim is a professor of philosophy, and philosophical questions are
to the fore in To Mend the World (1982), his most recent work on Jewish identity
after Auschwitz. The Holocaust is now seen as an epoch-making event that
challenges the very concept "epoch-making event". The Commanding Voice
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of Auschwitz can no longer be taken for granted. Fackenheim is able to recover
his faith in that Voice only by attending to the responses of the victims
themselves and discerning in some a principle of resistance. "Resistance in
that extremity was a way of being," he writes. "For our thought now, it is an
ontological category." 22 The Holocaust is a total rupture. Fackenheim is inspired
by his reading of the Jewish mystical tradition, the Kabbalah, to speak of a
Tikkun - or "mending" - made possible by the example of those, whether German
or Jewish, who did not succumb to what he calls the Nazi logic of destruction.
Any such Tikkun, however, will be fragmentary in nature. The world will never
be completely repaired.
Fackenheim reiterates his commitment to Zionism as the surest guarantee
of Jewish survival. "After the Holocaust," he writes, "the Jewish people owe
the whole world the duty of not encouraging its vices - in the case of the wicked,
murderous instincts, in the case of the good people, indifference mixed with
hypocrisy - by continuing to tolerate powerlessness." 23 Jewish identity is
preserved through fidelity to the past, both the past of a holy tradition and
the more immediate past of being singled out for death. Fackenheim proposes
a Tikkun made up of three elements: a recovery of Jewish tradition, a recovery
as in recuperation from illness, and the recognition that both these recoveries
will always be incomplete. The State of Israel, it turns out, is the fulfillment
of this Tikkun. God is brought to book but still regarded as the God of the Jewish
people. In fact, God's own survival is bound up with the survival of the Jews:
The Jewish people has persevered at a singled-out post through the centuries.
All too understandably, this people today may be tired of the post; leaving
the task of witnessing to others, it may create the prospect of a world without
Jews. This, of course, is not a new prospect. Throughout history many have
predicted such a world. Not a few have wanted it. A generation ago, an
unprecedented attempt was made to make an end to Jews, and some in this
generation regret that it failed of complete success. However, whether
or not the world today realizes it, it cannot do without Jews - the accidental
remnant that, heir to the holy ones, is itself bidden to be holy. Neither,
in our time, can God Himself.24
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Prophetic Judaism
In Beyond Survival (1982) Dow Marmur, a Reform rabbi, takes up the
challenge of Fackenheim's 6 14th commandment. Although, like Fackenheim,
a Zionist, Marmur believes that contemporary Judaism "is the victim of a survival
syndrome, i.e. that it seems unable to offer a positive reason for staying Jewish
but at the same time is neurotically preoccupied with the danger of ceasing
to be Jewish". According to Marmur, this danger is largely illusory since being
Jewish is not primarily about keeping the Torah: Judaism is "both peoplehood
and religion, civilization and belief". 25 A secular Jew like George Steiner would
argue along the same lines, defining what it means to be Jewish in terms of
a supra-national culture. "The value of being a Jew," Steiner claims, "is to
try to make truth one's locale and free inquiry one's native tongue."Zô But
such aims, however noble, are insufficient as far as the survival of Judaism
as a distinct tradition is concerned.
Marmur contends that the problem of Jewish survival is in the end God's
problem. The task for a religious Jew is to serve God through serving one's
fellow human beings. "Only a return to an authentically Prophetic approach
to Jewish existence," Marmur writes, "the approach reflected in Scripture and
manifest in Jewish Messianic aspirations throughout the ages, will enable us
to make sense of our history, improve things as we find them today and work
towards a better future." This is bold stuff, but is it anything more than rhetoric?
Marmur's preoccupation with the relevance of faith to contemporary social
concerns seems to blind him to the question of its relevance to the Holocaust.
"To seek to comprehend something of the mystery of the presence of God in
Auschwitz," we are told, "is to react Prophetically to the Holocaust." 27 One
starts from a position of faith and works backward, confident that God's presence
can in fact be traced.
And what does Marmur find? He finds that not all prisoners in concentration
camps were destroyed by the experience. Some were able to survive
- 131 -
psychologically as well as physically and, having survived, able to use their
own suffering to alleviate the suffering of others. Marmur draws particular
attention to the work of Victor Franki, the founder of logotherapy, and of Eugene
Heimler, a psychiatric social worker, both of whom are survivors of Auschwitz.28
Can we really conclude from such examples, however, that God was present
at Auschwitz? Was it necessary to sacrifice so many Jews to help create a
more caring society? If a spirit of amelioration is the driving force of prophetic
Judaism, it is hardly equal to the spirit of the age. But perhaps that has always
been the case. After Auschwitz, however, any belief in progress is severely
tested. To place a value on survival alone is regarded by Marmur as a form
of idolatry, and yet his conclusion that each generation must experience God
in its own way, seems to underestimate the nature of the catastrophe that gave
rise to the neurosis about Jewish survival in the first place.
The call for a return to prophetic faith is also sounded in one of the first
theological responses, Ignaz Maybaum's The Face of God after Auschwitz (1965).
Here we find a prophet defined as "a man ready to meet God in the tempest
of changing history". Maybaum, a German Reform rabbi who came to England
in 1939, offers his own prophetic interpretation of the Holocaust, using the
Exodus story to represent the pattern of redemption. God the Redeemer is
vindicated by the victory over tyranny. Prophetic interpretation, in other words,
is an attempt to see things from God's point of view:
It does not begin with history but begins with God who is the Redeemer
of man in his deadly predicament. Man either as survivor himself or as
offspring of survivors, in short, to use the biblical term, as Remnant, sees
a historic event as sign, as portent, as event full of wonders. Auschwitz
does not contradict the biblical prophets' approach to history, but contradicts
philosophies which trust history as producing progress out of itself. No historic
institution by itself, no historic event by itself guarantees progress. Progress,
Redemption is not immanent in history. '9
The identification of redemption with progress is a revealing one. Progress,
for Maybaum, is an end to the persecution suffered by Jews in the Middle Ages.
The Holocaust was simply an extreme consequence of medieval prejudices.3°
The Holocaust itself is described as the third Churban or destruction of
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the Temple, a cataclysmic event out of which comes progress. The murdered
East European Jews are celebrated as pioneers of an enlightened and, hence,
exemplary religious outlook. In this way they assume the significance of martyrs:
The West is founded on the belief in progress. In his heart, in his thinking,
in his hope the East European Jew was Western Man turning away from the
Middle Ages. The East European Jews perished, murdered by Hitler. We
are the loyal executors of their will when we teach and preach a progressive
Judaism which is able to renew the Judaism of our prophets and classical
rabbis.31
Given that Maybaum's own mother and sisters were among those who died, it
would seem indelicate to condemn this argument as wishful thinking but that
is what it is. We are not in a position to ascribe a collective will to the victims
of the Holocaust. The Jews in Eastern Europe held a variety of beliefs; there
was no such thing as a homogeneous Jewish community until the Nazis created
one by force.32
The Suffering Servant
In the past, Jews have sought an explanation for disasters in terms of
their covenant with God. Catastrophe has been regarded as the punishment
of a sinful Israel, as a test of faith, as a reminder to keep the Commandments.
The good Jew, like Job, must learn obedience to God's will. Jewish tradition
also teaches the role of the Suffering Servant (Isaiah 53), which has been called
upon especially to give meaning to the experience of being singled out for
persecution. Maybaum offers a classic formulation of this:
With the blood of their martyrs Jews are the uncontradictable witnesses
who verify the truth of their faith, revive their mission and progress hopefully
into the future. The Jews themselves are the historical proof for the truth
that God is the Redeemer of man and the Creator of the world. "Ye are
My witnesses, saith the Lord."33
On the one hand Maybaum wants his readers to recognize the radical
extremity of Auschwitz - "After Auschwitz the human imagination is not what
it was before"34 - but on the other he continues to employ the kind of religious
language which glosses over that extremity. To talk of martyrdom and sacrifice
in the face of mass graves and gas chambers begs more questions than it answers.
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The dehumanized victims were stripped, along with everything else, of the
consolation of a purposeful death. Maybaum even goes so far as to say, though
he does point out that he only thinks it appropriate to say this in sermons, that
in Auschwitz Jews suffered vicarious death for the sins of humankind. The
parallel with the crucifixion is quite explicit.35
It is not surprising, therefore, that one comes across the same argument
in a work of Christian theology - Franklin Littell's transparently titled The
Crucifixion of the Jews - where another Jewish scholar, Robert Wolfe, is quoted
for his insight into "one profound truth about the redemptive work of the
sacrificed Jews":
Had the Nazis not been racist, they would still have been evil - and infinitely
more dangerous, for then they would have found their natural fascist allies
among all races of men. So in order to bring them low - "Whom God would
destroy he first makes mad" - the genocidal but self-defeating madness
of racism was an indispensable ingredient of Nazism. The Jews, God's
perpetually willing instrument, paid the terrible price, serving as the racist
target in order to save mankind from the Nazi scourge; the reward to the
remnants, three years later, was the return to Zion.6
I find nothing profound or true in this at all. (Nazism was lethal because it
was racist - Italian Fascism being less racist was, in fact, less bent on murder.
"God's perpetually willing instrument"? But of course the Jews so ruthlessly
destroyed can give no answer. Had there been no Holocaust they might have
lived to participate in the return to Zion, not as a reward for pain endured but
as a shared blessing.)
Maybaum classes the murdered Jews, together with the soldiers who lost
their lives in the war to defeat Hitler, as martyrs in the cause of world peace.
"The death of the martyrs," he claims, "sanctifies and purifies the new generation
which can hope that with the existence of the bomb a third world war is
impossible." 37 Twenty years later that seems a foolish kind of hope: the
proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of their eventual use.
The existence of the Bomb, moreover, has done nothing to curb the loss of life
in conventional wars elsewhere. The civilian death toll is probably higher than
ever, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant having finally broken
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down in the bombing raids on densely-populated cities during World War Two.
It should perhaps be pointed out that the Jews were casualties of a different
war: when Adolf Eichmann diverted trains that were needed on the Eastern
front in 1944 in order to transport Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz, he was simply
recognizing which war, at least in Nazi ideology, took priority.
If, as Maybaum suggests, a Jew cannot help being chosen - "God chooses"38
- then a Jew is at the mercy of the divine plan. The traditional belief in election
diminishes the impact of the Holocaust by making a virtue out of Jewish
endurance. The Suffering Servant is a long-suffering servant. According to
Eliezer Berkovits in Faith after the Holocaust (1973), "There is no other witness
that God is present in history but the history of the Jewish people." No theodicy
is necessary:
The question after the holocaust ought not to be, how could God tolerate
so much evil? The proper question is whether, after Auschwitz, the Jewish
people may still be witnesses to God's elusive presence in history as we
understand the concept.
But to readers of Berkovits's book this is no longer a question as such, for we
a]ready know the answer. "At this very moment in history," Berkovits has written
earlier, "divine providence has placed into the hands of the Jew, in the form
of the state of Israel, the secular city of man - for us to turn it into a City
of God on this earth. Quite clearly, we have been called."39
The Return to Zion
Berkovits is not alone in appealing to the State of Israel as some kind
of answer to the Holocaust, but he is less tentative than most. 4° Not only does
the ingathering of the exiles - itself a Messianic concept applied uncritically
to the founding of a political state - proclaim "God's holy presence at the very
heart of his inscrutable hiddenness", but Israel's victory in the Six-Day War
is seen as a Messianic moment that vindicates the return to Zion as a new
beginning. "For the Jew," Berkovits asserts, "this is a renewal of biblical times."4'
In Reeve Robert Brenner's survey of the beliefs held by Jews who had lived
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through the ordeal in Europe, however - called simply The Faith and Doubt
of Holocaust Survivors (1980) - we are told that the majority of those questioned
(all of them survivors living in Israel) felt the State of Israel was not worth
the cost of six million lives, and many took the view it would have come about
anyway, if a little later. One survivor remarked tersely, "It is forbidden for
us to offer human sacrifices."42
In The Natural and the Supernatural Jew (1962) Arthur A. Cohen develops
the notion of the Exile as an eschatological principle. Not until the world is
redeemed will the Exile be ended. In support of this, he points out that Zionism
is now triumphant and yet millions of Jews are unwilling either to go to Israel
or to become assimilated. 43 For Berkovits, though, the hour of redemption
is at hand. "The Torah is not fully applicable outside of the land of Israel,"
he declares. He is incensed by the suggestion that Judaism has any other home:
In a sense, every generation is the guardian of all generations, seeking and
acknowledging only salvation of a kind that would redeem all Jewish history
from the curse of a senseless martyrdom. Jews who desire to believe that
the return to Zion and Jerusalem is not vital for Judaism have broken the
continuity of Jewish history; they have given up Jewish messianism, and
thus allowed the awesome drama of redemption to sink to the level of
meaningless misery. The prophets, the martyrs, the numberless millions
of simple people who perished believing and hoping, were all mistaken; the
blood and the tears were all in vain: the Messiah has changed his destination
and landed at New Amsterdam.44
The fury of this polemic allows Berkovits to deflect attention away from
the weakness of his own position, which relies heavily on an uncritical acceptance
of election as the abiding determinant of Jewish history. Jewish history is defined
as "faith history", in contrast to the history of the gentiles - "power history"
- which has brought the world to the edge of annihilation. 45 And because faith
history is the ultimate cause to fight for, "To fight for Jewish survival is being
in the forefront of man's struggle for human dignity, freedom, and peace."
This struggle does not appear to include the rights of Palestinians or, indeed,
any realistic assessment of Israel's role in international politics. "Even as a
state," Berkovits claims, "Israel lives in faith history." One does not have to
be anti-Zionist to question the wisdom of such a claim. "It is a form of Jewish
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tragedy," Berkovits laments, "that in order to maintain itself Israel has to use
instruments of power history." Any present-day observer of Israeli policies
would be hard put to make sense of the boast which immediately follows. "It
is its glory," we read, "that it is striving conscientiously and with considerable
success to do it by applying the spirit and the methods of faith history."6
In the wake of theology of this kind, it seems strange that Saul Bellow,
the American Jewish novelist, should find fault with non-Jews for expecting
too much of Israel. "The putative friends of Israel," he complains, "are always
urging that it set the world a moral example: We have to demand more from
this state. Not all states are exposed to this demand."47 But not all states
are saddled with theological significance. The emotional-cum-psychological
links between the Holocaust and the State of Israel must of course be recognized,
but the cause of Jewish survival is not served by mythologizing the way in which
the latter was established. A belief in miracles after Auschwitz must be weighed
against the reality of Auschwitz itself. The Red Sea would not part to let the
Jews of Europe through. No Esther was on hand to put a stop to Haman's
murderous plot.
Few theologians would rush to support the view that God had had a hand
in the construction of the death camps, and yet some are only too eager to
credit God with the power to alter the course of history since. Eugene Borowitz,
for example, in How Can a Jew Speak of Faith Today? (1969), is united with
Berkovits in the conviction that the Six-Day War marks a return to biblical
times. An American Liberal rabbi, Borowitz has no qualms about adopting a
more traditional position when it comes to interpreting such recent historical
events. By saving the Jewish people from a second holocaust, God is let off
the hook for not preventing the first. "Jews saw him once again as he who
remembers his Covenant," we are told. 48 Leaving aside the question of whether
or not another holocaust was in fact imminent, what is the sense of this
observation? That we should forgive God his sins of omission? That the past
- 137 -
ceases to matter when things go well in the present? The victory of the Israeli
armies may well have been a remarkable one, but even if its soldiers found
their courage in the desire to avenge the annihilation of the Jews in Europe,
are we really entitled to infer from this that God was working through them?
Victory certainly brought with it the assurance that Jews were now in
a position to defend themselves, and one should not underestimate the importance
of such assurance. Nevertheless, fostering the belief that God was in some
way responsible for a military triumph may also help to foster the dangerous
illusion that Israel cannot be defeated by its enemies. The need for a political
settlement will then lose its urgency. I do not question the sincerity of rabbis
like Berkovits and Borowitz, but one surely has to look for other ways of making
the divine mystery relevant.
The Miracle of Faith
Berkovits does take a different approach in a later work called With God
in Hell (1979), subtitled ' t Judaism in the Ghettos and Deathcamps" and dedicated
to the memory of his mother, brother and two sisters who were all killed in
1944. By drawing attention to the religious behaviour of the victims themselves,
he is able to provide a more coherent rationale f or continuing to uphold the
Jewish tradition. The authentic Jew, for Berkovits, is the one who embraces
the most rigorous faith, and in the context of the ghettos and camps this
essentially means the Hasidic Jew. Just as Fackenheim finds comfort in
Maimonides' alleged ruling that any Jew murdered solely for being a Jew is
to be considered holy,49 so Berkovits is reassured by the conviction that those
who died as believing Jews qualify for the status of martyrs, even though the
possibility of martyrdom in its traditional sense was denied them:
In those long and dark years, when mankind was silently standing by as the
most barbarous crime in all human history was wilfully perpetrated by one
of the technologically most advanced nations of the world, it was in the
ghettos and the concentration camps that the dignity of man was safeguarded,
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where the faith of man reached its highest manifestation, commensurate
in its greatness to the abysmal depths of the moral bankruptcy of Western
civilization.50
It might be thought that Berkovits overstates his case. After all,
communists and Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, were also able to sustain
their faith in the face of extreme adversity; the latter group with an unequivocal
claim to martyrdom, since they only had to renounce their beliefs to be set
free. And we must remember that many prisoners succumbed to the dehumanizing
conditions imposed upon them. They became, in the jargon of the concentration
camp, Muselmnner ("Muslims") or, as Primo Levi calls them, "the drowned".
It is worth reiterating Levi's account of how this happened:
On their entry into the camp, through basic incapacity, or by misfortune,
or through some banal incident, they are overcome before they can adapt
themselves; they are beaten by time, they do not begin to learn German,
to disentangle the infernal knot of laws and prohibitions until their body
is already in decay, and nothing can save them from selections or from death
by exhaustion. Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the
Muselmnner, the drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous
mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who march
and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them, already too empty
to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call
their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too
tired to understand.5'
Emil Fackenheim cites this same passage in To Mend the World. "The Nazi
state had no higher aim than to murder souls while bodies were still alive,"
he comments. "The Muselmann was its most characteristic, most original
product."52
Nevertheless, Berkovits does bear witness to the widespread religious
life of Jews under Nazi rule (when any form of Jewish observance was illegal).
Even in the harshest circumstances the continuity of worship was maintained.
Rabbis were able to find precedents in the tradition to help them make judgments
where lives were at stake. The Kiddush haShem, the sanctification of God's
name, was performed whenever Jews held fast to their communal identity.
Of the numerous examples Berkovits gives of what he believes is "the authentic
Jewish attitude", 53 perhaps none better illustrates both the courage and - from
a secular point of view - the hopelessness of uncompromising piety than the
- 139 -
story of D evorah Tuchnuntz-Halberstadt:
Shortly before the war, she had come with her husband and child to visit
her parents in Siedice. Overtaken by events, they went into the ghetto and
when that had been "liquidated" they went into hiding. Soon afterwards
her time came to give birth, an unforgivable crime in those proud days of
German domination. It became impossible for her to remain in her hiding
place and endanger the life of others. She left and took refuge in the fields
among some trees and bushes. When some gentiles heard her moanings in
labor, they assumed from her still quite healthy physical condition that she
was one of them, a homeless Christian woman and they took her to the city
hospital in Mariansk. Several days after she gave birth, a priest arrived
to perform the baptismal ceremony over the child. As he was about to begin
his prayers, the mother jumped up and said to him: "Please don't do it.
I am a Jewish woman and my child is a Jewish child. Let us be what we
are." The priest departed without a word. Soon afterwards police arrived
and took away both mother and child to be "liquidated".
Berkovits commends this woman for knowing instinctively the halakhah (rabbinic
law) in such a situation. The aim of the authentic Jew, he later argues, was
not survival at any cost.54
The price of authenticity, then, was almost certain death. Spiritual
resistance to the Nazis may have been a way of preserving the divine image,
but it could not preserve the religious community itself. "The authentic Jew
did not escape into spirituality," Berkovits wants us to understand, "but simply
lived the life of the Jew in the circumstances in which he found himself." Lest
we object that these circumstances were annihilating, Berkovits qualifies his
observation by adding, "Nevertheless, most Jews fully realized that this war
was a confrontation unto death between the Jewish people and what it represents
in world history and Nazified Germany and its spirit." Nazism was a spiritual
movement rather than a political one, we read, dedicated to the cult of the
demonic, and therefore Jews were right to oppose it spiritually. (The use of
arms as well was precluded by their unavailability rather than by the Jewish
tradition of non-violence per se.) The world remained indifferent to the fate
of the Jews because Nazism "was only a manifestation of a spiritually bankrupt
civilization".55
What Berkovits is moving towards is a celebration of the Jewish people
as a witness to the truth of the spiritual domain. The material power of great
nations is of naught by comparison:
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That the Jewish people has withstood all the barbarous attacks upon it, that
it has been able to maintain itself in the midst of deadly enemies, bespeaks
the presence of another kind of power, invisibly playing its part in the history
of men. The survival of the Jew, his capacity for revival after catastrophes
such as had eliminated mighty nations and empires, indicate the mysterious
intrusion of a spiritual dimension into the history of man.
The Final Solution, on this model, was intrinsically a rebellion against God.
The number of Jews murdered has no significant bearing on the destiny of the
Jewish people so long as the people itself survives:
The Nazis were quite correct in believing that if they did not succeed in
the elimination of the "Jewish influence" upon world history, they would
also fail in their plans for world conquest. No matter what they said in
their official propaganda, they sensed the mysterious nature of that influence,
the presence of a hiding God in history.56
The Covenant
It would appear that the relationship between God and Israel is unchanged.
Berkovits refers to the Akedah, the story of Abraham and Isaac, as the paradigm
of faith. You trust even where you do not understand. The authentic Jew is
defined by the Covenant - and continues to hear the divine call "in the midst
of God's exasperating silences". The Jewish tradition of non-violence, however,
has been found wanting, in spite of its moral superiority to the glorification
in Western culture of the military hero. The faith of those who died in the
Holocaust remains exemplary, but not their dependence on spiritual forms of
resistance. "It is ... quite obvious that the Jewish people can no longer continue
as before," Berkovits concludes. "The God of history Himself has acknowledged
this fundamental truth of the problematics of Jewish existence by guiding the
Jews back to the land of their fathers, in His own mysterious way."57
Not all Jewish theologians are as confident as Berkovits in their
interpretation of God's will, but most would agree that the Covenant is in some
sense intact. Irving Greenberg argues that Jews now live in the age of a voluntary
covenant. "From a conceptual viewpoint," he asserts, "the divine right to
command is forfeit in the Holocaust." But, again, God's presence is discerned
in the rebirth of Israel as a nation. "Israel," Greenberg declares, "is the great
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statement of life and redemption of the Jewish people - a response to an
unprecedented act of destruction - a statement of hope and abiding faith that
there is still a future for redeeming the world." 58 Since, however, we have
already read that after the Holocaust "holy secularity becomes the preferred
religious mode", 59 it is clear that, for Greenberg at least, God's presence is
not to be taken too literally.
Greenberg describes the Holocaust as "an orienting event" 60 for both
Jews and Christians. The Christian covenant must change too, in recognition
that redemption lies ahead, thereby creating the possibility of Jews and Christians
working together towards the same end. This kind of pluralism makes sense
in the United States, perhaps, but historical relations between the two faiths
are unlikely to be so quickly forgotten elsewhere. Greenberg's optimism is
also apparent in his willingness to see having children as "the counter-testimony
to Auschwitz", 61 as he once referred to it.
Warning Signs?
Greenberg takes the view that the Holocaust has a lesson in it for the
whole of humankind:
The Holocaust was an advance warning of the demonic potential in modern
culture. If one could conceive of Hitler coming to power not in 1933 but
in 1963, after the invention of nuclear and hydrogen bombs, then the Holocaust
would have been truly universal. It is a kind of last warning that if man
will perceive and overcome the demonism unleashed in modern culture,
the world may survive. Otherwise, the next Holocaust will embrace the
whole world.62
This is echoed by Eliezer Berkovits in Faith after the Holocaust, where he writes
"Auschwitz is like a final warning to the human race." 6 One thinks, too, of
Ignaz Maybaum's description of it as mophet or awful portent. 6 Such apocalyptic
interpretations are largely unhelpful, though, not least because they imply that
the Holocaust has some kind of retrospective meaning. I find it anyway hard
to believe that the lessons of history can be so readily assimilated by those
who need to learn them most.
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According to Eugene Borowitz, "History is the laboratory of Jewish
theology." But in contrast to those cited above, he sees no reason to regard
the Holocaust as a revelatory event:
It was not the Sinai of our time. It burned us, tortured us, scarred us, and
does so yet today. Nonetheless, its obscene brutality did not become our
paradigm for future history. I have never been able to cease wondering,
in the technical, Biblical sense, that after the Holocaust there was no mass
desertion of Judaism. If anything, there arose in the community as a whole
a conscious desire to reclaim and reestablish Jewish existence. It was no
more than that. Yet, considering what Jewishness had just entailed, that
spontaneous, inner reassertion was uncanny. It testified to that which is
more than man's wisdom and courage, which yet sustains and carries him
through the terrors of personal and social history.65
If I might be permitted to wonder, in the more modest, everyday sense,
how anyone can use figuratively verbs that describe literal experiences of
suffering - burn, torture, etc. - I nevertheless sympathize with Borowitz's desire
to contain the theological impact of the Holocaust within a practical
faith-centred response. "We are God's hostages in history," he preaches in a
sermon, placing a responsibility on Jews to preserve their tradition come what
may:
Each time we do a Jewish act, perform a Jewish command, participate in
a Jewish endeavor, affirm such Jewish faith as we can muster, we signify
that we shall not let God die in history. He may be withdrawn, but we shall
remain here to affirm his being; he may be absent, but we shall stand here
for his presence; he may be eclipsed, but we shall stiff-neckedly wait here
for his emergence. We shall not let him go. For the sake of our fathers,
for the sake of our children, for the sake of our martyrs - we shall not let
him go.66
This view of Jewish tenacity has much in common with the idea of the Suffering
Servant already encountered. What distinguishes Borowitz's position is the
emphasis on holding fast to God in spite of his apparent withdrawal from the
world. There is a note of desperation underlying the ostensibly affirmative
response.
As How Can a Jew Speak of Faith Today? progresses, however, the
affirmation becomes louder and clearer. "God may try Israel, even turn away
from it," we read further on, "but he does not entirely abandon or forget it.
Neither individual existence nor social destiny escapes his saving power. In
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such a world as ours that is a lot to know." 67 It is indeed a lot to know. It
is, in fact, a good deal more than we can possibly know. We live in a world
without such guarantees. How do we begin to reconcile God's saving power
with the individual lives destroyed so utterly or with the Jewish communities
in Eastern Europe obliterated within the space of a few years? It is one thing
to resist the temptation to make Auschwitz into a symbol of all that is wrong
with Western civilization, but quite another to ignore its message altogether.
Silence
"Whether or not the Messiah comes doesn't matter," says the protagonist
of Elie Wiesel's The Gates of the Forest; "we'll manage without him. It is because
it is too late that we are commanded to hope." 68 Perhaps no one has made
more significant theological use of Wiesel's paradoxes than his friend Andre
Neher, a French Jewish scholar now living in Israel and the author of The Exile
of the Word: From the Silence of the Bible to the Silence of Auschwitz (1970).
If God's absence has also been described as God's silence, Neher takes this a
stage further and argues that the relationship between God and the world is
built on silence. Exploring the theme of silence in the Bible, he interprets the
last few verses of Ezekiel 3 to mean that the divine-human encounter must
always be uncertain:
God has withdrawn into silence, not in order to avoid man but, on the contrary,
in order to encounter him; but it is an encounter of silence with silence.
Two beings, one of whom attempted to elude the other in the luminous face-
to-face, find one another in the silent reverse of the hidden face. That
is the price of an SOS situation of liberty. The dialectical relationship
between God and man is no longer positive, convex, proceeding from above;
it is concave, arising from below.09
The question Neher seeks to address is whether this silence can still be
regarded as meaningful in the wake of the silence represented by Auschwitz.
It is Elie Wiesel, in Neher's view, who has given voice to the latter. "Ploughed,
sown, and reaped within the Kingdom of Silence," we read, "the work of Elie
Wiesel is permeated with silence as a fruit is imbued with the soil which nurtured
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it." Wiesel's memoir of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Night, is described as the
Akedah in reverse. (Unable to prevent his father's death in the camp at
Buchenwald, Wiesel was left with the feeling that he had somehow been
responsible for it, as if he, Isaac, had been made to sacrifice his father Abraham.)
According to Neher, 'It is an exorcism of the Bible through the challenge of
the real."7 ° Or as Wiesel himself puts it in The Gates of the Forest, "He who
is not among the victims is with the executioners. This was the meaning of
the holocaust: it implicated not only Abraham or his son, but their God as
well."71
Not that Neher wishes to jettison the Bible altogether, but rather to show
how it must be read anew. He cites passages which reveal the hope that arises
out of complete abandonment, hope against all hope, and relates such hope
to Wiesel's distinction between it and salvation. No Messiah comes, yet
everything is possible. We shall manage without him. "Judaism is aware, first
of all," Neher contends, "that the messianic event is not crucial: it is not the
event par excellence." He invokes the teaching of Rabbi Yohanan ben Zakkai:
If you are planting an olive tree and you are told of the coming of the Messiah
first finish planting your olive tree and only then go and greet the
Messiah.72
Neher moved to Jerusalem in 1967 in order, perhaps, to plant his own
olive tree. At any rate, the State of Israel has replaced the Messiah in his
thinking as the cornerstone of a revitalized faith. He subscribes, like Ignaz
Maybaum, to what might be called the phoenix model of history - attributed
here to the Maharal of Prague:
In the sixteenth century, the Maharal of Prague showed how history copies
nature: there is no construction without ruin, no rise without a fall, no
development toward a higher condition without a previous erosion within.
The First Temple had to fall so that a Second Temple, more glorious, could
arise from its ruins; and the Second Temple had to fall to make way for
the still greater glory of the Third.
The martyr's victory over death is signalled by the triumph to come. "The
gathering around the Wall in Jerusalem and the resurgence of the State of Israel
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can, in this dialectical sense," Neher concludes, "be seen as the fruits of the
Night of Auschwitz."73
A dialectic of failure and hope is the inspiration for a mystical vision
of the universe as the sum of all possibilities. "The universe is the infinite field
of the possible," we read, "a forge in which any kind of spark may rise up at
any moment, in which any industry may produce some kind of atomic sword,
but in which, on the other hand, some exercise of will may turn that sword into
a ploughshare."74 It is going to take more than an exercise of will, I fear, to
fulfil Isaiah's prophecy. Nevertheless, Neher's vision - which is more that of
a poet than a conventional scholar - highlights the need to move beyond the
traditional boundaries of discourse in order to find an appropriate form of
response.
The Tremendum
Another singular interpretation of the Holocaust is to be found in Arthur
Cohen's The Tremendum (1981). A novelist as well as theologian, Cohen's first
major contribution to Jewish theology, The Natural and the Supernatural Jew
(1962), made almost no mention of the Holocaust, except for a brief reference
to "the immolation of European Jewry". 75 In The Tremendum, however, he
is concerned exclusively with that event, calling it the tremendum (literally,
"immensity") after Rudolf Otto's phrase, mysterium tremendum, which was
used to signify - according to Cohen - "the terror-mystery of God". Its application
here is to something entirely human but just as terrifying:
I call the death camps the tremendum, for it is the monument of a meaningless
inversion of life to an orgiastic celebration of death, to a psychosexual and
patholoica1 degeneracy unparalleled and unfathomable to any person bounded
to life.
This passage sets the tone for much of what is to follow. Cohen believes
that Jews were singled out for their very attachment to life. "The Jew may
well be the ideal victim," he claims, "because his mere persistence, his sheer
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endurance, his refusal to die throughout four millennia until the tremendum,
was a celebration of the tenacity of life." What Cohen seems concerned to
provide is a metaphysical framework for the uniqueness of the Holocaust and
then a new theodicy that takes this into account. "The death camps are
unthinkable, but not unfelt," he begins. "It is simply not adequate to feel this
enormous event," he asserts soon after. "One must live with it." And living
with it means making the effort to understand it. The old language of theodicy
seems "weary and insignificant" and rational analysis inappropriate. Rejecting
the use of the word "Auschwitz" to symbolize the tremendum, on the grounds
that it was only one of many sites of death, Cohen is moved to comment that
the argument over whether or not the Jews are a chosen people has been settled
once and for all by the death camps: "They are chosen, unmistakably, extremely,
utterly."77
Buber's notion of "the eclipse of God" gets short shrift. Likewise "the
death of God". Cohen is after a conceptual language that preserves the reality
of God at the same time as it discloses a fundamental rift in human history.
He challenges Buber's remark that there is no caesura in the history of the Jews
(meaning that the Messiah comes at the end of time, not before) by arguing
that from the perspective of negation - as opposed to redemption - there has
been more than one. "For the Holy there may be no caesura," Cohen writes,
"but for the unholy its name is caesura." In a passage notable for its lucidity,
he summarizes the Jewish experience of this:
The Jews, for reasons no longer curious, have looked into the abyss several
times in their long history. Tradition accounts the destruction of the temple
and the obliteration of the Jewish settlement in Palestine as one abyss.
There was a caesura. The abyss opened and the Jews closed the abyss by
affirming their guilt, denying the abyss, and taking upon themselves
responsibility for the demonic. Not "beyond reason", but "within providence"
became the satisfactory explanation. The expulsion of the Jews from Spain
is accounted another. There was a caesura. The abyss opened and the Jews
closed the abyss once again not only by reaffirming their guilt, but more
by transforming the event into an end-time of ordinary history and the
beginning-time of mystic gnosis in which a new heaven was limned and the
unseen order became transparent to mystical understanding. The death
camps of the modern world is a third. There was another caesura of the
demonic. This time the abyss opened and one-third of the Jewish people
fell in.78
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Of course, it doesn't end there. "It begins with the Jews," Cohen argues,
"and it may end with the habitable world." This is a gloomy prognosis, to be
sure, but one in keeping with the facts. And if the Holocaust represents a caesura
for Jews, it has barely been acknowledged by the majority of non-Jews, who
are content, it would seem, to regard it as another example of the kind of
brutality that characterizes every war. Even so, Cohen creates an artificial
barrier by claiming that the Holocaust has a unique significance for Jews today,
that they relive the event in the same way as, on the authority of the Passover
Haggadah, they relive the earlier decisive moments of their history: Egypt
and Sinai. In referring to the "real presence of all Israel in the death camps",79
he glosses over the distinction between those who were there and those who
identify with them now.
According to Cohen, "Theology is the discipline that enables an unleisured
time to compress its questions within the historical maelstrom." The danger
is that you will compress your questions too far or be too confident of finding
solutions. Cohen is cautious but suffers from no false modesty. He defines
the theologian as a hero struggling to articulate the mystery of God:
Historical catastrophe ends certain intellectual options as surely and
powerfully as it ends lives. The inadequacy of theology - the fact that its
object can be formulated but never grasped, that its language approaches
its object but can never exhaust it, that beyond every formulation of
theological language the mystery of the living God remains - is warrant,
however, for the theological heroism, that the theologian is given what he
breaks himself to understand and what he comes to understand is only the
shadow of the substance.8°
Cohen's own heroic endeavour in the final chapter of The Tremendum
is to undertake not only "a redefinition of the reality of God and his relations
to the world and man", but also "a reinvestment of the passive receptiveness
of the world and the active freedom of man with significant meaning". His
argument is not always easy to follow. He criticizes the varieties of
neo-Orthodoxy (including his own earlier work) for situating the tremendum
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"as the dialectic counter of an absent or hidden God", and lists the prerequisites
for a new constructive theology:
Any constructive theology after the tremendum must be marked by the
following characteristics: first, the God who is affirmed must abide in a
universe whose human history is scarred by genuine evil without making
the evil empty or illusory nor disallowing the real presence of God before,
even if not within, history; second, the relation of God to creation and its
creatures, including, as both now include, demonic structure and unredeemable
events, must be seen, nonetheless, as meaningful and valuable despite the
fact that the justification that God's presence renders to the worthwhileness
of life and struggle is now intensified and anguished by the contrast and
opposition that evil supplies; third, the reality of God in his selfhood and
person can no longer be isolated, other than as a strategy of clarification,
from God's real involvement with the life of creation.8'
The agenda has been set. All that remains is to make sense of it.
Cohen constructs a bridge over the abyss - with the help of the Kabbalah
and the theological ideas of Schelling and Rosenzweig. We are presented with
a "revisionist theism" which starts from a seemingly traditional view of creation:
As God's being is full and plenteous, creation is an overflowing - the
cosmogonic reading. As God's nature is abundant, what is plenitude for
God is seen by his creatures as love - a religio-ethical reading. As the whole
of divine nature is enlarged by the presence of nonbeing, by the depths of
the divine made manifest, so creation is necessity within God and free act
to man.
I am not sure why the whole of divine nature is enlarged by the presence of
nonbeing, nor is it clear what Cohen means by this latter term. "It is freedom
and the linguistic imagination that marks the attraction of nonbeing for the
rationality of man," we read. Is nonbeing, then, what used to be called "evil"?
"Man is a creature whose freedom tempts his reason," Cohen is inspired to point
out;82
 but as aphorisms go it is less than illuminating.
A dialectic of freedom and reason would appear to be the upshot of being
created in the image of God. "The bridge that I have ... cast over the abyss,"
Cohen affirms, "is one that sinks its pylons into the deep soil of human freedom
and rationality, recognizing no less candidly now than before that freedom without
the containment of reason returns to caprice and reason without the imagination
of freedom is supineness and passivity." We are God's speech, the syntax of
his dipolar nature:
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The word of God is God's flesh.... Human grammar is divine, but divine
speech is human.83
How does what Cohen is saying differ from earlier theodicies? "The most
penetrating of post-tremendum assaults upon God," he acknowledges, "has been
the attack on divine silence." But he counters this with the assertion that what
we take to be God's communication is always our interpretation of it. God,
in fact, is none other than "the mystery of our futurity", and that means,
apparently, we alone are responsible for what happens here and now. Cohen
elaborates:
If we can begin to see God less as the interferer whose insertion is welcome
(when it accords with our needs) and more as the immensity whose reality
is our prefiguration, whose speech and silence are metaphors for our language
and distortion, whose plenitude and unfolding are the hope of our futurity,
we shall have won a sense of God whom we may love and honor, but whom
we no longer fear and from whom we no longer demand.84
Divine life is decribed as a filament within the historical, so that we have
an obligation to keep it alight. God has clearly risked everything in the creation.
"There is, in the dialectic of man and God and history," according to Cohen,
"the indispensible recognition that man can obscure, eclipse, burn out the divine
filament, grounding its natural movement of transcendence by a sufficient and
oppository chthonic subscension. It is this which is meant by the abyss of the
historical, the demonic, the tremendum." Eschatological considerations are
not to be ruled out, however. The Jewish people is an eternal people. Yet
Rosenzweig was wrong, Cohen believes, to centre his faith on the end-time.
Cohen's own solution is to draw a distinction between salvation and redemption,
the latter defined as a Jewish phenomenon. Salvation is for individuals;
redemption for a community. It is the people which is eternal, holy:
Adam is the stem of the race, but Israel is the stem of mankind.85
From this it follows that to be a Jew is to cherish the idea of the holy.
The Jews are the manifestation of God's reality. The tremendum is attributable
to human destructiveness (which Cohen calls the demonic, but "demonic" smacks
of the supernatural to me). And God is justified because the people lives. Even
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the Jewish State, of which Cohen is by no means an uncritical supporter, bears
witness to the divine nature of Jewish ontology:
The being of the Jewish people is always behind the becoming of the nations,
its reformulation as State coming at a moment when the states of the nations
are weary and declining, but this is the way of Being - imponderable slowness,
because its renewals and conservations are outside life and death, but always
changes rung on eternal scales.86
Cohen writes as if nationalism were a thing of the past, when all the signs are
to the contrary. Moreover, the State of Israel is not the only state to be
established in the past forty years.
All will be explained in the end. The meaning of God's "self-narration"
will become apparent when it is over and done with "or else completed in the
last minute of redemption". 87 Is this dichotomy to suggest that human freedom
may yet destroy the redemptive process? It is a puzzling conclusion to a puzzling
book. Cohen's assortment of metaphors - tremendum, caesura, abyss, volcano
- fail to elucidate the overwhelming fact of mass murder; if anything, they
allow him to neglect the historical detail altogether. Faith is preserved at
the expense of clarity. In attempting to replace the hidden God with a more
intimate but less powerful divinity, Cohen seems unable to find a corresponding
language to express this change. God remains as hidden as ever in the thicket
of Cohen's prose.
Theodicy Revisited
A more accessible "revisionist theism" is to be found in an article by Hans
Jonas called "The Concept of God after Auschwitz: A Jewish Voice", published
in January 1987. Jonas champions the ideas of a suffering God and a becoming
God, ideas more readily associated, perhaps, with contemporary Christian
theology. A God who cares but cannot intervene is no longer an omnipotent
God, but does at least escape the net of the problem of evil. "Only a completely
unintelligible God," Jonas argues, "can be said to be absolutely good and absolutely
powerful, yet tolerate the world as it is." The silence of God at Auschwitz
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is explained through a particular understanding of the meaning of history:
For reasons decisively prompted by contemporary experience, I entertain
the idea of a God who for a time - the time of the ongoing world process
- has divested himself of any power to interfere with the physical course
of things; and who responds to the impact on his being by worldly events,
not "with a mighty hand and outstretched arm", as we Jews on every Passover
recite in remembering the exodus from Egypt, but with the mutely insistent
appeal of his unfulfilled goal.88
If one objects that such a God is no closer than the Deus absconditus,
already dismissed by Jonas, to the God of Jewish tradition, then Jonas recognizes
this but at the same time, like Fackenheim and Cohen, looks to the Kabbalah
for his authority. There is more than one Jewish tradition. The nub of Jonas's
argument is that we can expect no help from God. God has brought the world
into being: it is now up to us to make something of it. Is God exonerated from
responsibility, though, for becoming helpless? The fault lies in creation as much
as in the failure of human beings to heed God's appeal.
Dan Cohn-Sherbok has sought to avoid this impasse by calling for a return
to traditional Jewish eschatology, according to which Jews will be compensated
for their earthly travail in the hereafter. 89 Eliezer Berkovits takes a similar
line. "There must be a dimension beyond history in which all suffering finds
its redemption through God," he argues. "This is essential to the faith of a
Jew." 9 ° I find myself at a loss to conceive what it would mean to compensate
the victims of Auschwitz for their suffering. When asked to comment on the
possibility of redemption in the world to come, one camp survivor responded
as follows:
Most people simply do not believe in Heaven and Hell any more - if they
ever did. Surely except for the extremely religious no Jew I ever met during
the war believed in it or that there is any kind of life after death even if
we were all rather vague about it.... Jews live in this world. And the next
world, if there is any, will take care of itself. Besides, nothing, no possible
reward however great which we may be entitled to and which we may receive
in a world-to-come can ever compensate for the suffering which we endured
in this world. Ten more wives and a hundred more children will never replace
the one beloved wife and the two precious children I lost to the Nazis.91
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CHAPTER 5
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES (I): SUFFERING
They crowd my memory with their faceless presences, and if I could
enclose all the evil of our time in one image, I would choose this image
which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head dropped and
shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of a thought
is to be seen.
Primo Levi, If This Is a Man
To live is to suffer. But not all suffering is perdition. What Auschwitz
demands of the theologian is an honest recognition of the difference between
suffering that can be healed, that is in itself part of being human, and suffering
that simply lays waste. To recognize the difference is to dispense with former
notions of suffering as a mark of God's justice or due penance for sin. Simone
Weil was perhaps the first theologian to make clear the nature of suffering
at its most extreme, suffering that attacks the very core of a person's identity;
she gave it the name of "maiheur", translated into English as "affliction".'
Affliction, as Weil describes it in her essay on "The Love of God and Affliction",
involves social alienation and psychological distress as well as physical pain.
Although Simone Weil died in 1943 - before, that is, Hitler's war against
the Jews had run its course - her analysis of affliction highlights the need for
theological reflection in the face of atrocity. God's love is called into question
by the extent of human vulnerability. Affliction rather than suffering as such,
according to Weil, is life's great enigma:
It is not surprising that the innocent are killed, tortured, driven from their
country, made destitute or reduced to slavery, imprisoned in camps or
cells, since there are criminals to perform such actions. It is not surprising
either that disease is the cause of long sufferings, which paralyse life and
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make it into an image of death, since nature is at the mercy of the blind
play of mechanical necessities. But it s surprising that God should have
given affliction the power to seize the very souls of the innocent and to
take possession of them as their sovereign lord. At the very best, he who
is branded by affliction will only keep half his soul.2
Pain which is physical, once over is forgotten. Those who have suffered
affliction continue to suffer long after the event itself. Only God, Weil argues,
can set them free from the past. "And even the grace of God," she adds, "cannot
cure irremediably wounded nature here below. The glorified body of Christ
bore the marks of the nails and spear." God is bound by the blind necessity
he has willed into being. But why has he willed it into being? On the one hand
Weil considers it to be part of his Providence, and yet on the other believes
it to be the root of affliction. Affliction robs human beings of their sense of
worth precisely because there is no reason for it:
Affliction is anonymous before all things, it deprives its victims of their
personality and makes them into things. It is indifferent; and it is the
coldness of this indifference - a metallic coldness - which freezes all those
it touches right to the depths of their souls. They will never find warmth
again. They will never believe any more that they are anyone.3
We are urged to think of affliction as a distance: God created beings
capable of love from all possible distances but not, it appears, from the greatest
possible distance, "the infinite distance". God alone is capable of this, which
is revealed in the crucifixion ("this supreme tearing apart, this agony beyond
all others, this marvel of love"). The afflicted are at the foot of the cross,
"almost at the greatest possible distance from God". 4 It is unclear why God's
suffering should be considered greater than theirs. As IJirich Simon says of
Auschwitz, "Here the cross is elongated in time, by days, weeks, months."5
It is important for Weil that Christ was afflicted. She distinguishes him
from martyrs who go willingly to their deaths. Martyrdom is a privileged form
of suffering. And Christ - even if divine? - must be seen to have shared the
desolation of those who suffer without purpose:
Those who are persecuted for their faith and are aware of the fact are
not afflicted, although they have to suffer. They only fall into a state
of affliction if suffering or fear fills the soul to the point of making it
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forget the cause of the persecution. The martyrs who entered the arena,
singing as they went to face the wild beasts, were not afflicted. Christ
was afflicted. He did not die like a martyr. He died like a common criminal,
confused with thieves, only a little more ridiculous. For affliction is
ridiculous.6
But affliction does seem to have a purpose after all, in spite of being
ridiculous:
God can never be perfectly present to us here below on account of our
flesh. But he can be almost perfectly absent from us in extreme affliction.
This is the only possibility of perfection for us on earth. That is why the
Cross is our only hope.
What hope, though, does the cross represent without its implicit assurance of
resurrection? Well leaves aside questions of eschatology. What matters to
her is the present moment, the opportunity for loving God at a distance. Christ
was exemplary in his affliction:
The unity of God, wherein all plurality disappears, and the abandonment,
wherein Christ believes he is left while never ceasing to love his Father
perfectly, these are two forms expressing the divine virtue of the same
Love, the Love which is God himself.
This amplifies Weil's poetic vision of the universe as the locus of God's pain,
the tearing apart of Father and Son which "echoes perpetually across the universe
in the midst of the silence, like two notes, separate yet melting into one, like
pure and heart-rending harmony". According to Weil, "Those who persevere
in love hear this note from the lowest depths into which affliction has thrust
them. From that moment they can no longer have any doubt."7
As a consequence of original sin we are not free to move towards God;
neither are we free to move away from him. We are free only to choose in
which direction we turn our gaze. Sin is merely turning our gaze in the wrong
direction. From the perspective of eternity, necessity is really obedience.
By obeying the laws of nature, matter is seen to be doing God's will:
Matter is entirely passive, and. in consequence entirely obedient to God's
will. It is a perfect model for us. There cannot be any being other than
God and that which obeys God.
Are we, then, to become entirely passive? Or is obedience to God something
different for human beings? After all, it is the man who turns away from God
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who, according to Well, "gives himself up to the law of gravity". By God's grace
we are able to transcend the blind mechanism that governs matter - "to walk
on the water without violating any of the laws of nature".8
In defining evil as necessity and necessity as obedience, Weil is able
to remove evil from the picture altogether. The world is transformed at one
stroke into a paradise:
The sea is not less beautiful in our eyes because we know that sometimes
ships are wrecked. On the contrary this adds to its beauty. If it altered
the movement of its waves to spare a boat, it would be a creature gifted
with discernment and choice and not this fluid, perfectly obedient to every
external press. It is this perfect obedience which constitutes the sea's
beauty.
Should we be left in any doubt about the implications of this, Weil adds: "All
the horrors which come about in this world are like the folds imposed on the
waves by gravity. That is why they contain an element of beauty." 9 And at
the end of "Additional Pages on the Love of God and Affliction", Weil loses
sight altogether of what affliction means because she is so attached to the
idea of beauty. "To pay no attention to the world's beauty," she writes, "is,
perhaps, so great a crime of ingratitude that it deserves the punishment of
affliction. To be sure, it does not always get it; but then the alternative
punishment is a mediocre life, and in what way is a mediocre life preferable
to
What has happened to the recognition that affliction obliterates souls?
By a sleight-of-hand Weil is able to champion affliction as the ultimate proof
of God's love. To return to her original essay, this reversal is achieved in three
further stages. First, we can never escape from obedience to God. "The only
choice given to men, as intelligent and free creatures," Weil argues, "is to desire
obedience or not to desire it." Second - and this stage is developed more fully
- by desiring obedience we open ourselves to the experience of grace.
Contemplation of the natural world and its moral of obedience is the key to
salvation. "For us, this obedience of things in relation to God," we are told,
"is what the transparency of a window pane is in relation to light. As soon as
- 161 -
we feel this obedience with our whole being, we see Gód."1
To be saved we must first become apprentices, learning "to feel in all
things, first and almost solely, the obedience of the universe to God". Weil
uses the analogy of someone learning to read. When someone knows how to
read, what matters is the meaning of a sentence, not its physical appearance:
Whoever has finished his apprenticeship recognizes things and events,
everywhere and always, as vibrations of the same divine and infinitely
sweet word. This does not mean that he will not suffer. Pain is the colour
of certain events. When a man who can and a man who cannot read look
at a sentence written in red ink, they both see the same red colour, but
this colour is not so important for the one as for the other.
If the analogy works it does so only because Weil applies it to suffering rather
than to affliction. She appears to digress. Joy and suffering are presented
as complementary aspects of the human lot. "Through joy, the beauty of the
world penetrates our soul," Weil asserts. "Through suffering it penetrates our
body." She cuts her own digression short, however:
Affliction is something quite distinct from a method of God's teachingJ2
Would that Weil had ended her essay there. Instead she offers, as the
final stage of her argument, an account of God's triumph over human autonomy.
We are at his mercy. He seeks to possess us with his love. We may refuse to
receive him but are damned, eventually, if we do. Even if we consent he goes
away again, having planted a seed in us that will cause pain as it grows. The
sexual imagery is quite explicit - "We have only not to regret the consent we
gave him, the nuptial yes" - but offers little assurance of God's constancy.
Moreover, if the soul, once fully grown, returns to God and discards its human
image, one wonders what the point of being human in the first place is. For
Weil, the point is clearly to negate oneself:
A day comes when the soul belongs to God, when it not only consents to
love but when truly and effectively it loves. Then in its turn it must cross
the universe to go to God. The soul does not love like a creature with created
love. The love within it is divine, uncreated; for it is the love of God for
God which is passing through it. God alone is capable of loving God. We
can only consent to give up our own feelings so as to allow free passage
in our soul for this love. That is the meaning of denying oneself. We are
created for this consent, and for this alone.13
- 162 -
This is all very well, but one must recall that affliction consumes the
divine seed within us. Or does it? The soul finds its way back to God, we now
learn, through the very thing which seemed most inimical to it. "When the
seed of divine love placed in us has grown and become a tree, how can we, we
who bear it," Weil asks, "take it back to its origin?" The answer lies in "the
most beautiful of all trees", as yet unnamed but unambiguous. "Something still
a little more frightful than a gibbet," Weil calls it. Our consent means becoming
a human sacrifice. Affliction, it turns out, is "a marvel of divine technique".14
It pierces the soul, no longer to destroy it but to save it, to rescue it from its
mortal prison. Affliction is the soul's vehicle across the infinite distance to
God.
As in the crucifixion, the experience of powerlessness is central to
affliction. The person who suffers it is like a butterfly on the end of a pin.
"But through all the horror he can continue to want to love," Weil states
emphatically:
There is nothing impossible in that, no obstacle, one might almost say no
difficulty. For the greatest suffering, so long as it does not cause fainting,
does not touch the part of the soul which consents to a right direction.
This seems patently absurd, a caricature of affliction (which, remember, is
not martyrdom). What does it mean to want to love? How is that distinguished
from loving itself? We do not have privileged access to the souls of survivors.
All we can do is grant some measure of authority to what they have suffered.
The confidence which Weil expresses here is seldom apparent in their testimony.
"It is only necessary to know that love is a direction and not a state of the soul,"
Weil claims,' 5
 as if she were addressing an audience of the afflicted themselves
and this knowledge could lessen their anguish.
Weil's conclusion is so remote from her initial insight into the radical
difference between suffering and affliction, it is difficult to believe it is written
by the same woman. If she retains any sense of that difference now, it is solely
to impress on us the ecstasy of affliction:
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He whose soul remains ever turned in the direction of God while the nail
pierces it, finds himself nailed on to the very centre of the universe. It
is the true centre, it is not in the middle, it is beyond space and time, it
is God. In a dimension which does not belong to space, which is not time,
which is indeed quite a different dimension, this nail has pierced a hole
through all creation, through the thickness of the screen which separates
the soul from God.'6
Weil never once suggests that the soul can return to God by any other means.
Only the afflicted, it would seem, have the chance of salvation, unless death
marks the passage of souls not blessed with affliction.
In "Additional Pages on the Love of God and Affliction", after briefly
explaining why we all deserve affliction for sins of omission, Weil reiterates
her belief that it is anyway something to be welcomed, though only if one is
a disciple of Christ. This has a fairly broad definition. "Any man, whatever
his beliefs may be," she claims, "has his part in the Cross of Christ if he loves
truth to the point of facing affliction rather than escape into the depths of
falsehood." Nonetheless, many are doomed to perish in ignorance:
Often one could weep tears of blood to think how many unfortunates are
crushed by affliction without knowing how to make use of it. But, coolly
considered, this is not a more pitiful waste than the squandering of the
world's beauty.17
Coolly considered indeed. What began as an exercise in compassion is
now tinged with contempt. Simone Weil bore witness to the intensity of her
convictions in the manner of her own death. "They alone will see God who prefer
to recognize the truth and die," she wrote, "instead of living a long and happy
existence in a state of illusion." 8 What she could not finally accept was that
few have the courage or the strength to renounce everything for the sake of
an idea. The afflicted suffer the way they do precisely because they have no
such certainty to sustain them. Their suffering is bewildering; it cannot possibly
make sense. It would be utterly wrong to blame them for this. Either one
believes that God is in control or one doesn't. It is not a question of being able
to recognize the truth. The truth, unfortunately, is irrelevant. In the face




Simone Weil has given us a remarkably lucid definition of affliction,
in spite of her own use of it. But there has been little in the way of response
from later theologians. An exception is Dorothee Soelle, who makes Weil's
insight the starting-point for her own work on Suffering (1973). The men, it
would seem, have more serious matters to attend to - the so-called problem
of evil, for example, which demands intellectual rigour rather than any empathy
with the victims of atrocity. 19 Of course, I am not suggesting that one should
dispense with hard-headed analysis; but one must learn to feel too, and theodicy
becomes a pointless exercise if it is merely the abstract solution to an abstract
problem. "Theologians," Soelle writes, "have an intolerable passion for explaining
and speaking when silence would be appropriate."20
Soelle herself emphasizes the sense of powerlessness that overwhelms
the afflicted. Christianity has tended to view such powerlessness as a vindication
of divine power: God almighty reveals himself through a show of strength.
This has led to a tradition of what Soelle calls Christian masochism, in which
a willingness to suffer is paramount, submission the supreme virtue. Soelle
denounces Calvin's God as a sadist for using suffering to punish the human race.
She continues:
Both sadistic and masochistic theologies of suffering can be criticized
because of their first proposition, the omnipotence of a heavenly being
who decrees suffering. Perhaps it is possible to conceive of a combination
of omnipotence with righteousness, viewed as absolute and perfectionistic,
making demands that by definition cannot be fulfilled. There is, on the
other hand, no way to combine omnipotence with love.21
Soelle's own theology is an attempt to give credence to the idea of a
loving God who is not all powerful, to counter the post-Christian apathy she
defines as "a social condition in which people are so dominated by the goal of
avoiding suffering that it becomes a goal to avoid human relationships and
contacts altogether". Suffering is not always meaningless. The point is to
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distinguish between suffering that is meaningless and suffering that can make
us more human. The goal of human solidarity allows one to make a virtue of
suffering without also making it one's pleasure. "Only that pain is good," Soelle
claims, "which furthers the process of its abolition."22
But affliction must be recognized as something distinct. "It would be
sheer cynicism to develop a theology about such suffering," Soelle concedes,
"for theology presupposes at least a certain amount of common experience....
Respect for those who suffer in extremis imposes silence." However, the urge
to bear witness may be apparent even in the afflicted, and this is what Soelle
identifies as the second phase of suffering, that of lament or communication,
which takes the sufferer out of isolation and paves the way for the third phase
- solidarity - and the possibility of change. The experience of affliction itself,
though, is beyond words. As Soelle later observes, "Affliction defiles everything
a person is."23
If a theology of affliction as such is unacceptable, this does not prevent
Soelle from finding relevant images for it in the Gospel. Jesus' hour of need
in the Garden of Gethsemane and his agony on the cross are taken to represent
something common to all those whose suffering sets them apart. Jesus' suffering
is not unique. "All extreme suffering," according to Soelle, "evokes the
experience of being forsaken by God." In order to use the passion narrative
in this way, Soelle is forced to portray Jesus as purely human. 24 We might
be tempted to ask why his fate should be any more representative than that
of other thwarted idealists. Soelle relates it to the martyrdom of those
condemned to death for their resistance to Hitler and asserts, "Jesus' passion
is the quintessence of such freely chosen suffering." This amounts to a
declaration of faith; as an argument it carries no weight. Soelle's conclusion
is equally unconvincing:
Wherever people suffer Christ stands with them. To put it in less
mythological terms, as long as Christ lives and is remembered his friends
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will be with those who suffer. Where no help is possible he appears not
as the superior helper but only as the one who walks with those beyond
help.25
Soelle speaks of the superiority of those who die for a just cause. "But
the attempt that Christian faith makes to assert that by his death Jesus became
the Son of God means nothing else," she adds. On the one hand Soelle wants
to claim some special significance for the role of Jesus in the world - "He suffers
wherever people are tormented" - and on the other she is continually diminishing
its uniqueness. She cites the words of a German communist, written on the
eve of his execution: "I am dying and I shall live." 26 But this only underlines
how tenuous it is to centre one's theology on a human being. Without some
notion of the divinity of Christ we have no reason to find the story about Jesus
as compelling as Soelle intends us to. There are many stories just as deserving
of our attention.
Soelle devotes much of the book to showing how love for God, as love
for everything that exists, can lead one to a positive acceptance of suffering,
even though the senselessness of affliction remains an acknowledged stumbling-
block:
Nevertheless there remains the question about those who suffer senselessly
and are destroyed. It can only be attacked - not finally answered - by those
who learn in suffering. They will not give up the attempt at change. Nor
will they stop at the boundaries of this attempt. Where nothing can be
done, they will join in the suffering.
"Suffering makes one more sensitive to the pain in the world," she writes (without
irony). It is incumbent on us to learn from our own suffering; we must be open
to it in the way that mystics are. Suffering is then a discipleship. By dying
to the self we prepare ourselves to meet God. This is much the same as Simone
Weil's position, though Soelle does point out that "love of the cross" in its
distorted form leads to masochism - mistaking the way for the goal. The
specifically Christian aspect of Soelle's thought is expressed here:
The Christian idea of the acceptance of suffering means something more
than and different from what is expressed in the words "put up with, tolerate,
bear". With these words the object, the suffering itself, remains
unchanged.... The word "take", also in its combination with "on, up, over",
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means that the person doing the accepting is himself changed. What I "take"
belongs to me in a different sense from something I only bear. I receive
a guest, agree to a proposal, take on an assignment; I say yes, I consent,
I assent, I agree with.17
The upshot of such acceptance of suffering is that one suffers for the
sake of the oppressed and not purely for oneself. "To attain the image of Christ
means to live in revolt against the great Pharaoh," we are told, "and to remain
with the oppressed and disadvantaged. It means to make their lot one's own."
But the oppressed themselves are the devil's martyrs, in Thomas Mtintzer's phrase,
insofar as they tolerate the status quo. Implicit in Soelle's argument is an
exhortation to the powerless to refuse their bondage:
By nature suffering hits us in such a way that it makes us "the devil's
martyrs". Fear, speechlessness, aggression, and blind hate are confirmed
and spread through suffering. In Christ, that is, in humanity's true possibility,
which is by no means self-evident, suffering summons our self-confidence,
our boldness, our strength. Our oneness with love is indissoluble. To learn
to suffer without becoming the devil's martyrs means to live conscious
of our oneness with the whole of life. Those who suffer in this way are
indestructible. Nothing can separate them from the love of God.28
It is not Soelle's intention to accuse the Jews of going like lambs to the
slaughter. Her mind is above such cliches. Nevertheless, there is an inevitable
tension between claiming that people can become indestructible through freely
chosen suffering and recognizing that few people do. In theory, most victims
could have chosen to suffer in a spirit of solidarity before they were made to
suffer senselessly. It is a question of timing as well as of chance. "The suffering
of one thrust unconsciously into the role of victim excludes every attempt to
give meaning," Soelle observes. 29 But who has the right to be a victim once
there is a just cause to suffer and die for? As long as there are people who
do not share Soelle's faith in life as a whole being meaningful or who do not
have the strength to sustain that faith in the cruellest circumstances, there
will also be affliction.
Soelle's attempt to renovate an exhausted religious language reaches
its apotheosis in her analysis of the "gallows episode" from Elie Wiesel's Night.
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Yet here if anywhere, surely, is the moment for silence rather than explanation.
"How can hope be expressed in the face of senseless suffering?" Soelle asks,3°
before quoting the story of the boy hanged in Auschwitz - which I shall reproduce
here from the original translation:
"Long live liberty!" cried the two adults.
But the child was silent.
"Where is God? Where is He?" someone behind me asked.
At a sign from the head of the camp, the three chairs tipped over.
Total silence throughout the camp. On the horizon, the sun was setting.
"Bare your heads!" yelled the head of the camp. His voice was raucous.
We were weeping.
"Cover your heads!"
Then the march past began. The two adults were no longer alive. Their
tongues hung swollen, blue-tinged. But the third rope was still moving;
being so light the child was still alive....
For more than half an hour he stayed there, struggling between life and
death, dying in slow agony under our eyes. And we had to look him full
in the face. He was still alive when I passed in front of him. His tongue
was still red, his eyes were not yet glazed.
Behind me, I heard the same man asking:
"Where is God now?"
And I heard a voice within me answer him:
"Where is He? Here He is - He is hanging here on this gallows...."
That night the soup tasted of corpses.1
Soelle finds a parallel between the idea of God hanging on the gallows
and the Jewish tradition of the Shekinah or "indwelling presence of God in the
world". God shares the suffering of his people and himself awaits redemption
through them. The story has a meaning for Christians too. "It is Christ who
suffers and dies here," Soelle alleges, insofar, that is, as the boy really does
become God:
In Jesus' passion history a decisive change occurs, the change from the
prayer to be spared to the dreadfully clear awareness that that would not
happen. The way from Gethsemane to Golgotha is a taking leave of
(narcissistic) hope. It is the same change that occurs in the story from
Auschwitz: the eye is directed away from the almighty Father to the
sufferer himself. But not in such a way that this sufferer now has to endure
everything alone. The essence of Jesus' passion history is the assertion
that this one whom God forsook himself becomes God.32
What follows is a quite spurious exercise in making the Auschwitz story
fit the details of "the mythical story of the death and resurrection of Christ",
so that the boy's death itself appears to be mythical and not a senseless atrocity.
Soelle is right to question the traditional Christian doctrine of salvation, but
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her alternative is hardly more coherent:
Precisely those who in suffering experience the strength of the weak, who
incorporate the suffering into their lives, for whom coming through free
of suffering is no longer the highest goal, precisely they are there for the
others who, with no choice in the matter, are crucified in lives of senseless
suffering. A different salvation, as the language of metaphysics could
promise it, is no longer possible. The God who causes suffering is not to
be justified even by lifting the suffering later. No heaven can rectify
Auschwitz. But the God who is not a greater Pharaoh has justified himself:
in sharing the suffering, in sharing the death on the cross.33
Why speak of salvation at all? What difference can a suffering God make
to those who suffer without hope? According to Soelle, "God has no other hands
than ours." This is the moral force of her theology: it is up to us to act on
behalf of others. But unless one accepts Soelle's belief in the ultimate value
of martyrdom, there is still no answer for those whose suffering is meaningless:
If there were no one who said, "I die, but I shall live," no one who said,
"I and the Father are one," then there would be no hope for those who suffer
mute and devoid of hoping.... There is a history of resurrections, which
has vicarious significance. A person's resurrection is no personal privilege
for himself alone - even if he is called Jesus of Nazareth. It contains within
itself hope for all, for everything.34
In The Crucified God (1973) Jiirgen Moltmann has also sought to reveal
the theological message of Wiesel's narrative. He, too, refers to the Shekinah
of Jewish tradition and interprets the story from a Christian point of view.
The rabbinic concept of God's self-humiliation is considered as the forerunner
of Moltmann's own theologia crucis. Moltmann assumes that the inner voice
which says God is hanging on the gallows has been inspired by reflection on
theodicy rather than simply by despair:
Any other answer would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other Christian
answer to the question of this torment. To speak here of a God who could
not suffer would make God a demon. To speak here of an absolute God
would make God an annihilating nothingness. To speak here of an indifferent
God would condemn men to indifference.35
Writing on "The Impassibility of God and the Problem of Evil", Kenneth
Surin supports this endeavour to identify God in the suffering of human beings,
but takes the view that Soelle and Moltmann fall short of a fully Christian
response to atrocity. Surin is more traditional in his understanding of the meaning
of Christ's sacrifice:
- 170 -
It is not enough to suggest that God, in identifying with the victims of
Auschwitz, himself becomes a powerless victim of the place. For the
Christian message, in addition to showing us that God himself, in the person
of his Son, was a helpless victim on the cross, also assures us of the victory
of goodness over evil, of life over death. In the Christian faith, the cross
is inextricably bound up with the resurrection.36
This seems like a convenient strategy to have it both ways: a suffering God
and an almighty God. Nevertheless, Surin does highlight the difficulties entailed
by justifying God through his own capacity to suffer. Unless God can also redeem
the suffering of human beings, the suggestion that he suffers with them is of
no more value to the afflicted than the awareness that others are also starving,
humiliated and in pain.
More recently, Surin appears to have recognized the challenge to faith
that the Holocaust represents. "It is not, and indeed it cannot be, Christianity's
primary concern to 'make sense' of what happened at Auschwitz," he writes
in Theology and the Problem of Evil (1986). "If anything is Christianity's primary
concern with regard to what took place at Auschwitz," he continues, "(apart
from taking responsibility, in shame and penitence, for the centuries of Christian
anti-semitism which made it possible for Auschwitz to become a reality), it
is, rather, to allow itself to be reinterpreted, to be 'ruptured', by the pattern
of events at Auschwitz." 37 Moreover, Surin agrees with Johann-Baptist Metz
that the story of the boy hanged on the gallows is not to be appropriated by
Christian theologians.
Metz's censure of Moltmann and Soelle (all three, it might be noted,
are German) is based on the recognition that the majority of the victims at
Auschwitz were Jews, who were there for being Jewish and for no other reason:
Who really has the right to give the answer to the God-question - "Where
is God? Here he is - he hangs on the gallows"? Who, if anyone at all, has
the right to give it? As far as I am concerned, only the Jew threatened
by death with all the children in Auschwitz has the right to say it - only
he alone. There is no other "identification" of God - neither as sublime
as for instance in J. Moltmann nor as reserved and modest as in the case
of ID. Soelle - here, as far as I am concerned, no Christian-theological
identification of God is possible.38
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Liberation
Metz and Moltmann do have something in common, however. They both
believe you can draw a positive inference from the fact that some kept their
faith even in Auschwitz itself. In The Emergent Church (1980) Metz claims
"We can pray after Auschwitz, because people prayed in Auschwitz." 39 Moltmann
makes the same point, if at somewhat greater length:
A "theology after Auschwitz" may seem an impossibility or blasphemy
to those who allowed themselves to be satisfied with theism or their
childhood beliefs and then lost them. And there would be no "theology
after Auschwitz" in retrospective sorrow and the recognition of guilt, had
there been no "theology in Auschwitz". Anyone who later comes up against
insoluble problems and despair must remember that the Shema of Israel
and the Lord's Prayer were prayed in Auschwitz.4°
Indeed, The Crucified God as a whole could be said to reflect Moltmann's
awareness of the need to incorporate the reality of Auschwitz into theological
thinking. Whether or not it is lucid enough to convince any but the most patient,
it is nevertheless one of the few works of Christian theology to confront
Auschwitz directly. "God in Auschwitz and Auschwitz in the crucified God
- that is the basis for a real hope," claims Moltmann, "which both embraces
and overcomes the world, and the ground for a love which is stronger than death
and can sustain death."4'
A fashion for abstruse argument creates problems for the reader. In
her contribution to Concilium 175 (The Holocaust as Interruption), for example,
Rebecca Chopp appears to out-Moltmann Moltmann:
Central to the history of suffering is the realisation of the dialectic of
non-identity in these events which necessitates the retrieval of witness
as a basic category of Christianity. For the dialectic of non-identity -
the inability of these events to be contained in theories of interpretation
or action and the inability to be corrected and cured in history - is
represented best through the witnesses themselves.42
The point seems valid enough, if I understand it correctly, but why make it
in such a convoluted way?
Having already compared the task of liberation theologians with that
of Holocaust writers - to point, that is, to "massive public events of suffering"
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- Chopp is untroubled by the thought that these events might be obscured by
rhetoric. "Christianity must now stand with those who suffer," she asserts,
"not because suffering is itself privileged but because within the events of
suffering the contemporary historical subject is revealed." 43 One wonders
within what events the historical subject was previously revealed.
According to David Tracy, "The Holocaust is the classic negative event
of our age."44 John Pawlikowski endorses this, but unlike Tracy finds an
explanation for it in terms of original sin:
With a proper understanding of the meaning of the Christ Event men and
women can be healed, they can finally overcome the primal sin of pride,
the desire to supplant the Creator in power and status that was at the heart
of the Holocaust.45
Inadequate as this kind of response is, it does at least allow Christians to believe
that the Holocaust is our problem and not God's. However, it hints at the kind
of triumphalism Metz has condemned as "messianic weakness". "Does there
not exist something like a typically Christian incapacity for dismay in the face
of disasters?" he asks.46 According to him, Auschwitz should compel Christians
to undertake a radical self-interrogation. The messianic idea of salvation has
been cut off from its social roots and distorted into the privilege of an elite.
Metz regards the history of suffering undergone by the Jews as closer
to what Jesus foretold for his disciples than the Christian tradition itself is.
It is now incumbent on Christian theologians to acknowledge Auschwitz as a
turning-point in their own religion:
What Christian theologians can do for the murdered of Auschwitz and thereby
for a true Christian-Jewish ecumenism is, in every case, this: Never again
to do theology in such a way that its construction remains unaffected,
or could remain unaffected, by Auschwitz.47
One theologian who seems to satisfy this condition is IJirich Simon.
Simon is something of a special case. Himself a Jewish refugee from Germany
in the thirties, he was received into the Church of England soon after and
ordained. His father, a composer, died at Auschwitz. A Theology of Auschwitz
(1967) is unique as a systematic attempt to interpret the death camps in the
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light of traditional Christian motifs. It goes beyond Soelle's assertion that TMEvery
single one of the six million was God's beloved son"48 to a vision of Auschwitz
as the Incarnation writ large:
The radical nature of modern experience almost despairs of a verbal
definition of Deity. At Auschwitz the wholly Otherness of God, hidden
and immense, no longer clashes with the disclosure of the one as near,
loving, and afflicted in the afflictions of man. The science of the Cross
gives a new edge to the infinite qualitative distinction between God and
man in its acclamation of the Creator of the Universe as the Lamb of
sacrifice.49
Auschwitz is described in terms of Christ's passion. This leads at times
to analogies that cannot possibly work. Simon relates how the camp officers
committed a whole range of atrocities on children. "We take this to be the
totalitarian equivalent," he declares, "to the spitting at, and the beating of,
the Son of Man." But he later concedes that what people suffered in the camps
is beyond comparison:
To be selected to labour service after arrival is to be face to face with
the human condition which, under diabolical direction, is entirely devised
to crush humanity. To arrive for death, and then for death to be kept at
arm's length, so as to squeeze the last ounce out of the imprisoned human
condition, is a torture which Jesus could not know.5°
It is almost impossible to assess A Theology of Auschwitz. A strange
hybrid of lament and exultation, it challenges us to sound the depth of our own
response to the catastrophe. "A theology of Auschwitz cannot be written unless
its findings issue in prayer," Simon writes, "for we can face the horror only
by coming to terms with it liturgically." For Simon this means, in fact,
transforming the horror into an occasion for rejoicing:
This prayer is an existentialist decision for the faith which links freedom
with God. It releases in us the spirit which yearns to crown innocence
with freedom. It articulates the need for an eternal reality of freedom
and acknowledges God as the champion on the way to, and as the goal of,
freedom.
Unfortunately Simon fails to clarify what this freedom is. In spite of an earlier
commitment to examine "transcendental terms" afresh, 5 ' he habitually assumes
that their meanings are self-evident. Grace and redemption, for example, are
alluded to throughout as axiomatic truths.
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One consequence of such theological certainty is that the dead of
Auschwitz take on the role of sacrificial victims. "It is not man at Auschwitz,
but God," we are told, "who incorporates the terror into the pattern of meaningful
sacrifice." We might wish to know on what authority Simon can make this claim,
but he forestalls us:
This meaning, however, is perceptible only to faith. It is grounded in the
belief that God has himself entered human history in the sacrifice of Jesus.
Which precludes further discussion. Except to underline the connection between
the Atonement and the murdered Jews:
Christ died to save mankind from its pagan madness. The victims of
Auschwitz died because pagan madness wished to extirpate the light and
to rule the world in dark, ecstatic nihilism.52
If the Jews died to create a new type of corporate martyrdom, as Simon
suggests, what significance does that have for us today? On the one hand Simon
states quite emphatically, "Even Auschwitz held and holds the secret of
redemption," while on the other he does seem prepared to express some doubts:
"The resurrection from Auschwitz," he writes, "is ... still more a demand than
a given fact." We cannot expect God, then, to do all the work:
The legacy of Auschwitz for theology is the return to the rock of action
against which hollow verbiage disintegrates.53
But what should we do? Simon clearly regards Edith Stein's voluntary walk
to the gas chamber as exemplary, and also calls for a willingness to carry out
unpleasant duties (like delousing neglected children) in a spirit of asceticism.54
Simon's theology is liberation theology of a kind - more devotional than
political:
The liturgical petition "Libera nos ...' sums up, in all languages, whether
formally intoned or ejaculated as a cr from the heart, the re-enactment
of God's transcendent will in the world.5'
The redemptive process is inexorable. Only the wholly evil will suffer the
retribution of the annihilating nothingness of death. For the rest, death is merely
the fulfilment of this life. 56 Christ is "the eternal mediator" who assures us
of the life to come. And Christ alone makes it possible to contemplate Auschwitz
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without despair. "Without the God-Man," Simon writes, "Auschwitz would stand
as a nightmare, the culmination of unreason and malice."57
The assumption, of course, is that Christianity is better equipped than
Judaism to assimilate the catastrophe. In the next, and final, chapter I shall
be considering the extent to which Christians helped prepare the way for the
Final Solution by their refusal to tolerate the reality of a Jewish people, and
I shall also consider the extent to which some still refuse to tolerate it now.
Simon's glorification of Christ as the Redeemer skirts over the fact that most
of those who suffered believed, if they believed at all, in a Messiah who was
yet to come. Christian theologians would be more qualified to discern the
meaning of Auschwitz if the Final Solution had been directed against Christians
rather than Jews. It was not the Church but the Jewish people that was
threatened with destruction.
It seems to me that Christ is smuggled into Auschwitz mainly as a way
of distancing oneself from the suffering it represents. Let me conclude with
a striking example of this. Franz Mussner, a German Catholic New Testament
scholar, is the author of an ambitious attempt to provide the basis for a revised
Christian understanding of Judaism. Written in the wake of Vatican II and the
increased awareness of the Church's responsibility for antisemitism, Tractate
on the Jews (1979) is concerned essentially with making theological reparations.
And yet its author is unable to relinquish the supremacy of his own faith. Citing
Jewish thinkers who regard the murder of the Jews as some form of vicarious
atonement for the sins of the world, Mussner translates this into Christian terms.
The crucified Christ is thus held up as an inclusive image of Jewish suffering
- to the exclusion of the real victims:
The Christian must, in the face of the "total sacrifice" of the Jews in
Auschwitz, openly confess his complicity in anti-Semitism. However, he
cannot grasp the meaning of this sacrifice without the crucified Christ,
who took up the sacrifice of Auschwitz into his glorified crucified body.58
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CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES (U): ANTISEMITISM
It cannot be said too often or too strongly that antisemitism is a Gentile,
and pre-eminently a Christian, problem.
James Parkes, Judaism and Christianity
Without anti-Semitism, Nazism would have been inconceivable, both
as an ideology and as a catalyst of the emotions.
Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich
The values that informed nearly two thousand years of Christian
civilization continue to inform our post-Christian culture. Antisemitism is
not a thing of the past, even if Auschwitz has made it less fashionable as a
political weapon. Other kinds of hatred, it is found, will do just as well. The
main thing is to have an enemy you can identify. Jews were identified as the
enemy by the Church Fathers. Does this mean that the latter paved the way
for their destruction in twentieth-century Europe? Various Christian theologians
- from the Anglican James Parkes to the American Catholic Rosemary Ruether
and her critics - have sought to unravel the thread of responsibility, essentially
as an act of contrition for the Church's teaching in the past, but also in
recognition of the failure of the churches in Germany and elsewhere to speak
out against Hitler when it was incumbent on them to do so. There were Christian
martyrs, to be sure, and historians debate the contribution of the Confessing
Church to the resistance,' but Christendom as a whole was a mortuary not
a refuge for the Jews.
It comes as some surprise, therefore, to read one theologian, John
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Pawlikowski, a Catholic priest of the Order of the Servants of Mary, in his
pamphlet on The Challenge of the Holocaust for Christian Theology (1978),
seeking to pin the blame for the catastrophe on Western liberalism:
At least indirectly, Western liberal thought was responsible for the Holocaust.
By breaking the tight hold the God-concept had on previous generations,
it paved the way for greater human freedom and self-sufficiency without
realistically assessing the potential of the destructive forces within mankind
to pervert this freedom into the cruelty revealed by the Nazi experiment.
Thus, the Holocaust shattered much of the grandeur of Western liberal
thought. In some ways it represents the ultimate achievement of the person
totally "liberated" from God.
Are we, then, to believe that all the anti-Jewish rhetoric of the Christian era
is of less significance in the singling out of the Jews for destruction than the
absence of God as a restraining factor? Is Pawlikowski not aware that an appeal
to God's authority has been the pretext (indeed Hitler himself used it) for
massacres since time immemorial?
However, I have not cited Pawlikowski merely to berate him. There
is a problem here of context, or lack of one. The history of religiously-inspired
Jew-hatred and the history of antisemitism (an ideology that gets its name
from political movements in the late nineteenth century) do not necessarily
coincide. Pawlikowski is able to exploit this ambiguity and regard the two
histories as more or less distinct. Before considering other Christian perspectives,
therefore, it might be helpful to trace the apparent inspiration for the Final
Solution in the myth of a Jewish world-conspiracy, and ask what bearing this
has on our understanding of the links between the Church's teaching of contempt,
as a French Jewish historian has called it, 3 and the virulent antisemitism that
formed the basis of Hitler's political campaign.
The Myth of a Jewish World-Conspiracy
In her Preface to Part One of The Origins of Totalitarianism, written
in 1967 (sixteen years after the work was first published), Hannah Arendt
questions the notion that antisemitism is pre-eminently a Christian problem:
The notion of an unbroken continuity of persecutions, expulsions, and
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massacres from the end of the Roman Empire to the Middle Ages, the modern
era, and down to our own time, frequently embellished by the idea that
modern antisernitism is no more than a secularized version of popular
medieval superstitions, is no less fallacious (though of course less
mischievous) than the corresponding antisemitic notion of a Jewish secret
society that has ruled, or aspired to rule, the world since antiquity.4
For Arendt, modern antisemitism is related solely to the development of the
nation-state, and its source can be found in the economic role of Jews during
the previous centuries. What she omits to explain, in spite of citing numerous
instances of it, is the marriage of the old religious hatred to this new political
dogma. In her detailed account of the lJreyfus Affair, for example, she highlights
the part played by the clergy in stirring up anti-Jewish feeling, and draws
attention to the fact that the Catholic press throughout the world was against
Dreyfus. 5 The Church, it seems, continued to regard Jews as reprobate.
Norman Cohn helps to substantiate this in Warrant for Genocide (1967).
Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army, was accused and convicted of
spying at the end of 1894. (He was pardoned five years later and eventually
acquitted of all charges in 1906.) Edouard Drumont, whose antisemitic daily
newspaper Libre Parole enjoyed considerable Catholic support and was one
of the most successful papers in the country by the time of the Dreyfus Affair,
had already written an influential book called La France juive (1886) that
popularized the arguments of various theological tracts claiming to have
uncovered a Jewish world-conspiracy. 6 And in 1893, the year before the trial,
a work was published in Paris that appears to have been one of the more likely
sources for the notorious ItProtocols of the Elders of Zionht. Written by a Catholic
Archbishop, it expressed the conviction that the whole of human history was
the result of a Jewish conspiracy which had now reached the point of fulfilment,
and called upon the rulers of Europe to unite against this. In spite of their
allegedly demonic strength, the Jews were going to be defeated:
Do not hope, 0 Jews, to be able to escape the calamity that once more
threatens you.... The day when you are crushed will see the Church, your
victim, enjoying a vital expansion such as has never been seen.7
The t?PrOtocols hl themselves were first disseminated in Russia early this
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century by a fervent adherent of the Orthodox Church called Sergey Nilus.
He inserted them into the third edition of his mystical book The Great in the
Small - published in 1905 - to convince Tsar Nicholas II of the need for antisemitic
legislation. According to Norman Cohn, they had been fabricated some time
between 1894 and 1899, probably after the first Zionist Congress at Basel in
1897 (which was interpreted by antisemites as incontrovertible evidence of
the Jewish world-conspiracy), and the country of origin was undoubtedly France8
- at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, therefore. The forgery is nevertheless
considered to be the work of a Russian, so it is unsurprising that Russia should
be the country where it surfaced. The Metropolitan of Moscow, no less, ordered
a sermon quoting Nilus' version of the "Protocols" to be read in all 368 churches
of Moscow, while the text itself was still in manuscript.9
It was not until 1917, however, that the "Protocols" became a force in
world history, used by the Black Hundreds to rationalize the success of the
Bolshevik revolution and justify retributive progroms against thousands of
innocent Jews. It is sobering to recall that as late as 1920 the Times was prepared
to lend credence to the authenticity of these "Protocols")° The Nazis, of course,
used them to strengthen their own ideology of a Jewish world-conspiracy. And
even though Hannah Arendt takes issue with Cohn over his historical
understanding of antisemitism, she shares his estimation of the importance
of the "Protocols" as an instrument of propaganda. Thus:
The point for the historian is that the Jews, before becoming the main
victims of modern terror, were the center of Nazi ideology. And an ideology
which has to persuade and mobilize people cannot choose its victim
arbitrarily. In other words, if a patent forgery like the "Protocols of the
Elders of Zion" is believed by so many people that it can become the text
of a whole political movement, the task of the historian is no longer to
discover a forgery. Certainly it is not to invent explanations which dismiss
the chief political and historical fact of the matter: that the forgery is
being believed. This fact is more important than the (historically speaking,
secondary) circumstance that it is forgery)1
As Cohn has pointed out, the Berne trial of 1934-5 established once and
for all that the "Protocols" were a forgery, but this did not stop the Nazis from
continuing to affirm their authenticity. The myth of a Jewish world-conspiracy
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was exploited to the full. In 1936, for example, one could read in Der Stiirmer,
"The mobilization of the German people's will to destroy the bacillus lodged
in its body is a declaration of war on all Jews throughout the world. Its final
result will decide the problem whether the world is to be redeemed by German
virtues or to perish by the Jewish poison." 12 The continued repetition of such
propaganda helped to sanction the idea that Jews somehow brought trouble
upon themselves, encouraging indifference to their fate if not actual hostility.
Antisemitism is not simply a generalized dislike of Jews. It is always
tenaing towards something more extreme. Pace Hannah Arendt and her strictures
on "the thesis of eternal antisemitism"? 3 I would nevertheless argue that
antisemitism is distinct from other types of prejudice insofar as it is rooted
in a refusal to acknowledge the right of Jews to exist at all as Jews. The choice
between conversion and death (which is at least a choice: the Nazis abrogated
even this) articulates the real meaning of the Church's caricature of the Jewish
people as reprobate. Violence against Jews has always been sanctioned by shifting
the blame onto the victims. The revival of the medieval superstition about
the ritual murder of Christian children has proved a convenient alibi for progroms
over the last hundred years. As Cohn observes, "Myths do not necessarily
disappear with the circumstances that first produced them." 14 In fact, there
were almost more cases of ritual-murder accusation in Central and Eastern
Europe between 1880 and 1945 than during the whole of the Middle Ages.15
As soon as one begins to reflect on the insidiousness of antisemitic ideas,
it is hard to resist the plausibility of explanations drawn from the realm of
psychoanalysis. Whether these are grounded in any empirical research is another
matter. Hence, Norman Cohn, confronted by the persistence of the Jewish
world-conspiracy myth, is driven to conclude, "This surely suggests that it answers
to deep and enduring unconscious needs." He goes on to define fanatical
antisemites in similar terms:
Fanatical antisemites are in fact people whose own deepest emotional
needs compel them to see life as a struggle against just such a conspiracy
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as is portrayed in the Protocols. For them belief springs from an inner
necessity; and this gives them an air of absolute conviction, which in turn
gives the criminals and opportunists the reassurance and encouragement
they need.6
"The Blackmail of Transcendence"
George Steiner has provided a more elaborate interpretation of these
deep unconscious needs, taking his cue from a remark of Hitler's: "Conscience
is a Jewish invention." 7 First formulated as part of In Bluebeard's Castle (1971),
his thesis has since been refined, appearing most recently in an article called
"The Long Life of Metaphor: An Approach to 'the Shoah" (in Encounter, February
1987). Steiner also incorporated it into his novella The Portage to San Cristobal
of A.H. (1979), allowing no less an authority than Hitler himself - imagined
to be living into old age somewhere in the South American jungle - to put his
case for him.' 8 In its earliest form the argument went something like this:
the Jews were responsible for the moral thrust of Western civilization; they
had given the world the idea of a single, all-powerful deity, which had then
been translated into the absolute demands of Christian ethics and, ultimately,
the vision of messianic socialism:
Monotheism at Sinai, primitive Christianity, messianic socialism: these
are the three supreme moments in which Western culture is presented with
what Ibsen termed "the claims of the ideal". These are the three stages,
profoundly interrelated, through which Western consciousness is forced
to experience the blackmail of transcendence.19
The Holocaust, or the Shoah, as Steiner now prefers to call it, was thus
a backlash against the demands imposed on the pagan world by an alien God.
Steiner refers to it as "a reflex, the more complete for being long-inhibited,
of natural sensory consciousness, of instinctual polytheistic and animist needs".
But this is pure speculation. The Nazis may have believed in the restoration
of Teutonic culture, but to what extent there was an instinctual basis for this
(rather than, say, a sentimental one) is open to question. Also open to question
is the view that Western civilization only started to break down in the twentieth
century. A closer analysis of the past would reveal considerable barbarism
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in the rational order that Steiner is nostalgic for. "To most intelligent men
and women of the nineteenth century," he claims, "a prediction that torture
and massacre were soon to be endemic again in 'civilized' Europe would have
seemed a nightmarish joke." But only because "civilized" Europeans were able
to torture and massacre elsewhere. "There is nothing natural about our present
condition," Steiner complains. 20 There was nothing natural about the slave
trade either, or the slaughter of indigenous populations. Of course we must
recognize the appalling scale of this century's atrocities, but don't let's blind
ourselves to the pattern of diplomacy that was the model for them.
I have no reason to suppose that Steiner's diagnosis of a suicidal impulse
in Western civilization is wrong. Perhaps the Holocaust really does mark "a
second Fall". For Steiner, anyway, the explanation f or twentieth-century mayhem
is to be found in "the malignant energies released by the decay of natural religious
forms". He compares the camps to the image of hell as it has appeared to writers
like Dante. "The concentration and death camps of the twentieth century,"
Steiner argues, "wherever they exist, under whatever regime, are Hell made
immanent. They are the transference of Hell from below the earth to its
surface." More explicitly:
In the camps the millenary pornography of fear and vengeance cultivated
in the Western mind by Christian doctrines of damnation, was realized. 2 -
By ceasing to believe in hell, he claims, we have had to construct it for ourselves.
Fascinating as an insight into the link between real and imagined horrors, this
nevertheless leads us away from the problem of antisemitism, except insofar
as it reminds us that Jews were often associated with the devil in medieval
theology.
More significantly, in "The Long Life of Metaphor" Steiner alludes directly
to the Christian temper regarding Jewish existence. In an examination of Paul's
Epistle to the Romans 9-12, he uncovers two equally ominous scenarios. The
first decrees that since Christ is the Messiah foretold by the prophets and
the Jews had him crucified, the latter have placed themselves beyond God's
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mercy. The second scenario decrees that by refusing to recognize Jesus of
Nazareth as the Messiah, the Jews have put off the day of salvation; and this,
according to Steiner, can lead to one of two logical consequences: either the
elimination of Israel altogether (whether by forced conversion or murder) or
what Steiner calls "Christian patience and self-questioning" - by which he means
the view, more common since Auschwitz, that Christ's mission is incomplete
until the Jews have chosen freely to recognize him as Messiah. Even this view,
attributed to Karl Barth among others, appears fraught with ambiguity.22
Steiner reiterates his own theory of "the blackmail of transcendence"
(expressed now as "the blackmail of perfection"):
Nothing is more cruel than the blackmail of perfection. We come to hate,
to fear most those who demand of us a self-transcendence, a surpassing
of our natural and common limits of being. Our hate and fear are the more
intense precisely because we know the absolute rightness, the ultimate
desirability of the demand. In failing to respond adequately, we fail
ourselves. And it is of deep-lying self-hatreds that hatreds spring.
Jews are hated because they invented God. "The force, the obsessive depth
of a doctrine," Steiner asserts, "become greater as this doctrine passes into
the individual and collective unconscious in the guise of symbol and metaphor."
And these symbols become malignant at the point when the doctrine they
represent is no longer believed in. Thus, the repressed antipathy to monotheism,
combined with the theology of Jew-hatred, prove most lethal as the influence
of Christianity itself begins to decline. Steiner discerns "a clear pattern in
the fact that the Auschwitz-world erupts out of the subconscious, collective
obsessions of an increasingly agnostic, even anti- or post-Christian society".23
Acknowledging that his hypothesis is not susceptible of proof, Steiner
is nevertheless convinced it provides a framework of reference for asking the
right questions:
Only a theological-metaphysical scale of values, only an acute awareness
of the life-force of theological-metaphysical metaphor and symbolism
(even vestigial) in Western collective consciousness and subconsciousness,
can hope to throw some light - I do not lay claim to more - on the
aetiology, on the causal dynamics of Jew-hatred and of the Auschwitz
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experience as these arose from inside the core of European history and
culture.24
Jewish theologian Richard Rubenstein appears to endorse Steiner's perspective.
"The murder of God," he writes, "is an immensely potent symbol of man's primal
desire to do away with his impediments to instinctual gratification." 25 Certainly
one cannot hope to comprehend the single-minded devotion shown by so many
to the cause of a Europe without Jews, unless one recognizes that a shared
belief may also be a shared mania.
The Church and the Devil
Christian theologian A. Roy Eckardt, a Protestant but by no means a
fundamentalist, adds a new slant to this perspective by invoking the supernatural.
In a chapter of Your People, My People (1974) called "Enter the Devil", he tries
to persuade us that Satan is ultimately responsible for the virulence of
antisemitism. "Antisemitism is the special way we murder God," he claims,
in much the same vein as Steiner and Rubenstein. And initially his argument
seems no different:
Generically speaking, the war against the Jews is a war of pagans against
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whom Jews represent. More
delimitedly, antisemitism is the war we Christians wage against Jesus the
Jew; it is the symbolic re-enactment of the crucifixion of Jesus, who
confronts Christians with God; the rejection of the Jew Jesus, turned against
his own people.... We have fought for almost two thousand years to get
Jesus off our backs. We cannot put our hands on him directly, but we can
easily put our hands on his people. A more qualified scapegoat is simply
unimaginable. When we Christians accuse "the Jews" of spurning and
crucifying the Christ, the charge represents our below-conscious wish to
kill Christ and to dispose of him once and for all.26
In what way are gentiles worse equipped to cope with the summons to
righteousness than Jews? This question is raised implicitly by Steiner and
Eckardt, but it is obviously a dangerous one to ask. To explain antisemitism
in terms of a desire to murder God mystifies the central issue - that Jews were
vilified for refusing to be Christians before they were vilified for anything else.
Such prejudice as existed in the pre-Christian world was more to do with hostility
to foreigners than with what we would recognize as antisemitism. 27 Pagans
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had their own morality; they did not need to feel inadequate. To say that their
values are the inspiration for Christian antisemitism is an evasion of
responsibility.
Eckardt's thesis doesn't stop there, however. Christian antiseniitism
is to be explained in terms of "the primordial conspiracy of Christendom with
the demonic powers". This is an inversion of the antisemite's own belief that
the Jews are in league with the devil. Which is to say that Eckardt is speaking
the same language. In the end it hardly matters who is part of the conspiracy
as long as you are able to detect one. Jews, Freemasons, Bolsheviks1 and now
(other) Christians. "I hypothesize that a major field of operations for Satan
is our collective unconscious," Eckardt continues, 28 warming to his theme.
The devil, it appears, wants us to think he is dead. But he hasn't fooled
A. Roy Eckardt. What is more, antisemitism may have a special place in the
fiend's scheme of things:
Is antisemitism simply one more of the devil's unnumbered stratagems,
just another species within the genus of prejudice-persecution-annihilation?
Or is it of the very essence of the devil, the special malignancy that suffuses
and destroys the entire divine-human creation? The assertion is sometimes
dared that the very imperium of the societal libido is, at least in the West,
somehow relatable to antisemitism. To David Polish, for example, "the
truth of every cause is validated or found fraudulent in the way in which
it confronts the Jewish people".
It hardly needs to be said that there is no reason why every cause should have
to confront the Jewish people in the first place. To universalize antisemitism
is to deny its historical context. According to Eckardt, "Jews are hated without
limitations of date or boundaries of place." 29 This is simply not true. One
has only to consider the difference in behaviour of the various nationalities
under German occupation to realize how unhelpful such generalizations are.
Why did the Danes, for example, not only refuse to enact any anti-Jewish
legislation but also, in a gesture of supreme defiance, ferry nearly all the Jews
of Denmark across to Sweden on the eve of a major round-up?3°
By calling antisemites the devil's chosen people, Eckardt sets the scene
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for a Manichean drama - God and the devil leading their respective armies,
their elect, into battle. His logic in ascribing antisemitism to the powers of
darkness is tortuous indeed:
The identifying of the Jews, 
.2! the Jews, with the devil is the devil's
unique work, for only the devil himself could uncover the devil in the Jews.
Only the devil can fabricate devilish accusations.3'
Eckardt's determination to see Christian antisemitism as the work of
the devil is a measure of his own sense of guilt. He devotes the opening chapter
of Your People, My People to a discussion of this, expressing the need for a
repentant faith. In Anti-Semitism and the Christian Mind (1969) Alan Davies,
a fellow American Protestant, calls for an adequate confession of guilt from
the Church as a whole:
Only through such a confession - a confession unafraid to feel the pain
of Christian guilt with the classical remorse of an Orestes, when conscience
entailed inner terror and agony - is the church likely to experience the
measure of healing that would make it a suitable catalyst for breathing
new power into the consciences of its members.32
Does it make sense, though, to speak of an institution feeling anything, let alone
"the classical remorse of an Orestes"? What the Church can do to acknowledge
its heritage of antisemitism is to change its liturgy and teaching where these
continue to denigrate Jews.
The Christian Heritage
As for the teaching of contempt, how far back does it go? Eckardt and
others hold that even the New Testament has traces of antisemitism in it.
The pioneer of this position was James Parkes, an Anglican theologian whose
own concern with antisemitism dates from 1925. In Judaism and Christianity
(1948) he makes it quite clear that he regards the Church from its inception
as culpable for later developments:
In our own day and within our own civilization, more than six million
deliberate murders are the consequence of teaching about Jews for which
the Christian Church is ultimately responsible, and of an attitude to Judaism
which is not only maintained by all the Christian Churches, but has its
ultimate resting place in the teaching of the New Testament itself.34
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Eckardt puts it even more starkly, alleging that "the line from the New Testament
through the centuries of Christian contempt for Jews to the gas ovens and
crematoria is unbroken".35
The trouble with such pronouncements is that they can easily be dismissed
as rhetorical by those who wish to ignore their import. If antisemitism has
an unbroken history, the forms in which it has been expressed must nevertheless
be identified. No Christian theologian has done more in this area than Rosemary
Ruether, whose Faith and Fratricide (1974) has provided the focus for debate
about the theological roots of antisemitism ever since. 36 Her argument, more
recently summarized in a pamphlet on The Bible, Racism and Anti-Semitism
produced by the Church of England, is that theological anti-Judaism developed
as "the left hand of Christology". 37 In other words, a consequence of affirming
Jesus as the Messiah was to denigrate the tradition which continued to await
his coming. In the same pamphlet John Pawlikowski considers specifically the
question of whether or not the New Testament is antisemitic, countering
Ruether's thesis that it is (at least in embryo) with the views of various apologists.
"The word Jews, in the Gospels, Acts, and Paul," Ruether has pointed out, "means
the Jewish religious community. It is in this sense that the word Jews becomes
a hostile symbol for all that resists and rejects the gospel." 38 Neither the counter
-assertion that John, for example, was merely condemning opposition to Jesus
rather than a particular people nor the attempt to argue that "the Jews" is
anyhow a mistranslation,39 are sufficient to explain away the sustained polemic
against the Jewish community for its alleged apostasy and the use which has
been made of this in succeeding generations.
Ruether locates the source of Christian anti-Judaism in "an alienated
and angry Jewish sectarianism which believed it had the true midrash on the
Scriptures and was founded on the true cornerstone of God's people, but found
itself rebuffed and rejected at every stage by the Synagogue". Once this anti-
Judaism had taken root in a predominantly gentile Church, however, it ceased
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to be related to any personal disappointment. The adversos Judaeos tradition
in the Church Fathers marks the shift from sibling rivalry to the teaching of
contempt. The Jews were regarded as having forfeited their election to the
new Israel, the Church. Ruether notes that there was little attempt to convert
them; the emphasis was on the eternal reprobation of Jews as Jews.4°
In Thy Brother's Blood (1950) Malcom Hay, a Scottish lay Roman Catholic,
offers one of the first comprehensive indictments of the Church's obsessional
hostility, and draws attention to the acts of violence that often resulted from
the preaching of the Early Fathers. After the burning of a synagogue, St Ambrose
declared that he, in principle, had set fire to it, and that it had been burnt as
the judgement of God. 4 ' As for what these divines had to say about Jews
themselves, perhaps the example of St Gregory of Nyssa will suffice:
Slayers of the Lord, murderers of the prophets, adversaries of God, haters
of God, men who show contempt for the law, foes of grace, enemies of
their father's faith, advocates of the devil, brood of vipers, slanderers,
scoffers, men whose minds are in darkness, leaven of the Pharisees, assembly
of demons, sinners, wicked men, stoners, and haters of righteousness.42
The apotheosis of such enmity is to be found in the sermons of St John
Chrysostom. His homilies against the Jews, preached in Antioch at the end
of the fourth century, are a model of intemperance and gall. Even allowing
for their context - Chrysostom was anxious to enlighten the Judaizing Christians
who combined membership of the Church with observance of Jewish rituals
- there is no way to excuse the sentiments they express. "Your situation, 0
Jewish people," Chrysostom preached, "becomes more and more disastrous,
and one cannot see showing on your foreheads the slightest ray of hope." To
argue as he did that their misfortunes were brought about by their own turpitude,
and with God's blessing, is to set the tone for centuries of persecution. 43 It
is hardly surprising that there were outbreaks of violence against the Jewish
community in Antioch early in the fifth century. Synagogues were destroyed.
Simon Stylites, the famous pillar saint, intervened to prevent the governor from
making reparations to the Jews. In the sixth century they were expelled from
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Antioch altogether.44
Systematic discrimination against Jews was seemingly inevitable once
Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire. According
to Rosemary Ruether, the laws enacted by the Christian emperors to restrict
the rights of Jews contain a language of "clerical vituperation". 45 But, unlike
pagans and heretics, Jews were at least allowed to practise their beliefs. In
retrospect this was a golden age. As Malcom Hay puts it, "The Dark Ages of
Jewish history in Western Europe date from the First Crusade (1096), which
began and ended with a massacre." 6 As many as ten thousand Jews were killed
on the first day.
The Crusades were essentially a reign of terror, during which fanatics
like the monk Ralph took the opportunity to instigate atrocities against the
"enemy within". St Bernard, Ralph's abbot, repressed the latter's zeal but
continued himself to preach against the Jews. His friend Peter the Venerable,
Abbot of Cluny - "a model of Christian charity", according to one commentator
cited by Hay - was given to doubt "whether a Jew can be really human". "I
lead out from its den a monstrous animal," he continued, "and show it as a
laughing stock in the amphitheatre of the world, in the sight of all the people.
I bring thee forward, thou Jew, thou brute beast, in the sight of all men." He
also preached that it was a duty to hate Jews but not to kill them. 47 Ruether
suggests that the subtlety of such distinctions was apt to get lost in translation:
The fine point of the Church's theory that the Jews, though damnable,
are to be physically preserved to the end of time, although in a state of
"misery", to witness the triumph of the Church, eluded the comprehension
of the mobs. The Church, in turn, proved incapable of understanding that
the mobs merely acted out, in practice, a hatred which the Church taught
in theory and enforced in social degradation wherever possible.48
Peter Abelard was one of the few Christians in the Middle Ages prepared
to question the anti-Jewishnes of the Church's teaching. This teaching was
given new impetus by Innocent III at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. His
plan to establish a Christian commonwealth entailed further degradation for
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Jews, including the wearing of a special badge (a yellow circle - the Nazis
enforced the wearing of a yellow Star of David). The Councils of Breslau (1266)
and Vienna (1267) both decreed, moreover, that Jews should be segregated.49
The theological rationale behind all this was that the Jewish people are
condemned to servitude for their refusal to believe in Christ. Right up to 1948,
Catholic congregations were urged on Good Friday to pray for "the perfidious
Jews" (Oremus et pro perfidis Judaeis) - and to pray standing rather than on
their knees. A nineteenth-century French priest had an explanation for this:
When praying for the perfidious Jews, the faithful do not kneel, as they
do for other prayers, because of the perfidious and derisory genuflections
with which they insulted the Saviour.50
"Perfidious", as Hay points out, is more pejorative than the Latin (which is closer
to "unbelieving" in sense), but that is the epithet which stuck.
It was only too easy to hold Jews responsible for outbreaks of the plague.
Throughout the Middle Ages they were suspected of demonic activities. Ignorance
combined with superstition to brand the Jew as the member of an evil cult.
On a number of occasions Hebrew books were burnt. The Talmud itself was
regarded with horror, a misconception revived during the last century in France
- when one would have been able to read the following, given the tenacity to
wade through thirty volumes on the history of the Catholic Church:
The Talmud not only permits the Jew, but recommends, nay commends
him to cheat and to kill a Christian whenever he can get the opportunity.
This is a fact beyond doubt, which deserves the attention of nations and
kings. '
Ritual-murder accusations became a pretext for looting and massacre.
"When the anti-Semite accuses the Jew of ritual murder," Richard Rubenstein
has observed, "he accuses him of the very crime which he himself intends to
commit." 52 In 1247 a papal bull was published that disputed the myth behind
these accusations, but eight years later the Jews of Lincoln were successfully
prosecuted for the alleged sacrifice of a Christian child. 53 Little Saint Hugh,
whose body was found in a well, is still commemorated in Lincoln Cathedral.
The nineteen Jews who were hanged have no such memorial.
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Jews were also accused of desecrating the host. There was, after all,
profit to be made from any retribution that followed. In this way the confiscation
of Jewish property was made to seem legitimate. In 1290 Jews in England found
themselves faced with expulsion, permitted to take only as much personal
property as they could carry. Sixteen years later, a similar expulsion took place
in France. Ironically, Jews fared best in the Papal States, where they were
protected from such extreme measures, if not from degradation. Pope Paul
IV, however, was to announce in 1555 that there should be no amelioration of
their condition. The Jews were condemned by God to eternal slavery and must
therefore live apart from Christian society. 54
The repercussions of segregation were still felt after the ghetto walls
came down. As Rosemary Ruether writes, "The ghetto Jews of Christian
mythology remained the screen through which western Europe continued to
view the emancipated Jew." 55 Jews were noW held responsible for the decline
of the Church's authority, for secular values in general, for the evils of capitalism.
We should hardly be astonished, then, to discover that the only part of Nazi
ideology "which carried real passionate conviction was ... the hatred of the
Jews". 6 According to Ruether, "Nazism arose as the final repository of all
this heritage of religious and secular anti-Semitism, making Jews responsible
for capitalism and communism simultaneously! The racial theory was new,
but the stereotypes of hatred were old." Even the racial theory was not
completely new: Ruether herself points out that the Nuremberg laws were
foreshadowed four hundred years earlier in Spain by the "laws of purity of
blood".57
The Reformation brought about no fundamental change in theological
attitudes to the Jewish people. We may be puzzled by the fury of Martin Luther's
invective, but we are sadly aware of its consequences. "Verily a hopeless, wicked,
venomous and devilish thing is the existence of these Jews," he wrote, "who
for fourteen hundred years have been, and still are, our pest, torment and
misfortune. They are just devils and nothing more." 58
 Some of his later
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references to Jews are extremely scatological, reinforcing the link with the
devil. 59 One would like to believe that his mind was unbalanced when he wrote
such things. In 1938 the Nazi party honoured the anniversary of his birth with
Kristallnacht (November 10).
Protestants continued to uphold the view that Jews had forfeited their
right to be Jews. Even Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose involvement in the plot
to kill Hitler would cost him his life, was not exempt from this theological
weakness. In a response to the Aryan Clauses of 1933 he argued thus:
The church of Christ has never lost sight of the thought that the "chosen
people", who nailed the redeemer of the world to the cross, must bear the
curse of its action through a long history of suffering.... But the history
of the suffering of this people, loved and punished by God, stands under
the sign of the final home-coming of the people of Israel to its God. And
this home-coming happens in the conversion of Israel to Christ.60
Bonhoeffer was therefore compelled, theologically, to show more concern for
Jewish converts to Christianity than for Jews who remained Jews. Theologians
parted company with Hitler over his failure to distinguish between the two.
The racial myth allowed for no exceptions: all Jews were condemned by birth.
In Your People, My People Roy Eckardt has sought to prove that the
Jews were not in fact responsible for having Jesus put to death. 6 ' This is a
well-intentioned line of argument, but the issue of who ultimately bears
responsibility for the crucifixion is a red herring. It may be comforting to know
that the Romans and not the Jews were to blame, since no one is likely to set
fire to the Vatican as a result; the problem, however, stems from the charge
of deicide itself, which is inherently antisemitic. One has only to consider that
most of the Jews alive at the time of the crucifixion would have been unaware
that a man called Jesus of Nazareth had ever existed, to realize that the
imputation of collective guilt is a calumny. The Augustinian view that God
punishes the Jews for refusing to acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah, albeit they
are to be preserved as negative witnesses to the truth of Christianity, is hardly
less pernicious, even if it has the distinction of greater subtlety.
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Christian Antisemitism Today
Do these prejudices have any currency after Auschwitz? Alas, yes.
Charlotte Klein's Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology highlights numerous
instances of contemporary hostility. Sometimes a prejudice is modified in such
a way as to seem respectable. This is the most heinous kind of self-deception,
if not downright sham. Georg Fohrer, for example, a German Old Testament
scholar, had this to say in 1969:
What then is the deeper reason for the terrible sufferings which have
constantly afflicted Jewry? They are not simply - as Christians frequently
thought - the consequence of rejecting Jesus, still less a punishment for
this.... These sufferings can be understood at most as the result of the
failure of Judaism to perform its task - or of its denial of this task - which
itself includes the rejection of Jesus. Nor are the sufferings of Jewry -
as Jews frequently think - the consequence of the fulfilment of Israel's
divine task, through which it has become the object of mankind's hatred;
for Judaism has not in fact fulfilled its task. It suffers indeed on account
of that task which still faces it, by which ... it is marked, which makes
it seem like a foreign body in the world: the world for which it was intended
to be an example and model, sign and pointer to an existence founded in
God, and - by fulfilling its task - a permanent call to decision for God.
But Jewry suffers also because it has always failed to seize this task, by
understanding it wrongly, refusing to fulfil it, or rejecting it outright, and
seeking security instead in the world in its own way.62
It is revealing that Christian error merits the past tense ("as Christians frequently
thought") while Jewish error merits the present ("as Jews frequently think")
- even though the Christian error in question, that Jewish suffering is a
punishment for the rejection of Jesus, persists today.6
By holding Jews responsible for their own affliction, Fohrer absolves
the real criminals of their guilt. He also sanctions that indifference to the
suffering of others which says, in effect, "They've only themselves to blame."
Had Christians been sent by the train-load to the gas chambers, would Fohrer
have then rebuked them for failing to perform their divine task? Or would
he have hailed them as martyrs, witnesses to the truth, and so on? For a Christian
to accuse Jews of spiritual failure is rubbing salt into the wound. The insinuation
that Jews are preoccupied with the acquisition of wealth ("seeking security
instead in the world in its own way") is, of course, a standard antisemitic jibe.
I don't think we have to dignify it with the name of anti-Judaism.
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The obduracy of some modern theologians is beyond belief. At least
two German Catholics are prepared to ride roughshod over recent history.
"Only because God cannot forget his people ... he chastises it harshly and often,"
Michael Schmaus has written. And according to Heinrich Schlier, "On every
Jew the mark of God's wrath is imprinted." There is support for these ideas
outside Germany too. Pierre Benoit in France, for example, asserts that "every
member of the Jewish race bears the penalty of the crime of Calvary in that
he receives from his race a religion deprived of that messianic flowering which
its God offered to it and which the responsible leaders of this religion did not
want at the decisive moment". 6 Benoit's choice of the word "race" is surely
significant. Like Fohrer, he regards "Israel's failure in its mission" as a cause
of antisemitism rather than a pretext f or it.
Unfortunately, even sympathetic Catholic theologians have failed to
see the connection between conservative dogmatics and popular antisemitism.
Alan Davies makes this point forcefully in Anti-Semitism and the Christian
Mind. 65 The Second Vatican Council appeared to offer the promise of reform,
but its "Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions"
(1965) stopped short of radical change. Roy Eckardt reveals how a reference
that exonerated the Jews of deicide, approved a year earlier, was replaced
in the official Declaration with the more cautious statement that "the Jews
should not be presented as rejected by God or accursed, as if this followed from
the Holy Scriptures". 66 Augustin Cardinal Bea later defended the decision
not to repeal the charge of deicide on the grounds that it would have called
into question the divinity of Christ! According to the Declaration, "Jerusalem
did not recognize the time of her visitation, nor did the Jews, in large number,
accept the Gospel; indeed, not a few opposed its spreading." 6 Michael McGarry
takes issue with Eckardt over the latter's negative interpretation of this final
draft. In an attempt to show it in a kinder light, he cites the statement that
"the Jews still remain most dear to God because of their fathers", only to concede
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that the qualification is "unfortunate " • 6 8
The Protestant churches have also been slow to change. Eckardt provides
a critical analysis of the statement on "Israel: People, Land and State" adopted
by the General Synod of the Reformed Church of Holland in 1970, pointing out
how its various errors stem from an over-literal reading of the New Testament.6
The dangers of an unquestioning belief in scriptural authority are all too plain.
James Daane makes them even plainer:
According to the New Testament records, Jews desired, plotted, and
promoted the execution of Jesus.... No rewriting of history by those
interested in freeing the Jews from responsibility for the crucifixion, or
by script writers of modern movies, dispels these claims of the New
Testament historical records.7°
Such blithe assurance is terrifying. Another Protestant theologian, by contrast,
attacks the inhumanity of this outlook. "The Christians have no one to condemn
but themselves," he writes, "that the cross remains a sign of boundless human
cruelty rather than an arrow of hope pointing to the final victory of the Kingdom
of God."7'
Christian-Jewish Relations
In The Crucifixion of the Jews (1975) this particular theologian - Church
historian Franklin Littell - looks to the State of Israel as a sign of God's continuing
fidelity to his people, and makes support for it the basis of a revitalized
Christianity:
The crucifixion and resurrection of the Jewish people is a sign that God
is not mocked, that pride brings the biggest battalions low in the end, that
the Author and the Judge of history blesses the Suffering Servant and brings
the human hero low.72
The equation of theological truth with the founding of a political state is a
tenuous one, as I argued in Chapter 4, especially where justifying Auschwitz
is concerned. In Your People, My People Roy Eckardt gets round this by appealing
to two levels of perception. "We may celebrate the resurrection of the State
of Israel," he claims, "yet never justify the crucifixion of Auschwitz as
kind of exchange for Israel." It is the eye of faith, apparently, which discerns
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"an ultimate correlation of Auschwitz-Israel".73 In Jews and Christians (1986)
he goes further, making the role of witness to the State of Israel the new
cornerstone of Christian redemption:
The state of Israel may be construed as a liberating, divine-historical event,
which, in addition to being an end in itself for the sake of the Jewish people
and human freedom everywhere, acts to heal the historj that has profaned
the Resurrection of Jesus into a weapon of victimization. '4
The State of Israel, then, is seen as the proof that the Jews are not cursed
by God for rejecting Christ, as well as a test for the sincerity of Christian
penitence. Eckardt's commitment to uprooting antisemitism leads him at times
to assume an authority he doesn't really possess. He champions Jewish autonomy
even in the sight of God, when this is something Jews must decide for themselves:
How is the past to be redeemed? How is the Final Solution finally to be
annihilated? There is no way, save through the radical transformation
of the covenant. The covenant of demand means divine consent to Jewish
oppression. The elect were informed that they were going to have to be
"a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Exod. 19:6). There is no theological
or moral way to give answer to the EndUisung unless we arrange a decent
and fitting burial for this entire idea. There is no way to give answer until
we beat into the dust the myth of the Jew as "suffering servant". The
gestalt beyond all convenantal demands, the forming of full Jewish humanity,
is the birth of the epoch F.S., after the Final Solution.75
Christian theologians must let go of the conviction that they know what is best
for Jews. Dialogue and didacticism are not synonymous.
While much has been done to improve Christian-Jewish relations, the
problem in the end is a theological one, as Rosemary Ruether underlines:
There is no way to rid Christianity of its anti-Judaism, which constantly
takes social expression in anti-Semitism, without grappling finally with
its Christological hermeneutic itself.74
Various attempts have been made to do just that. In "A Statement to our Fellow
Christians", released in the summer of 1973 by a group of Christian theologians
who had worked for four years on the topic of Israel in its several dimensions,
the third clause dealt specifically with Christology:
The singular grace of Jesus Christ does not abrogate the covenantal
relationship of God with Israel (Rom. 11:1-2). In Christ the Church shares
in Israel's election without superseding it. By baptism and faith the Christian,
as the Roman liturgy sa,ys, passes over to the sonship of Abraham and shares
in the dignity of Israel.7
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This is doubtless an improvement on the traditional claim that salvation comes
through Christ and Christ alone, and addressed to other Christians it may have
some value; Jews themselves, however, have no reason to suppose that the
Church shares in Israel's election.
The clause continues by interpreting the survival of the Jewish people
("despite the barbaric persecutions and the cruel circumstances under which
they were forced to live") as a sign that the Covenant remains intact and
concludes with a vote of thanks:
For our spiritual legacy and for all that the Jews have done for the whole
human race we Christians are grateful to God and to the people whom
God has chosen as a special instrument of his kindness.
This in itself is hardly an adequate response to the history of antisemitism.
To be fair, the fifth clause of the Statement does broach the teaching of contempt
(though plays down the role of the New Testament in this), and the Statement
as a whole is directed against theological anti-Judaism. But rediscovering the
Jewish roots of Christianity, which is advocated at the start, is an unlikely
antidote to antisemitism. In saying that Jesus himself was a Jew I am merely
stating the obvious, and yet this has never inhibited religiously-inspired Jew-
hatred. With reference to the crisis in the Middle East, the Church is urged
"to attend to its role as agent of reconciliation", as if the Church had fulfilled
this role in the past. And the final clause is an appeal to enlightened self-interest.
"The pain of the past," it begins, "has taught us that antisemitism is a Pandora's
box from which spring not only atrocities against Jews but also contempt for
Christ."78
Rosemary Ruether takes up this last point in her contribution to
Antisemitism and the Foundations of Christianity. "The modern racial antisemite
from Voltaire to Hitler," she argues, "hates the Jews as a way of hating the
Jewishness in Christianity. He wants to remake his identity on a non-Christian
basis, by nostalgically calling up some heroic pagan self which he imagines existed
before the Western 'soul' was corrupted by this debilitating Jewish faith via
Christianity." 7 9 It is a view shared by a Jewish theologian:
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The ancient Jewish-Christian quarrel over the true Israel led to the
utilization of the original Israel as a surrogate victim for the presumed
sins of the New Israel in effecting the alienation of the German people
from their native traditions.8°
I can only suppose that the racial antisemite has been unable to hate Christians
directly as a matter of expediency. But whatever the grounds for believing
that the Jewishness of Christianity is the real target of modern antisemitism,
we must remember it is Jews who have had to suffer for it.
Ruether describes Nazism as "the demonic anti-Christianity of
ex-Christians",81 an insight that allows us to make a more explicit connection
between Christian antisemitism or anti-Judaism (the distinction is frequently
meaningless in practice) and its secular counterpart. For Christian antisemitism
is also a kind of anti-Christianity, a rejection of things Jewish without which
there would be no Christianity in the first place. That so many Christians,
both in Germany and in Eastern Europe where the killing centres were established,
were gulled into complicity with the enemies of their faith must surely reflect
this. The ascendancy of anti-Christianity throughout Christendom is a measure
of the Church's blindness to its own self-negation. Obsessed by the retention
of temporal power, it has sought to consolidate its authority with Jewish blood
instead of Jewish spirituality. Only as the edifice begins to crumble do the
truly prophetic voices get a hearing.
I do not think it is an exaggeration to describe Rosemary Ruether as
a latter-day prophet. Other theologians have found fault with the historical
accuracy of her work - even the venerable James Parkes has criticized Faith
and Fratricide for being too slipshod, while at the same time commending Ruether
for the courage of her challenge8Z - but on the whole this has been done in
a spirit of defensiveness and does not affect her central thesis. "Without twenty
centuries of Christian vilification of the Jews," she reminds us, "it would be
impossible to understand why it was the Jews, rather than some other group,
that became the particular sacrificial victim of Nazi nationalism." But she
also takes pains to stress that the Christian "final solution" was conversion
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rather than mass murder.83
Is Jesus the Messiah?
Not that Ruether is inclined to let her co-religionists off the hook. She
detects a reluctance on their part to learn about the darker side of the Church's
history. Her own motivation for reversing this trend is not based purely on
the need to come to terms with the past, but also on the desire to give
Christianity a new impetus:
Nothing touches so near to the roots of Christian identity than its relation
to Judaism. The very meaning of Jesus as a historical person and as a bearer
of christological identity for us, the entire patterning of our theological
systems, is profoundly linked with our ways of identifying ourselves over
against the rejected parent religion. To reconsider that relation is, at
the same time, to enter into deep transformations of our own theological
identities. Reflection on our anti-Judaism is both searing judgment and
grace to begin anew.84
This provides an additional rationale, then, for the modified Christology put
forward at the end of Faith and Fratricide, part and parcel of which was the
recognition that the Messiah of Jewish expectation has yet to come, a Messiah,
that is, who will redeem history. "Is it possible to purge Christianity of anti-
Judaism without at the same time pulling up Christian faith?" Ruether had
asked. "Is it possible to say 'Jesus is Messiah' without, implicitly or explicitly,
saying at the same time 'and the Jews be damned'?"85
Ruether has held back from becoming a Jew herself. That would
nevertheless be a logical outcome of her argument:
In practice, Christianity tends to boil down to a religion of grace and good
deeds structurally identical to Judaism in its assumptions about the
unredeemed nature of man and history, except that it is far less sure what
good deeds are commanded and is impenetrably obscurantist about the
meaning of the word "Christ".
Instead, she chooses to look to Judaism to validate her belief in Christ. The
historical Jesus was a faithful Jew, according to Ruether, with no thoughts
of replacing Judaism by another religion, who lived "in lively expectation of
the coming of God's Kingdom and judged his society in its light". This expectation
drove him to his death. "The messianic meaning of Jesus' life, then," Ruether
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concludes, " is paradigmatic and proleptic in nature, not final and fulfilled."86
Acknowledging that there are other authentic paradigms, Ruether
reaffirms her own commitment to Christianity:
The vision which drove Christians into separation from the parental faith,
however unrealized, still determines our religious consciousness and the
way we appropriate the older stories. However much we may repent of
having pursued this vision falsely, we cannot forget our own story. The
messianic encounter which originally inspired us continues to be our
foundational paradigm, through which we appropriate the earlier stories
and out of which our history flows.87
The Messianic encounter she alludes to here is the crucifixion rather than the
resurrection. The substance of Ruether's faith is inevitably attenuated. In
order to preserve Easter yet purge it of its triumphal overtones, she reduces
the resurrection to a symbol of hope. "Easter gives no license to vilify those
who cannot 'see it'," she claims in Antisemitism and the Foundations of
Christianity:
Indeed, we must see that Easter does not cancel the crucifixion at all.
There is no triumph in history. Easter is hope against what remains the
continuing reality of the cross. The crucified messiah is the paradigm
of messianic hope under the conditions of unredeemed human history.88
As for the meaning of "the crucified messiah" (which in the Jewish
tradition would be a contradiction in terms), Ruether explains that "In unredeemed
times the messiah can only appear as the Victim." The crucifixion then becomes
the Christian equivalent of the Holocaust as a lesson in divine powerlessness.
Does this mean that the crucifixion should be regarded as a catastrophe on
a par with the Holocaust? I am sure Ruether does not intend us to draw this
conclusion, but her argument is ambiguous. "Jews do not need the cross of
Jesus to know about destruction and divine abandonment," she asserts. "The
Holocaust needs no interpretation by the cross for them. It is unmediated
reality."89 We could also say that Jews had no need of the cross before the
Holocaust to know about such things, though it was the indirect source of that
knowledge.
The point is that there are grave difficulties about centring one's faith
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on the crucifixion. As a symbol of destruction it can be used to destroy as much
as to enlighten. What it teaches us about divine abandonment is only significant
if Jesus of Nazareth really were the Son of God, which means placing it in the
context of the resurrection. The difference between the crucifixion and the
Holocaust as events should be clear: the one is primarily a religious event,
the other completely historical. The importance of the crucifixion is not that
it happened but, rather, that it is believed to have happened, just as most
Christians continue to believe that the resurrection also happened. The
importance of the Holocaust is that it did happen, whether we believe it or
not.
Christianity, for Ruether, is like the prodigal son. 9 ° In Jews and Christians
Roy Eckardt makes the same analogy. 91 An earlier book by him was called
Elder and Younger Brothers. Malcom Hay suggests a different sibling relationship
in the final title of his pioneering study of Christian antisemitism: Thy Brother's
Blood. But whether Christians are seen as prodigal sons or Cams, their family
ties remain ambivalent. Eckardt has diagnosed the heart of the problem:
We say that we hear God's voice through the "Old Testament", but we are
unable to authenticate our central proclamations in a manner consistent
with that Testament: here is the heart of the Christian problem. There
is just no way to speak of God's "fulfillment of his purpose in Christ" without
implying that this means "fulfillment" for Jews. But the centuries-old
obstacle remains that the Hebrew Bible, Holy Scripture, gives no unequivocal
support to the contention that Jesus was the consummation of Israelite
hopes.92
Like Ruether, Eckardt is forced to recognize the impasse of belief in
a Messiah who is not regarded as such by the very people who await him. Unlike
Ruether, his proposed solution is to abandon Christianity altogether, to deny
God for God's sake. This proposal is rhetorical. Eckardt salvages his vocation
by resorting to paradox:
Certain paradoxical demands appear inescapable: to deplore Christianity,
in the name of Christian faith; to announce the death of the Christian God,
in the name of the living God; to proclaim the death of the resurrected
Christ, in the name of the Christ who may one day come.93
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Making Amends
Eckardt is more intelligible when he appeals to the need for practical
atonement. He points to the example of the German Reconciliation Movement
(Aktion Sühnezeichen), started in 1958 as a way of enabling German young people
to do voluntary work among Jews and other so-called enemies of the Third Reich.
"Love penetrates with the light of redemption into the dark world of human
depravity," Eckardt is moved to announce. "Through deeds of vicarious suffering
- necessarily cleansed and sustained at every moment by the forgiving grace
of God - the fateful power of guilt is at last broken." 94 But is it? The criminal
gets off scot-free while someone else takes the rap. In Eichmann in Jerusalem,
in a parenthetical response to a remark made by Martin Buber after Eichmann's
execution, Hannah Arendt argues that only the guilty can atone for their guilt:
It is quite gratifying to feel guilty if you haven't done anything wrong:
how noble! Whereas it is rather hard and certainly depressing to admit
guilt and repent. The youth of Germany is surrounded, on all sides and
in all walks of life, by men in positions of authority and in public office
who are very guilty indeed but who feel nothing of the sort. The normal
reaction to this state of affairs should be indignation.95
This has implications for the question of Christian responsibility in relation
to Auschwitz. I make no apologies for repeating myself: calls for the confession
of guilt are far less pertinent than Ruether's insistence on tackling the doctrinal
bias that gives rise to antisemitism within the Church. The donning of hair
shirts is no substitute for honest self-criticism. Even the famous Stuttgart
Declaration by the Council of the German Evangelical Church (the Confessing
Church) in October 1945 was largely misplaced - it said too little too late.
Its signatories were anyway men who had least to reproach themselves with,
and, in spite of its penitential tone, there was no explicit reference to the
destruction of the Jews. Thus:
With great pain we say: Unending suffering has been brought by us to many
peoples and countries.6
The shift to an optimistic view of the future - "Now a new beginning is to be
made in our churches" - may be understood as an attempt to move beyond
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contrition, even if, according to one scholar at least, the Confessing Church
was to abandon its oppositional role in the freer circumstances of the post-war
world.97
Are there any grounds for optimism today? Even if we accept Michael
McGarry's resolution of the Christological dilemma - that there are two
complementary covenants - it does not follow that relations between Christians
and Jews will improve, although McGarry hopes they will:
A theological pluralism, fleshed out by a logos-Christology which would
grant and account for a Christ who is Messiah for Christians and for the
abiding validity of the Jewish tradition for Jews, may, in the end, bring
about a new rapprochement between Jew and Christian.9
Alan Davies emphasizes throughout Anti-Semitism and the Christian Mind that
Christians must learn to understand Judaism on its own terms, but seems to
endorse the Liberal Protestant notion that Jews and Christians, as custodians
of an essentially identical revelation, need each other. His prescription for
dialogue to help eliminate mutual misconceptions, by way of a prelude to deeper
dialogue based on mutual respect, is backed up by an appeal from the Christian
side for a diaconate to the Jews that would shoulder responsibility towards
eliminating antisemitism. He is aware all the same of a fundamental tension
between the two faiths. God will resolve who is right at the end of time, he
assures us. tim the meantime, each faith has its own distinctive witness to
bear. it99
Davies bases his ecumenism on an interpretation of the life of Jesus:
Jesus was unconcerned with converting people to a religion, but deeply
concerned with serving them through his personal enactment of the role
of a servant. His ministry provides the church with its true pattern of
mission. 100
This enables Davies to skirt the vexed question of the divinity of Christ. Roy
Eckardt follows suit. "Jesus was a specialist in celebrating the image of God,"
he claims. "The integrity and the irreplaceableness of Christianity," he continues,
"center in Christian people and what they do rather than in an exclusivist dogma.
John Hick identifies the peculiarity of Christianity as the response of discipleship
to Jesus of Nazareth." 101
 But large numbers of Christian people would be unable
- 208 -
to accept that Jesus is not the Messiah in an exclusive sense.
For evangelical Christians, the only true soteriology is faith in the
Atonement. An illustration of what this means in practice is provided by the
front-page story of the Evangelical Times, May 1985. Essentially a review
article on The Cross and the Swastika by F.T. Grossmith, it recounts the
conversion to Christianity of some of the Nazi war criminals awaiting sentence
at Nuremberg. The American army chaplain given credit for this, Henry Gerecke,
had no doubts as to the authenticity of these conversions, at least not as the
article describes it:
Perhaps the most remarkable conversion was the melting of Ribbentrop,
a cold, harsh man, disposed to argue and berate, and at first giving no sign
of penitence. One of those condemned to die, he did in fact speak of the
Lamb of God at the time of his death. "Then he turned to me and said
- and my heart still warms to think of it - 'I'll see ou again.'" That was
the comment of the one who stood by him to the end.10'
The thrust of the article seems to be that the greater the sinner saved,
the greater the saviour (Jesus Christ, that is). The conversion of von Ribbentrop
would therefore represent a real coup. This was the man who in September
1941 issued instructions to the effect that the evacuation of Jews from the
various countries of Europe should be done with speed; the man who complained
to Mussolini that "Italian military circles, and sometimes the German army
itself, lacked a proper understanding of the Jewish question". 103 The Jews
themselves, excepting those who had been baptized, were damned by their
unbelief. First, hell on earth, then hell. If we concur with this model of salvation,
Ribbentrop the mass murderer is in heaven while his victims endure eternal
torment. The very least we can do for them is to let their ashes rest.
"After Auschwitz the Christian churches no longer wish to convert the
Jews." Thus spoke Gregory Baum at an international symposium on the Holocaust
in 1974.104 If only it were true. Scholars often live in ignorance of the gulf
between the enlightened exchanges that take place at prestigious conferences
and the unreconstructed prejudices in society at large. It's almost as if these
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scholars were too busy attending such conferences to notice how far the rest
of the world lags behind. In Long Night's Journey into Day Roy and Alice Eckardt
hold up a monograph on Die Judenfrage ("The Jewish Question") as an example
of what might be called unrepentant Christianity. 105
 Published in 1970 as part
of a series devoted to "the strengthening of biblical faith and Christian life"
and designed to reach large audiences in the churches, Die Judenfrage moves
from a call for the reconciliation of Jews and Christians to an attack on the
Jewish faith, the conclusion of which is that there can be no reconciliation
until the Jews conquer their sins and turn to Christ (at which point antisemitism
will cease to be a problem, it is claimed). The Eckardts refer to the debate
within some German church circles over the tendency towards "a spiritual Final
Solution". They quote Rudolf Pfisterer as saying that the Christian attempt
to convert Jews is "nothing more than the continuing work of the Holocaust".'06
This is clearly an exaggeration - conversion is qualitatively different from
genocide (as the Nazis themselves demonstrated in their contempt for anyone
deemed to have Jewish blood) - but not without point.
The churches have no reason to be complacent. The vitality as well
as the integrity of the Christian tradition are dependent on a thorough reappraisal
of its attitude to Jews. Theologians like James Parkes, Malcom Hay, Roy
Eckardt, Franklin Littell, Alan Davies, and, above all, Rosemary Ruether, have
provided the necessary groundwork for institutional change. What matters
finally, though, is the content of official pronouncements and the sermons being
preached every Sunday. There is little evidence that popular beliefs have been
seriously affected by the Holocaust. Jews are still thought to be responsible
for the death of Christ. 107
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CONCLUSION
I fail to understand! thought Herzog, as this good man, jowls silently
moving, got off the stand. I fail to ... but this is the difficulty with people
who spend their lives in humane studies and therefore imagine once cruelty
has been described in books it is ended. Of course he really knew better
- understood that human beings would not live so as to to be understood
by the Herzogs. Why should they?
Saul Bellow, Herzog
It is now just over a month since I attended an international conference
on the Holocaust in Oxford.' Emblazoned with the title "Remembering f or
the Future", this conference brought home to me how much has already been
forgotten. Survivors present complained of being treated as invalids or as objects
of curiosity. They resented what they felt to be the implications of research
into the effect of the trauma on their children. 2 "It's not a genetic disease,"
one pleaded. All the same, being a survivor has taken its toll. Those like Primo
Levi who felt it incumbent on themselves to bear witness, have often paid a
high price for their loss of privacy. Those who, on the contrary, drew a veil
over the past have sometimes paid an even higher price for keeping silent.
We are anxious to commemorate the suffering but unable as yet to confront
it. It is only proper that survivors should insist on reminding us of their humanity.
This is what the Nazis sought to deprive them of.
But we must not lose sight of the destruction either. Lucy IJawidowicz
estimates that sixty-seven percent of Europe's Jewish population was annihilated
in the Final Solution. 3 This staggering fact - the murder of nearly six million
Jews for being Jewish - where it has evoked a response at all from non-Jews,
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has led to a form of cultural necrophilia which it has been one of my chief
concerns to question here. The confusion as to what is appropriate and what
is not, however, still remains. In a recently published textbook on Approaches
to Auschwitz (1987), written by a Jewish and a Christian theologian (Richard
Rubenstein and John Roth respectively), William Styron's Sophie's Choice is
one of the half dozen or so literary responses to the Holocaust put forward
as seminal works of art.
My own thoughts on Sophie's Choice were made clear in Chapter 3. Let
me reiterate my conviction that it is an execrable travesty of the experience
of being a victim. Rubenstein and Roth begin their defence of it thus:
The novel's importance stems from its sustained reflection on the significance
of choosing in a context of human domination. For if some Holocaust
literature disillusions us about what is possible, Styron's story shows how
victims themselves can be put in a position of participating, not willingly
but still actively, in their own demise. This they do by making choices,
a reality that subverts the optimistic assumption that choice makes life
worth living and substitutes instead the realization that choices may make
life unbearable. Under Nazi pressure, Jews and other victims still had
to decide what to do. If those choices rarely permitted more than opting
only between evils, which were not even clearly differentiated between
"lesser" or "greater", the choices were no less real, and the Nazi scheme
of destruction entailed that their victims had to make them.4
I can only assume that we have been reading different novels. Sophie Zawistowska
is primarily a sexual victim, an erotic sacrifice, as I put it. This has very little
to do with choosing and a great deal to do with the author's erotomania.
For most Jewish victims, moreover, choice-making was irrelevant once
they reached Auschwitz. Dr Mengele and his assistants chose: one line for
immediate gassing, the other for a more prolonged death from starvation,
beatings, and exposure. Even Sophie's so-called choice, exceptional and therefore
of no general significance, is not really a choice. When we speak of choosing,
we imply a context of responsibility. If someone forces you to choose which
of your two children to send to the gas chambers, you are no longer responsible
for what happens. It is ridiculous to dignify this kind of torture with the notion
of a choice.
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"Although criticized for being preoccupied with sex, unscrupulously mixing
fact and fiction, and substituting caricatures for characters," Rubenstein and
Roth contend, "suffice it to say here that Sophie's Choice rises far above such
objections." Suffice it not, gentlemen. This fails to take into account the passage
I cited in which Sophie is subjected to sexual humiliation by her Jewish lover
Nathan. "The merits of Styron's work are sufficiently obvious," the authors
assume. "Most Americans who approach Auschwitz," they go on to claim,
"especially but not exclusively non-Jews, will find much of Stingo in themselves."5
But only if they are men. This is either a gross exaggeration, anyway, or a
terrible indictment of American culture. I do not understand why anyone should
want to ignore the obvious defects of Styron's work. Are some men so at ease
with the colonization of female sexuality that they can embrace such prurient
versions of the Holocaust without reflecting on the violence at the heart of
them?
But if the argument over the worth of Sophie's Choice is destined to
continue, one hopes that the book itself (and others like it) will have transient
appeal. New disasters create new fashions, which is hardly reassuring but does
at least prevent us from regarding the age's voyeurism as specific to the death
camps. Rather, the trivialization of the Holocaust may be seen as symptomatic
of a larger failure to impede the dynamic of atrocity in the world at large.
Another aspect of this trivialization that needs to be addressed, however,
is the tendency, deplored by Primo Levi among others, to sanctify the victims.
As Etty Hillesum wrote in her diary in July 1942, barely a year before she herself
would perish in Auschwitz, "Many who are indignant about injustices are only
indignant because the injustices are being inflicted on them. Their indignation
is skin-deep." 6 The victims, after all, were human, which is the whole reason
for protesting against their destruction. If they were guilty of no crime, neither
were they preternaturally innocent. It seems crass to imagine that their sacrifice
has any redeeming value: it was involuntary and without purpose. Suffering
so extreme - call it affliction - is neither ennobling nor exemplary.
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I believe that the quest for signs of God's presence in the midst of such
desolation is inappropriate. It is simply unforgivable when this becomes a way
of denying the catastrophe that Auschwitz represents. The canonization of
Maksymilian Kolbe is a case in point. Were one to take Diana IJewar's
hagiography of this Polish priest at face value - and the title Saint of Auschwitz
makes it quite plain what that would entail - one might easily overlook the
irrelevance of Kolbe's martyrdom to the fate of the Jews. Leaving aside the
question of whether or not Kolbe was himself an antisemite, except to note
in passing Dewar's glib response to this question,7 the fact is he gave up his
life for a fellow Pole. He had been deported to Auschwitz in the first place
not for helping Jews, but because he was the founder of the Militia of the
Immaculate, an order that combined devotion to the Virgin Mary with Polish
nationalism.
The man whom Kolbe volunteered to replace (one of ten condemned
to die in reprisal for someone's escape) had cried out that he had a wife and
family, as Dewar tells it, so it is disingenuous of Dewar to then suggest that
his identity was immaterial:
Kolbe died a lonely and seemingly anonymous death. He could not rely
on the subject of his sacrifice to talk about it, and the identity of that
man was immaterial; a stranger, he could have been an atheist, heretic,
Jew or Freemason.8
Perhaps it was a coincidence that Franciszek Gajowniczek turned out to be
a devout Catholic, but his Polish identity would have been no secret. Which
is not to belittle Kolbe's sacrifice, only to question the use that has been made
of it. Kolbe died on 14 August 1941. It was not until the following month that
the first gassings were carried out in Auschwitz - on an "experimental" basis
in Block 11 (the gas chambers at Birkenau had yet to be constructed) - and not
until the Wannsee Conference held on 20 January 1942 that the Final Solution
was formally put into effect. 9 Dewar's lament for "the crucifixion of Poland"
and insistence that "priests came second to Jews in Hitler's hate-list",' 0 lead
one to suspect that she wishes to appropriate Auschwitz as a symbol of Christian
suffering. Kolbe was canonized by Pope John Paul II in October 1982, but to
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call him " saint of Auschwitz" is wilfully misleading.
We may discern a similar disregard for historical accuracy in Thomas
Keneally's transformation of Oskar Schindler into a kind of secular saint.11
The emphasis on the individual's noble and courageous deeds reduces the context
of near-total destruction to a dark backcloth against which these deeds shine
brighter by contrast. Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who helped to
save thousands of Jewish lives in Budapest, is another name that springs to
mind. John Bierman's account of his exploits and later disappearance into the
Soviet prison system, Righteous Gentile (1981), may even have provided a model
for Schindler's Ark. The very idea of a Righteous Gentile appears to have inspired
the unwarranted conclusion that the heroic behaviour of a few is sufficient
to expiate the complicity of the many.
Less dramatic, and therefore largely ignored, are the daily acts of kindness
that allow us to perceive a glimmer of humanity in the most inhuman
circumstances. These anonymous demonstrations of virtue, just as heroic in
their own way, always involved the risk of severe punishment. Emmanuel
Ringelbium, the archivist of the Warsaw ghetto (himself killed with his wife
and son on 7 March 1944), records in his journal entry for 19 November 1941,
for example, that a Christian had been killed that day for throwing a sack of
bread over the ghetto wall. 12 There is your true martyr, if martyrs are what
you seek.
Rubenstein and Roth devote a chapter of Approaches to Auschwitz to
a study of relations between Christians and Jews during the Holocaust (Chapter
7), highlighting the part played by Righteous Gentiles but bemoaning, too, the
failure of the churches to offer more resistance to the Nazi regime. They also
provide a chapter on "The Silence of God" (Chapter 10) that ends with a curious
response to the tension between being unable to affirm traditional beliefs after
the Holocaust and yet electing to continue with Jewish observance. "As the
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horror of the Holocaust recedes in time," we are told, "religious Jews, although
greatly reduced in number, may once again find themselves reducing the
dissonance by declaring with the traditional Prayer Book that 'because of our
sins all this has come upon us'. That time has not yet come, but it may be on
its way." 3 But of the various attempts to incorporate the suffering into a pattern
of redemption, this is the least tenable. Not only does it entail regarding Hitler
and the SS as instruments of God's will, as Rubenstein himself pointed out in
After Auschwitz; 14 it also makes light of the suffering of others.
What is forgotten is that the criminals themselves, even when brought
to justice, have shown little sign of remorse. As time passes, the scale of the
crime will inevitably appear to diminish. Other atrocities vie for our attention.
But the crime remains unchanged. It is the world that is no longer the same.
As Hannah Arendt has observed, "It is in the very nature of things human that
every act that has once made its appearance and has been recorded in the history
of mankind stays with mankind as a potentiality long after its actuality has
become a thing of the past." 15
 It happened, it can happen again.
Such a conclusion lacks originality, perhaps, but that does not make it
less true. The difficulty is to establish what else can be said that isn't simply
an evasion or an invitation to despair. As time passes, the unspeakable becomes
the unspoken. The witnesses decrease in number. Their erstwhile persecutors
grow old and die. A different enemy is abroad. The watchword is reconciliation.
A few years ago, however, the Times published a thoughtful editorial on the
question of Christian responsibility in relation to the Holocaust, at the end
of which it stated:
The real problem of evil is how it is to be forgiven, and by whom.16
This became the theme of a couple of articles to follow.
The first of these articles, "The Holocaust Must Not Be Forgotten", by
Rabbi Albert Friedlander, was published in the Times on 4 May 1985, on the
eve of President Reagan's ill-advised visit to the cemetry at Bitburg (where
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members of the SS are buried). Friedlander's central premise is that forgiveness
comes from God and not by proxy. The living can only forgive the wrongs done
to them; they cannot forgive on behalf of the dead) 7 Anthony Phillips, Chaplain
of St John's College, Oxford, and respected by Jews for his involvement in
interfaith dialogue, wrote an article in reply, published on June 8, under the
heading "Why the Jews Should Forgive". "Without forgiveness there can be
no healing within the community," he argued, "no wholeness, holiness." He
went further, asserting that failure to forgive "adds to the sum total of evil
in the world and dehumanizes the victims in a way the oppressors could never
on their own achieve". But none of this prepared the reader for the
extraordinarily careless remark with which Phillips ended his homily:
In remembering the Holocaust, Jews hope to prevent its recurrence: by
declining to forgive, I fear that they unwittingly invite it.'8
This strikes me as a continuation of antisemitism by other means. The
Jews remain a "problem", we are led to believe, even if Hitler's uncompromising
solution is viewed with horror. It is not that Phillips hates the Jews. Far from
it. They are God's chosen people. But the logic of his conclusion is that they
bring trouble on themselves. This is the logic of genocide: the victims are
to blame. Moreover, when Phillips calls on Jews to exercise forgiveness, which
he clearly regards as the Christian thing to do, he ignores the fact that those
who need to be forgiven have rarely acknowledged that what they did (and what
they did was murder Jewish men, women and children on a scale hitherto unknown)
was wrong. His prescription for wholeness is anodyne, unrelated to the guilt
of the perpetrators.
Phillips and others like him refuse to accept that something irreparable
has taken place. Rather than confront the reality of Auschwitz, they invoke
a concept of forgiveness that is tantamount to forgetting. Their amorphous
love allows of no distinction between victim and executioner, as if the lamb
were already lying down with the lion. This is not love but a denial of injustice.
To forgive the unrepentant is to condone their offence.
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Jews do not need instruction from Christians in the practice of virtue,
however kindly it is meant. There is nothing kind about theological imperialism.
Let me refer once more to the chance encounter, some years after the war,
between Primo Levi and the Dr Muller who had been his overseer in the chemical
laboratory at Auschwitz. As we saw in Chapter 1, Levi's record of their
correspondence shows how Muller failed utterly to grasp the enormity of what
had happened. He did at least read the copy of If This Is a Man Levi sent him,
but wrote back to the author that he perceived in it "an overcoming of Judaism,
a fulfillment of the Christian precept to love one's enemies". It seems fitting
that Prirno Levi should have the last word:
I declared myself ready to forgive my enemies, and perhaps even to love
them, but only when they showed certain signs of repentance, that is, when
they ceased being enemies. In the opposite case, that of the enemy who
remains an enemy, who perseveres in his desire to inflict suffering, it is
certain that one must not forgive him: one can try to salvage him, one
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